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From serious violations of human rights, international law derives a set of 
consequences that fall to the responsible states. These consequences take the form of 
secondary obligations arising from primary rules and standards, which guide governments in 
the process of coming to terms with a violent past. This thesis argues that some of these legal 
constraints, because of the manner in which they have been developed in practice, may affect 
the way wrongdoing states choose to deal with their past. As a result, they influence the 
processes of memory-making within societies. Through the legal analysis of international 
norms and their application to, and implementation in, situations of gross and systematic 
human rights abuses, this research develops the concept of a duty of memory under 
international law. In so doing, it offers a critical assessment of the ways international law may 
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The passing of time imposes (…) the duty of remembrance and 
emphasizes the need for it. Each person has a “spiritual patrimony” to 
preserve, hence the need to cultivate memory to preserve identity, both 
at personal and collective levels. Oblivion enhances the vulnerability 
of the human condition, and cannot be imposed (not even by “legal” 
contrivances, such as amnesty or the statute of limitations): there is an 
ethical obligation of remembrance. 
1
 
(Judge Antonio Augusto Cançado Trindade ) 
                                                 
1
 IACtHR, Case of Gutiérrez-Soler v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 
12, 2005 Series C No. 132, Separate Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade, “El Deber de Memoria y Su 






The Duty of Memory 
From serious violations of human rights, international law derives a set of 
consequences that fall to the responsible states. These consequences take the form of 
secondary obligations arising from primary rules and standards, which guide governments in 
the process of coming to terms with a violent past. This thesis argues that some of these legal 
constraints, because of the manner in which they have been developed in practice, may affect 
the way wrongdoing states choose to deal with their past. As a result, they influence the 
processes of memory-making within societies. Through the legal analysis of international 
norms and their application to, and implementation in, situations of gross and systematic 
human rights abuses, this research develops the concept of a duty of memory under 
international law. In so doing, it offers a critical assessment of the ways international law 
influences official representations of the past in the present, playing the role of vector of 
memory. 
The thesis develops the concept of a ‘duty of memory’ in the framework of 
international law. Of course, here, the state’s duty of memory is not understood as a state duty 
to remember. States cannot remember, since remembering is a particularly human activity. 
Yet, states can – and, as I will argue in the thesis, sometimes must – undertake certain 
activities that influence the way memories are shaped, circulated, and changed within society. 
I therefore refer to the duty of memory to indicate the set of states’ behaviours that are 
compelled by international norms, and that may have an impact on the processes of memory-
making. The two constitutive elements of this concept have a precise, theoretical content. 
First, the concept of duty, which suggests that these behaviours are induced by international 
legal norms that prevent states from freely determining their relationship with the past. And 
second, the concept of memory, as the focus of this research, that points to the subject that 
these behaviours touch upon, id est the processes of reading, understanding, and representing 
past violence. 
As a set of behaviours constrained by law, the duty of memory is conceived as the 
result of a puzzle. The pieces which form this puzzle are the different duties borne by states 
2 
that orient governments in relation to the past. These duties, in turn, are parts of the content of 
distinct international norms pieced together. Therefore, the research aims at building the 
puzzle, by identifying its components, while clarifying their legal bases. As a result of the 
analysis, in conclusion, this puzzle will be completed. The pieces that constitute the ‘duty of 
memory’ – defined at a first stage as consisting of the need for states to take action to ensure 
that events of the past marked by widespread violence be recognized and remembered - form a 
whole. Put together, the ‘duty of memory puzzle’ suggests the impact of international legal 
norms on the process of a nation to read, and work through its mourning past. 
The Demand for Memory and the Relevance of this Research 
In 1598, in an effort to put an end to the bloody religious war between Catholics and 
Huguenots that, in the sixteenth century, afflicted France for over thirty years, King Henry IV 
issued the Edict of Nantes, which was directed toward re-establishing peace and unity in the 
kingdom. To that end, the Edict set out, ordering: 
Premierement, que la memoire de toutes choses passées d'une part et d'autre, 
depuis le commencement du mois de mars mil cinq cens quatre vingtz cinq 
jusques à nostre avenement à la couronne, et durant les autres troubles 
preceddens et à l'occasion d'iceulx, demourera estaincte et assoupie, comme de 
chose non advenue. Et ne sera loisible ny permis à noz procureurs generaulx ny 
autres personnes quelzconques, publiques ny privées, en quelque temps ny pour 
quelque occasion que ce soit, en faire mention, procés ou poursuitte en aucunes 
courtz ou jurisdictions que ce soit.
2
 
The King deemed that amnesia was the only possible condition for the society to 
achieve closure on the abhorrent past, and to walk toward a different era of peace. 




Four hundred years later, in 1995, in the struggle to come to terms with the thirty years 
of dictatorship and violence that Chile had faced, another demand to forget resounded loud in 
the process of transition to peace, notably worded by the General Augusto Pinochet: 
Es mejor quedarse callado y olvidar. Es lo único que debemos hacer. Tenemos 
que olvidar. Y esto no va a ocurrir abriendo casos, mandando a la gente a la 
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Édit de Nantes, 1598, XII, 01 [emphasis added]. The original text is available at 
http://elec.enc.sorbonne.fr/editsdepacification.  
3




cárcel. OL-VI- DAR, esta es la palabra, y para que esto ocurra, los dos lados 
tienen que olvidar y seguir trabajando.
4
 
In both cases, oblivion was called upon to turn the page of the past, and move toward 
the future. And yet, whilst the promise of freedom of conscience offered by the Edict tried to 
compensate for the suffering of oblivion, and put at least a temporary end to the ferocity of 
war, Pinochet’s call to the nation to forget was perceived as an unacceptable offence to the 
dignity of victims, and stridently clashed with the demands of truth and justice that victims’ 
groups and the civil society were loudly asking for. In this case, the demand to forget could 
not be satisfied. Another claim urged the nation to work through its past and acknowledge its 
brutalities, as a conditio sine qua non to proceed in the transition. The first Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission was therefore established in Chile with the objective to clarify the 
historical truth of violations, to restore victims’ dignity, and to pass on the warning of the 
atrocity to future generations: Nunca Mas! 
The tension between remembering and forgetting, admittedly, is intrinsic to every 
process of coming to terms with past trauma. Nietzsche formulated this issue, questioning 
when it becomes necessary to forget the past in order not to bury the present, and how to 
determine that threshold between remembering and forgetting.
5
 I am not convinced that a final 
answer to this question can be advanced in general terms, neither from an ethical nor from a 
political point of view, or a general threshold can be set.
6
 And yet, the remembering-forgetting 
dilemma has certainly characterized the twentieth century and its brutalities, while the 
emergence of the human rights discourse has definitely influenced this trade-off. Therein lies 
the interest and relevance of this research. 
The whole contemporary universal human rights claim was built upon the ethical 
imperative to remember the atrocity which marked the Second War World. The narrative of 
the Holocaust was permanently engraved on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a 
                                                 
4
 Pinochet, A., “Speech to the Nation”, 13 September 1995, delivered two days after the 22th 
anniversary of the 1973 golpe. 
5
 Nietzche, F., Untimely meditations, ed. Breazeale, D., trans. Hollingdale, R.J. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 62. 
6
 On the ethics of memory, see Margalit, A., The ethics of memory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2002); Wyschogrod, E., An Ethics of Remembering: History, Heterology, and the Nameless 
Others (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
4 
founding myth of the universal human rights movement.
7
 Responding to that stringent 
imperative, state leaders have increasingly made public apologies for historical injustices 
committed by nation-states in different regions of the world, and narratives of mass violence 
have become part of the identity of the states’ history.
8
 
This call for memory finds further support in a number of trends at the international 
level. The progressive rejection of amnesty laws in relation to the most serious crimes; the 
widespread practice of establishing truth commissions in the aftermath of systematic violence, 
with the aim of providing violence-torn societies with a historical account of the violations;
9
 
the increasing commitment of international institutions and civil society organizations to 
preserving and disseminating knowledge about the past, are all indicators of the need for 
memory in the process of making sense of past atrocities. Accordingly, transitional justice 
scholarship nowadays agrees on recognizing memory as one of the pillars which should guide 




                                                 
7
 The second preamble clause recalls the “barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of 
mankind”. UN GA, Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR], 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), available 
at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3712c.html . 
8
 The literature on official apologies is abundant. See, inter alia, Barkan, E., Karn, A., eds., Taking 
wrongs seriously. Apologies and reconciliation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); Gibney, M. and 
others, eds., The age of apology: facing up to the past (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); 
Batchelor, D., “Performing reconciliation: a performance approach to the analysis of political apologies” in 
Critical Perspective to Transitional Justice, eds. Palmer, N. et al., (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2012). 
9
 On the difficulty of conceptualizing the idea of truth and the tension between historical and judicial 
truth, much has been written. The concept of truth has been examined by the most known philosophers, crossing 
from classical to post-modernist thought. From Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Immanuel Kant, John Locke, Stuart 
Mill, Friedrich Nietzsche, Jacques Derrida, Heidegger and more, this concept has been constructed and 
understood in the most different ways. For a review of the main positions, see Naqvi, Y., “The right to the truth in 
international law: fact or fiction?” International Review of the Red Cross 88, no. 862 (2006): 249 – 254. On the 
distinction between legal and historical truth, see also, inter alia, Koskenniemi, M., “Between Impunity and 
Show Trials”, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 6 (2002): 1-35; Todorov, T., Mémoire du Mal, 
tentation du Bien: enquête sur le siècle. (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2000); Resta, G. and Zeno-Zencovich, V., “La 
storia ‘giuridificata’”, in Riparare Risarcire Ricordare. Un dialogo tra storici e giuristi, eds. Resta, G. and Zeno-
Zencovich, V. (Napoli: Editoriale Scientifica, 2012), 46-47; Rodotá, S., “Il Diritto Alla Veritá”, ibid. 
10
 See, for instance, the work of the “Truth and Memory Project” of the International Center for 
Transitional Justice, at: http://www.ictj.org/our-work/transitional-justice-issues/truth-and-memory. The 
contribution of the transitional justice scholarship to the issue of memory is further explored in Chapter I of this 
thesis, where the relevant literature in this field is reviewed. Infra, Chapter I. From the perspective of the 
historians, moreover, Berber Bevernage argues that, in cases of historical injustices, “the option of a collective 
amnesia has lost credit, not only because it is deemed unjust but also because it is no longer considered adequate 
as a tool for putting the past to rest”. Bevernage, B., History, Memory and State Sponsored Violence: time and 
justice. (New York: Routledge, 2012), 12. 
 
5 
The demand for memory has progressively, and necessarily, entered legal institutions, 
pointing to a process of ‘juridification of memory’. 
11
 Literature addressing this process of 
memory juridification – looking at the relationship between law and memory-making 
processes – is flourishing.
12
 From the perspective of international law, claims related to the 
past are currently challenging international courts in applying traditional principles of 
international law and human rights law. Few years ago, the Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights issued the ruling for the Kononov case, where the application of the 
non-retroactivity principle in criminal law indirectly caused the Court to shake well-
established narratives about the partisan resistance against the Nazi-German occupation of 
Latvia during World War II.
13
 The decisions of the Italian Corte di Cassazione to award 
damages to victims of Nazi war crimes
14
 generated a heated debate about the traditional 
regime of state immunity; the debate was subsequently referred to the International Court of 
Justice.
15
 National laws which criminalize the denial of historical atrocities challenge the core 
principles of freedom of expression in national and international courts, raising important 
issues about the appropriate ways to discuss the past.
16
 Human rights bodies that are called to 
adjudicate cases related to patterns of systematic state-sponsored violence are furthermore 
                                                 
11
 The concept of “juridification” – as it is used in this thesis – recalls the German idea of Ver-
rechtlichung, explained and used by Resta and Zeno-Zencovich as the progressive assimilation of human 
activities – originally free or regulated only by social constraints – to legal rules, which are normative both in the 
source that enacts them and in the orders they prescribe. Resta, G. and Zeno-Zencovich, V., “La storia 
‘giuridificata’”, 16. 
12
 See Ch. I, para. 2.1. 
13
 ECtHR [GC], Kononov v. Latvia. App. No. 36376/04. Judgment of 17 May 2010. The case had such a 
big impact on the perception and representation of the events of World War II in Russia that Mikhail Margelov, 
chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation, stated: 
“Strasbourg against Nuremburg. Russia must reconsider the perspectives for its participation in international 
judicial instances.” Speech of 24 May 2010, quoted by Bowring, B. “The ECtHR Grand Chamber judgment in 
Kononov v Latvia (17 May 2010): is the Russian Federation correct in its understanding of the relationship 
between politics and international law?” International Justice 2 No.3 (2012), 7. 
14
 Since the landmark Ferrini case, the Court has reiterated its position in several subsequent decisions. 
Corte di Cassazione (Sezioni Unite), Ferrini v. Repubblica Federale di Germania. Judgment n° 5044, 2 March 
2004. See also, more recently, Milde, Corte di Cassazione (First Criminal Section). Judgment n°. 1072, 21 
October 2008; Corte di Cassazione (Sezioni Unite), Mantelli and ors. Judgment n°. 4201/8, 29 May 2008. 
15
 ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening). Judgment of 3 
February 2012, I.C.J. Reports 2012: 99. See also the subsequent decision of the Italian Constitutional Court. 
Judgment n° 238/2014, 22 October 2014. 
16
 On the issue of negationism, national and international practice, and the consequent international 
debate from the human rights perspective, see infra, Ch. VI. 
6 
playing an increasing role – wittingly or unwittingly – in the task of interpreting the past, and 
writing history through legal judgments.
17
 
The call for remembering past atrocities has also been echoed in some international 
legal instruments. Already in the nineties, the UN Special Rapporteur Louis Joinet, in a study 
on the impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations, recognized that “the knowledge of 
the oppression it has lived through is part of a people's national heritage and as such must be 
preserved”.
18
 The “duty to remember” that follows from that statement was therefore 
constructed as a mechanism of prevention against the mystification of history, in the form of 
revisionisms or negationisms.
19
 As such, it was formally included as part of the updated Set of 
Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat 
Impunity (hereinafter Principles against Impunity or Principles to Combat Impunity).
20
 
Principle 3 provides the terms of the duty: 
A people’s knowledge of the history of its oppression is part of its heritage and, 
as such, must be ensured by appropriate measures in fulfilment of the State’s 
duty to preserve archives and other evidence concerning violations of human 
rights and humanitarian law and to facilitate knowledge of those violations. 
Such measures shall be aimed at preserving the collective memory from 
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 See, for instance, the discussion on the impact of the IACtHR’s judgment Castro Castro v. Peru on 
the memory-processes in Peru, Infra, Ch.V. For an analysis of the role of international courts in making history, 
see, inter alia, Wilson, R. A., Writing history in international criminal trials (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011); Osiel, M., Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law (New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction, 
1997); White, E. B., “History in Courthouse: The Presentation of World War II Crimes in U.S. Courts Sixty 
Years Later”, in Nazi crimes and the law, eds. Stoltzfus, N., and Friedlander, H. (Washington, D.C.: German 
Historical Institute; Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 173–195; Specifically with 
regard to the Nuremberg trial and its legacy, see the different contributions included in Mettraux, G., ed., 
Perspective on the Nuremberg Trial (Oxford, New York: OUP, 2008). 
18
 CHR, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Revised Final report 
prepared by Mr. Joinet on the question of the impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations (civil and 
political), 2 October 1997. UN. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1, para. 17, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3b00f4298.pdf. 
19
 Ibid. On the phenomenon of negationisms and its criminalization by national laws see also infra, Ch. 
VI. 
20
 CHR, Report of the independent expert to update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity, Diane 
Orentlicher. Addendum: Updated set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through 
action to combat impunity, [hereinafter, Updated Set of Principles to Combat Impunity]. UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 18 February 2005, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/42d66e7a0.html. 
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The ethical imperative to remember has further been transposed in the legal language 
in courtrooms. The establishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, as well as historical 
domestic trials such as the Eichmann one, were driven, at least in part, by the moral 
responsibility to inform future generations about the horrors of the war. The oft-cited Justice 
Jackson’s words, US Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, well express this urgency, when saying: 
Unless we write the record of this movement with clarity and precision, we 
cannot blame the future if in days of peace it finds incredible accusatory 




More recently, Judge Cançado Trindade, in his separate opinion to the case Gutiérrez-
Soler v. Colombia, meaningfully articulated the ethical duty to remember in the following 
manner: 
The passing of time imposes (…) the duty of remembrance and emphasizes the 
need for it. Each person has a “spiritual patrimony” to preserve, hence the need 
to cultivate memory to preserve identity, both at personal and collective levels. 
Oblivion enhances the vulnerability of the human condition, and cannot be 
imposed (not even by “legal” contrivances, such as amnesty or the statute of 
limitations): there is an ethical obligation of remembrance.
23
  
Yet, in spite of the strong ethical demand for memory and memorialization in the 
aftermath of mass atrocities, and despite the growing attention to the different processes of 
memory-juridification, the legal nature and foundation of this demand has not been adequately 
explored by international legal scholarship. To what extent can this call for remembering be 
framed in legal terms? In other words – from the perspective of international law –, to what 
extent is there a state ‘obligation to memory’ with regard to past atrocities, and, if any, what 
would this entail concretely? Stepping back from the ethical assessment of the demand for 
memory, this thesis aims to fill this gap in the literature, and originally contributes to the 
development of a theoretical legal framework in which such a demand can be placed. 
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 Justice Jackson's Report to the President on Atrocities and War Crimes; June 7, 1945, Part III, para. 4, 
Excerpt from the Department of State Bulletin, published on 10 June 1945, available at: 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt_jack01.asp.  
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 IACtHR, Case of Gutiérrez-Soler v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 12 
September 2005 Series C No. 132, Separate Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade, “El Deber de Memoria y 
Su Necesidad”, para III. 
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Approach and Methodology 
Despite the fact that it has been evoked in declarations and statements of international 
and national bodies, a state duty to remember, as such, has not been included in any binding 
international legal instruments. In order to answer the research question that this thesis raises 
about the existence and the content of states’ duties regarding the processes of remembering 
past wrongs, the legal foundations and the contours of a possible duty of memory are therefore 
to be inferred from the different provisions that bind states according to their international 
obligations. The identification of these legal bases and the interpretation of their content are 
therefore the first steps this study takes in the enterprise to construct the duty of memory-
puzzle. 
This thesis adopts a positivist approach to the research question. It analyses the state of 
contemporary international law and practice in order to verify whether, and to what extent, the 
demand for memory finds a legal hold in international law provisions. In conjunction with this 
positivist approach, moreover, the study comprises a critical analysis of the practice, 
indicating hurdles and shortcomings of the current trends. Conversely, the research does not 
attempt to suggest a normative argument in favour or against the establishment of the duty of 
memory. This is because, as it will be shown in the course of the dissertation and elaborated 
further in the conclusions, the impact of international norms on the construction of social 
memories may lead to alternative, unpredictable results, due to the specificities which 
characterize each society and its narratives. In this sense, the value of this research, in line 
with the most inspired transitional justice scholarship, lies in the provision of a general 
framework of international principles and standards in which the vernacular negotiations over 
memories and narratives can be accommodated and protected. 
On this positivist stance, human rights norms are the primary sources from which the 
legal foundations of a duty of memory are inferred. The branches of international 
humanitarian law, international criminal law, and cultural heritage law, in contrast, are not the 
direct focus of the analysis, and can be considered as subsidiary criteria of interpretation of the 
human rights framework related to memory. Besides, these fields are potentially fruitful for 
future research on this subject, and may constitute a new line of investigation to be explored, 
in more detail, along the theoretical background provided by this study. Within the human 
rights law framework, in order to interpret the regional and universal human rights instruments 
relevant in the contexts of serious human rights violations, the study reviews the practice of 
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the main international and regional judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. In particular the Human 
Rights Committee’s, the European Court of Human Rights’, and the Inter American Court of 
Human Rights’ relevant decisions and pronouncements provide most of the materials for the 
analysis. Relevant soft law instruments, adopted both in the universal and regional systems of 
human rights protection, are also assessed as evidence of emerging practice and opinio juris, 
in order to verify the research hypothesis.
24
  
The relevance of the practice on memory at the international level is subsequently 
verified against the practice carried out by states dealing with the legacy of gross violations of 
human rights. This is the second step taken in the thesis, assessing the trend pointing to the 
emergence of a state duty of memory. State practice that recognizes and regulates the 
responsibilities of governments toward the recollection and representation of knowledge about 
past atrocities, as well as the implementation of relevant international standards in domestic 
legislation and policies, are considered. Such a practice allows us, on the one hand, to detail 
the concrete content of the different components of the duty of memory. On the other hand, it 
shows the extent to which such a duty is understood as mandatory by states, and, therefore, it 
suggests the degree of opinio juris which supports it. In this sense, the thesis does not – and 
could not – attempt to provide a comparative study of memory politics around the world. 
Instead, in each chapter, it selects relevant cases that exemplify the general trend supporting or 
clarifying the specific duty under discussion. Since the focus of this study is the memory of 
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 The role of soft law instruments – in particular with respect to UN General Assembly resolutions – as 
indicators of state practice and opinion iuris has been recognized also in a series of judgments of the International 
Court of Justice. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA). 
Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, 14; Legality of the Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion of 8 June 1996, ICJ. Reports 1996, 226, at 254–255, para. 70. On the role of soft law in the process of 
creation of contemporary international law, see, inter alia, Guzman, A and Meyer, T., “International Soft Law”, 
The Journal of Legal Analysis2, no. 1(2011): 171-225; Boyle, A., “Some reflections on the Relationship of 
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the international legislative process, ed. Gowlland-Debbas, V. (The Hague; Boston: M. Nijhoff, 2000) 25-38; 
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System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Shelton, D., “Soft Law”, in Routledge Handbook of 
International Law, ed. Armstrong, D., (London ; New York: Routledge, 2009), 61-80; Fitzmaurice, M., and Elias, 
O., Contemporary issues of the law of treaties. (Utrecht: Eleven International Pub, 2005), 34-46; Dupuy, R.J., 
“Declaratory Law and Programmatory Law; from Revolutionary Custom to ‘Soft Law’”, in Declaration on 
Principles: A Quest For Universal Peace, eds. Akkerman, R.J, Krieken, P.J., and Pannenborg, C.O. (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1977), 247-257. On the ICJ jurisprudence with regard to the legal effect of soft law 
declarations of UN bodies, see Oberg, M.D., “The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and 
General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ.” European Journal of International Law 16, no. 5 (2009): 
879-906. 
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large-scale and systematic human rights abuses, much of the state practice is provided by 
Latin American countries dealing with the recent history of military rules and internal 
conflicts, as well as Eastern European countries facing the legacy of the communist regimes. 
Based on the critical observation of controversial cases that result from the implementation of 
international norms and standards in the practice, moreover, the dissertation identifies possible 
pitfalls and risks of attempting to regulate the way a society remembers and forgets past 
trauma through international, universal criteria. 
In addition to legal sources and state practice, secondary sources are also employed. 
Whilst the thesis explores the research question from the point of view of international law, 
and thereby conducting the analysis through the lens of the international law categories, the 
academic sources used for this research are grounded in different fields of study. Many of the 
extra legal academic materials used for the research, especially in the first theoretical chapter, 
are in fact mainly borrowed from transitional justice scholarship, as well as from memory 
studies and history. This allows the analysis to grasp and tackle the multidisciplinary nature of 
the subject. In so doing, the thesis in fact creates a bridge between these different fields, 
attempting to make them communicate with each other through the tool of memory, whilst 
keeping the legal approach to the question it poses. Ultimately, the research may provide the 
legal framework in which the multidisciplinary literature on memory can be read. 
As a result of the legal analysis conducted on the international obligations that bind 
states as a consequence of mass violations of human rights, and the corresponding practice at 
the domestic level, finally, the elements which make up the ‘duty of memory’ are spelled out 
and presented. The thesis identifies a set of behaviours that states should adopt when dealing 
with the ways in which the traumatic past should be represented and told. This research 
discloses five components of the state ‘duty of memory’: to clarify historical facts which 
constitute serious human rights violations; to disclose information related to mass atrocities; to 
preserve the records, keeping safe the memory of those atrocities; to commemorate those 
events; to respect the free discussion of them, while protecting historical accounts from 
malicious manipulations and falsifications, including negationist approaches to past atrocities. 
Synopsis 
The dissertation is organized according to the five elements which form the ‘duty of 
memory puzzle’ – the duty to ascertain, to disclose, to preserve, to commemorate, to respect 
and protect. While the first chapter provides the theoretical framework which underpins the 
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legal analysis, each of the following chapters correspond to (and examine) one of these duties. 
For each one, the thesis firstly clarifies the relevance of the corresponding duty to the 
processes of memory; subsequently, it presents an analysis of the legal foundations that 
ground the duty and the interpretation provided by international bodies; and finally, it reviews 
relevant state practice that implements it. 
In detail:  
Chapter I seeks to explore the concept of memory and its features, with the aim to 
provide a common understanding of this term, and the way it is used in the research. For this 
purpose, it identifies relevant elements in the notion of memory to narrow down and tailor this 
concept for the purpose of the investigation. It starts with reviewing the relevant literature on 
memory studies to provide a stronger and more comprehensive understanding of the 
phenomenon of memory. Then, it proceeds to compare the conceptual underpinnings 
emerging from this first analysis with other fields. Relevant legal and transitional justice 
literature is reviewed, as appropriate, to explore the relations between memory and law and 
memory and transitional processes, in order to understand how the two latter impact on the 
former in the aftermath of mass atrocities. As a result of the analysis, Chapter I eventually puts 
forth one of the main claims of this research and develops the idea of international law as a 
vector of memory. 
Chapter II introduces the first element through which international law and its 
branches may influence and shape the memory of a society: the duty to ascertain the facts of 
the past. It argues that, by imposing an obligation on states to investigate human rights abuses, 
and indicating standards and guidelines to accomplish that task, international law influences 
the ways in which states engage in the clarification of past events characterized by systematic 
violence, and – consequently – the historical accounts that result from those investigations. 
The duty to ascertain and the standards necessary to comply therewith are inferred from 
different legal foundations: i) “ensure and protect clause”; ii) right to an effective remedy; iii) 
right to truth; and iv) right to reparations. These legal bases are in turn analysed in the light of 
the decisions of judicial and non-judicial mechanisms of clarification and accountability. This 
practice provides the framework for evaluating and understanding the relevant states’ conduct, 
and for assessing their compliance with the identified standards. 
12 
Chapter III analyses and conceptualizes the state duty to disclose information and 
documents in respect of past violations, in relation to memory processes. After requiring states 
to dig into their violent past to investigate human rights abuses (Chapter II), the second step 
that international law takes in influencing the processes of memory making, is to encourage 
states to make information related to past abuses available to victims and other individuals. In 
so doing, it expects states to comply with a number of requirements – more or less compulsory 
– concerning access to information, and indicates standards and guidelines to be applied. The 
right to access to information, both in the collective and individual dimension, sets the 
framework in which the duty to disclose is conceptualized. Along these lines, through the 
second component of the duty of memory – the duty to disclose –, the chapter explores how 
international law regulates access to and circulation of knowledge about the past within the 
society, with evident consequences on the production of memories. The chapter observes the 
concrete impact of such a duty in state practice, and points out the risk it may hold for the 
societal memory-negotiation processes. To that aim, the analysis focuses on state policies and 
legislation on opening secret archives of previous authoritarian regimes, especially in Eastern 
European countries. . 
Chapter IV presents the state duty to preserve the knowledge of the past, through the 
collection and preservation of documents related to past abuses. Through the lens of the legal 
basis of the right to know, under its different conceptualizations, it analyses international 
norms (mostly soft law) specifying guidelines and standards for the management and 
preservation of documents and materials regarding mass human rights abuses from the past. In 
this way, I suggest, international principles not only require states to create ‘collections of 
memories’ of past violence, but also give indications to governments how to select them and 
preserve them. The review of examples of public policies and legislation on archives storing 
evidence and records of gross human rights violations, allows the assessment of the extent to 
which these international principles and guidelines find resonance in state practice. This, in 
turn, clarifies whether state practice supports the stabilization of the duty to preserve at the 
international level. 
Chapter V explores the state duty to undertake public acts of commemoration – in the 
form of official ceremonies or memorials – as one of the ways in which governments, in the 
aftermath of state violence, can (at least partly) discharge their obligation to provide 
reparations to victims, and to offer guarantees for the non-repetition of similar events in the 
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future. This is the fourth piece of the duty of memory puzzle, which was named ‘the duty to 
commemorate’. In order to verify the emergence of such a duty as part of the secondary norms 
which determine the legal consequences of the states’ responsibility for serious and systematic 
human rights abuses, the chapter analyses international norms and judicial decisions that 
require states to commemorate past abuses as means of reparations for victims. It identifies 
principles and standards developed by human rights bodies in this domain. In the duty to 
commemorate, the two-fold dimension of reparations – individual and collective – reflects the 
two-fold dimension of memory – both personal and social. In the analysis of practice, primary 
relevance is given to the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which 
proves particularly fruitful in the definition of such a duty. The concrete implementation of the 
duty to commemorate and its effects are subsequently evaluated through specific cases of the 
practice of Latin American countries. In this fashion, in the chapter, the extent to which 
specific remedial orders may become instruments of memory-making, and the manner in 
which supranational courts’ decisions may directly shape the public recollection of past 
events, is assessed. 
Chapter VI adds the last element to the duty of memory puzzle. It examines the 
normative framework under international law regulating historical debate. The chapter aims to 
understand what role international law expects states to play in striking the balance between 
freedom of speech and the protection of historical “truth”. The analysis suggests that the 
general principle that informs historical debate in the international arena is freedom. At the 
same time, however, it recognizes that international bodies pose some limits to disputing 
certain historical narratives amounting to mass crimes. On this basis, the research 
conceptualizes, on the one hand, a state duty to respect freedom in historical debate and 
research under different rationales. On the other hand, it critically analyses limits to this 
freedom, indicating a state duty to protect certain historical narratives from revisionisms and 
denial. The ECtHR case law offers the main source to reconstruct the normative framework 
and the legal rationale of these two issues. Together with that, additional relevant practice of 
international bodies, as well as state practice related to the criminalization of genocide denial, 
come to the fore to tackle the complexities of historical debate under the perspective of 
international law. 
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In the Conclusions, eventually, the duty of memory puzzle will be put together. Its 
different components will be recalled, and the rationales behind, and content and nature of this 
duty finally assessed. Ultimately, the major findings about the role of international law as a 






This chapter sets out the theoretical framework in which the ‘duty of memory’ is 
developed in this thesis. As anticipated in the introduction to this dissertation, the ‘duty of 
memory’ encompasses the set of behaviours that a state is to undertake in compliance with 
international law, which have an impact on how society understands and represents traumatic 
events of its past. As such, the ‘duty of memory’ enshrines two elements: the concept of legal 
constraint and the concept of memory. The first is justified by the methodological approach of 
the present study. It suggests that such a duty is inferred through the process of interpretation 
of international legal norms, and of assessment of international and national practice – 
diuturnitas and opinio juris. The second element indicates the content of the duty. That is, the 
duty of memory embraces states’ conduct which relate to the interpretation and representation 
of events from the past and their narratives. Before we turn to examining the substantive legal 
bases of the states’ duty of memory, the elusive concept of memory requires clarification in 
order to agree upon a common understanding of its meanings and the way in which it is used 
in this dissertation. Hence, this chapter engages with the idea of memory as a theoretical 
category, and by looking at its relationship with applied disciplines that are relevant for the 
research. 
Since the notion of memory has been applied broadly so far, this Chapter sets out to 
narrow it down. To that aim, it first identifies “differentiating markers”
25
 to tailor the concept 
of memory to the purpose of the thesis. This task is performed by highlighting, through the 
analysis of the existing literature, some of the specific features of memory that prove to be 
relevant for our discussion. Then, once the characteristic features of memory are spelled out, 
the notion is further refined by looking at the intersections between memory and other 
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Cubitt is a Senior Professor of History and member of the Institute for the Public Understanding of the Past. In 
his seminal book History and Memory, he offers an accurate insight for getting a first conceptual handle on the 
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discriminate on the various conceptions of “memory” that have been offered by the various areas of scholarship. 
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disciplines that regulate states’ conduct in the aftermath of large-scale and systematic human 
rights violations: law and transitional justice. 
1. Identifying Differentiating Markers 
[M]emory is one of those elusive topics we all think we have a handle on. But as soon 
as we try to define it, it starts slipping and sliding, eluding attempts to grasp it either 
culturally, sociologically, or scientifically.
26
 
1.1 The Multiplicity of Memory. Defining the Concept 
The notion of memory has much (pre)occupied scholars, practitioners, and 
philosophers. A complex, controversial, ungraspable nature has been associated with this 
notion in order to reflect the elusive, visceral, ancestral relation of the present with the past. 
Memory is often understood as a mysterious boat, which ferries past experiences to present 
knowledge. It travels through time, shaking the idea of linear time, making present what was 
past and making the past present again.
27
 In an untraditional understanding of time, memory 
rejects the equivalences between past and closure, past and death, past and gone.
28
 Memory, it 
has been said, is “the presence of the past within the present”.
29
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28
 There is an extensive and important school of philosophers and thinkers that question the concept of 
time. Among others: Benjamin, W., “Theses on the Philosophy of History” in Illuminations, ed. Arendt, H. 
(London: Fontana, 1973), 245-258; Braudel, F., Ecrits sur l'histoire (Paris: Flammarion, 1969); Agamben, G., 
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At least since the ancient Greeks, memory has been considered either as an instrument 
to gather knowledge – be it innate and related to the metaphysic world, 
30
 or a voluntary or 
involuntary collection and recollection of images in association with extant ideas in the 
present –
31
, or as a vehicle to transmit knowledge. 
32
 Its complex relation with myths, 
traditions, and historical truth has been widely discussed,
33
 and historians have been divided 
between using it as a source of history
34
 or warning against its fallibility. 
35
 Memory, 
moreover, has always involved far-reaching ethical and moral questions. Because of an ethical 
duty to mourn and commemorate, Antigone challenges Creon’s decree that prohibited the 
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(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), 279-285. 
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burial of her brother Polynices’ body,
36
 while Dante has to soak in and drink from the Lethe 
river – the oblivion – to forget the experience of sin, leave Purgatory, and ascend to Heaven.
37
 
The notion of memory has been used to indicate a wide range of activities, processes, 
and initiatives. “Many very different things happen when we remember”, wrote 
Wittgenstein.
38
 Memory is the presence of Franca Jarach in the life of her mother, Vera Jarach 
Vigevani. Franca was an 18-year-old young woman when she was arrested in Buenos Aires on 
26th June 1976, and then disappeared in the hands of the Argentinean Army. Vera, nowadays 
almost 90 years old, has spent most Thursdays of her life standing in front of the Casa Rosada 
de Buenos Aires with a picture of her daughter and a white pañuelo, asking to know her 
child’s fate. Memory is the process through which the Jews elaborate their exile from the Holy 
Land as an essential tie for the Jewish people’s identity, although none of those who suffered 
from that displacement is still alive today to witness it. Memory is the monument El Ojo que 
Llora, which stands in the Campo de Marte park, in Lima, to tell the history of all of the 
almost 70,000 victims of the violence during the Peruvian civil war. 
Indeed, because of its malleable nature, the concept of memory has been used and 
applied in an enormous number of disciplines, which range from history to informational 
technology, from psychology to anthropology, from philosophy to sociology, from 
neurosciences to law. All these disciplines – and more – have been conceptually brought 
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together in the research field of “memory studies”. 
39
 Despite the common umbrella for the 
memory studies field, each of these disciplines applies its own methodology in order to 
highlight the features of “memory” that best fit its focus. As a consequence, definitions of 
memory of the most different natures flourish in literature. Each of them suggests not only a 
different perspective to the same concept, but sometimes even conflicting conceptual 
understandings of the same idea. In spite of their differences, however, the common 
denominator of most definitions is the idea of memory as something fluid, in motion, 
dynamic, and modifiable. 
It is not the purpose of this chapter to provide a comprehensive literature review of 
what has been written about memory. Firstly, this titanic enterprise would result in little 
contribution for the purpose of the present research on the role of international law in shaping 
the memories of past atrocities. Secondly, in the light of the considerable and sometimes 
contradictory literature on the topic, the effort of establishing a general definition of memory 
is certainly both naive and intellectually misleading. However, while the variety of ideas 
connected to the concept of memory warns us to refrain from providing an ontological 
definition of what memory is, the multi-layered meaning of this concept requires that order is 
brought to this agglomerate of ideas, and to be discriminating in the terminological use of the 
term. Indeed, “[a] word may be allowed to mean many things, but it is usually unwise to allow 
it to mean all of them simultaneously.” 
40
 I should therefore identify “differentiating markers”, 
as Cubitt suggests, for our concept. 
41
 My ambition in the following, hence, is to pinpoint the 
main elements – the ‘differentiating markers’ – of the notion of memory to define the meaning 
of this concept as used in this thesis. That, of course, without forgetting the complexities and 
debates that this concept brings with it. The starting point to narrow down the notion of 
memory is the concept of collective memory. 
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1.2 Collective memory 
Much has been written on collective memory.
42
 Since the French-Jewish, Durkheimian 
sociologist Maurice Halbwachs developed the concept in his landmark works Les Cadres 
Sociaux de la Mémoire 
43
 and, posthumously, Mémoire Collective,
44
 collective memory has 
progressively become an oft-used term to indicate – generally speaking – the social 
phenomena of making sense of and representing events of the past by a community or group in 
a way which is collectively acknowledged and shared. 
45
 At a first stage, collective memory 
can be defined as “the knowledge about the past that is shared, mutually acknowledged, and 
reinforced by collectivities”. 
46
 The founding idea is that all the processes of individual 
remembering are somehow moulded and shaped by the social structures of each specific 
group, and as a result, all the processes of remembering are therefore “born and raised” within 
the group. 
In evolving his thought on collective memory, Halbwachs borrows, from the 
Durkheimian thought, the idea that all human experiences are rooted in a social context and 
structure. At the same time, he follows Bergson in the perception of the variability of 
memory.
47
 Coherently, collective memory is thusly seen as the variable product of a social 
construction, that of assigning shared meanings to events of the past that are momentous for 
the group’s identity. In this view, the perception that individuals have about their past and its 
representation can be understood and interpreted only within, and through the specific group 
context to which they belong. In Halbwachs’ words, “[t]he individual calls recollections to 
mind by relying on the frameworks of social memory.” 
48
 It is therefore the group which offers 
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the framework in which, and through which images of the past are elaborated and recorded. 
However, if the social dimension of memory is certainly the main characteristic of the notion 
of collective memory, some criticisms to this theory are to be considered in order to better 
tease out its specific treats. 
1.2.1 Critiques on Collective Memory  
1.2.1.1 Collective v. Individual memories 
As noted, collective memory is born and evolves within social groups. Arguably, 
however, this intrinsic “social determinism”
49
 tends to neglect the individual agency in the 
process of remembering. Many criticisms have been issued against the theory of collective 
memory on this point. It has been said that the very concept of collective memory would 
essentially deny the individual dimension of recollection.
50
 It has furthermore been argued 
that, by relying on the power of society to shape individual memory, “the dialectical tension 
between personal memory and the social construction of the past” remains mostly 
underexplored, and the dynamics of collective memory remain unclear. 
51
  
While it is true that the idea of collective memory, on account of its sociological origin, 
focuses mainly on the group dynamics of the processes of remembering, this does not 
automatically imply the denial of a role for the individual. When talking about ‘collective 
memory’, we are not referring – as has been sometimes criticized – to a fictitious group-mind 
that actually remembers. 
52
 Theory of collective memory does not exclude the individual from 
this process of memory-making, but it stresses that individual’s agency in relation to the past 
is determined by the social structures in which she or he lives. Indeed, while the society 
creates the framework within which the representation of the past comes to take shape and 
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Still, some subsequent theories on memory have tried to remove this hurdle by 
suggesting to move from the concept of collective memory to other notions, such as the one of 
social memory, shifting the attention from the group’s social frameworks to the social 
dynamics between individual and society. 
54
 While certainly most of these works actually add 
more depth to memory studies, for the purpose of this research, the concept of collective 
memory – if used with the caveat that I provide in this chapter – still seems an appropriate fit. 
In fact, from a closer and perhaps more flexible analysis, collective memory can be understood 
as an inclusive category of different processes and actors, rather than as an exclusive label to 
mark differences. Olick suggests this broader approach to the term in order to overcome the 
antagonist relation between individual-collective remembering. In his view, collective 
memory can well sum up different kinds of what he calls “mnemonic products and practices” 
– from stories to images, from commemorations to monuments –, which are at the same time 
individual and social. In this sense, the focus of the concept is not on the category that it stands 
for, but on the dynamics of remembering that it grasps.
55
 
In the light of this, I understand collective memory neither as an autonomous, external 
social entity that shapes individual memories, nor as the sum of the latter. I see it as both a 
social process and its result, to which each individual contributes with his or her own 
experience and within which each individual experience finds its place and meaning, over time 
and through time. In this sense, by considering the collective dimension of memory as a 
complex process inclusive also of individual memories, I believe the concept of collective 
memory provides a good framework in which to assess the role of law, in general, and that of 
international law, in particular, in determining how victims and societies that experienced 
mass atrocities understand and represent their past. 
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1.2.1.2 Collective Memory and the Unitary Past 
In conjunction with the critique about the exclusion of the individual from the process 
of remembering, we should consider another significant critique that has been raised against 
the theory on collective memory. Collective memory, so goes the critique, seems to 
presuppose that societies always share a collective, unitary vision of the past. However, this 
vision does not necessarily correspond to the reality. Admittedly, the idea of one cohesive and 
unified memory is unrealistic.
56
 In democratic societies - even when an ‘official memory’ is 
purported by the government -, different narratives still coexist in the social fabric, ideally in 
dialogue, more often in contrast. Similarly, even during dictatorial regimes where a hegemonic 
narrative dominates society and dissenting memories are silenced through violence, hidden in 
the social fabric, competing narratives rest in the private sphere of individuals, families, and 
minority groups, waiting to find a locus to express themselves. This is actually the most 
frequent scenario for societies in democratic transition after periods of violence and conflicts, 
which are the main focus of this thesis. Many stories of ethnic conflicts and civil wars 
demonstrate that there is hardly one truth, and – even more so – one memory. It is therefore 
important that, in our understanding of memory, we take into account the existence of 
different entities within a social group, each of which may carry a specific narrative of the 
past. Collective memory, in this research, accordingly is the patchwork of the different 
representations of the past that individuals elaborate and recollect in groups within, and 
throughout the social frameworks. 
1.3 Memory and Identity 
Since collective memory is a social product, it has manifold facets. Not only each 
society constructs its own collective memory, but – as noted – also within a society there are 
as many memories as social groups.
57
 As said, the coexistence of different memories within 
the umbrella of collective memory is central to the understanding of the concept of memory in 
this thesis. Yet, memory is a crucial element to found identity. The identity of a people is 
ultimately both defined and reinforced by its shared stories on the past. These stories 
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constitute the acknowledged, social framework in which individuals recognize themselves as 
belonging to the community. 
The bond between memory and identity is reciprocal. Collective identity – in the sense 
of shared values, interests, and aspirations of a society – provides the filters through which a 
collective sense of the past is created. At the same time, these shared images of the past 
reinforce the social solidarity, moulding the collective identity of the nation into a common 
narrative. 
58
 To the multiplicity of collective memories that emerge from the different social 
groups within a nation, a shared representation of the past at the national level provides the 
continuity to ensure the stability and identity of the nation. Rituals, monuments, 
commemorations, and symbols celebrating the past create a continuum in time that “serve[s] to 
convey the identity of the nation over time”. 
59
 The shared national narrative constitutes the 
backdrop against which the different memory-carrying groups will recount their own 
narratives, drawing support from it when they are compatible, or challenging it when they tell 
conflicting stories. 
This intrinsic, reciprocal connection between memory and national identity is central to 
the establishment and maintenance of political leaderships within nation-states. It is not 
surprising, in fact, that politics of memory proliferate when nation-states find themselves in 
need of boosting their legitimacy. Not by coincidence, the first ‘memory boom’ experienced 
by the nation-states, as Olick notes, was in the late nineteenth century, when the social 
legitimacy of European states’ political authorities suffered as a consequence of what Nora 
calls “an acceleration of history”. 
60
 In that period, which challenged traditional political 
systems, political leaders rushed to build imposing monuments to tell the story of the heroic 
past of the nations, and archives and museums became crucial in the process of identity-
construction.
61
 In this respect, Hobsbwam noted how the dramatic transformation of social 
groups and the relationships between them urged the nation-states to resort to use the past to 
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create symbols of unity and cohesion. 
62
 The overproduction of monuments, symbols, and 




Coherently, the correlation between memory and identity has been used to explain also 
the contemporary “memory boom”.
64
 Scholars argue that, similarly to what had happened in 
the late nineteenth century, the crisis of the welfare state and that of the post-war progress 
induced a restructuring of national identities and collective aspirations. As a consequence, 
nation-states have again turned to the past to strengthen their unstable legitimacy. 
65
 These 
arguments may also apply to the case of societies and governments in the aftermath of 
institutional and social collapse. In those situations, the interrelation between memory and 
identity proves to be crucial for the reconstruction of the social and political fabric, and the 
endeavours of giving meaning to the recent past contribute to shaping the future figure of the 
new society. Because of the relevance thereof for the thesis, this will be elaborated further 
below. 
1.4 The Presentist Approach 
So far, by means of the analysis of Halbwachs’ work and his legacy, we have been able 
to identify some of the “differentiating markers” – as Cubitt calls them – of the concept of 
collective memory that are important for the thesis. Collective memory is a social 
phenomenon which involves individual agency, diverse in nature, and deeply intertwined with 
the concept of group identity at different levels. Being a social process, moreover, collective 
memory can be constructed and reconstructed. From the latter feature, Halbwachs and his 
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followers derived another observation, which quickly came to attract the attention of 
sociologists. They argued that the process of construction and reconstruction of the past does 
not occur in a vacuum, but is directly connected to the present.
66
 Going even further, 
Halbwachs contents that the process of reframing the past not only happens in the present, but 
is also driven by the present. 
67
 More precisely, in his view the representation of past events is 
filtered and moulded according to the present interests and capacities of the society. Current 
aspirations, principles, ideals, and material needs determine how communities read and 
remember the past. They determine, even more, what the past is for the present. 
This theory, which is known as the “presentist approach”, 
68
 strengthens and enriches 
the image of memory as the boat connecting not only the present to the past, but also the past 
to the present. Taken to extremes, admittedly, it can lean towards a strong determinism that 
should be opposed.
69
 Nevertheless, I believe this approach provides important insights for our 
notion. From the presentist approach, we learn, on the one hand, that collective memory is not 
only selective, but also selected, and, on the other hand, that collective memory always 
evolves and is negotiated according to the concrete interests of a given group in a specific 
historical moment.
70
 The presentist approach highlights the instrumental character of 
collective memory, and explains its proximity to power-games and political dynamics. As 
                                                 
66
 Lessa, Memory and Transitional Justice, 18. Hutton, P., H., “Collective Memory and Collective 
Mentalities.” Historical Reflections 15, no. 2 (Summer 1988): 314.  
67
 Halbwachs, La topographie légendaire; On Collective Memory, 25. 
68
 Savelsberg J. And King, R. American Memories. Atrocities and the Law. (New York: Russel Sage 
Foundation, 2011), 10, 18. Misztal, Theories of Social Remembering, 55-61. The “presentist theory” is discussed 
and critically reviewed by Schwartz, B., “The Social Context Of Commemoration: A Study On Collective 
Memory”, Social Forces 61, no. 2 (December, 1982): 374-402. ). For a critical analysis of the link between the 
past and the present, see also Olick, J. K., “From Usable Pasts to the Return of the Repressed” 9, no.2 The 
Hedgehog Review (Summer 2007): 19-31. 
69
 Taken to the extreme, this approach leads Hobsbwam and his school of thought as far as to the 
invention of tradition theory. This theory was first put forth by Hobsbwam and Ranger (eds.) in the book The 
Invention of Tradition, and then developed by other authors. It claims that most of the traditions (intended as the 
“set of practices (…) of a ritual or symbolic nature”) are “invented” by the dominant elites, that is, they “seek to 
inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the 
past.” Hobsbwam, ibid., 1. Images of the past, accordingly, are constructed on purpose, with the specific aim of 
transmitting a certain record of the past to legitimize the political power and authority of the dominant leadership. 
See also Anderson, B. Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (London: 
Verso, 1983). 
70
 See, for instance, Schudson, M., “The Past in the Present versus the Present in the Past.” 
Communication II (1989): 105-113, included in the volume The Collective Memory Reader, ed. Olick, 287. His 
argument, though, admits that social organizations and nations are not fully free in “mak[ing] their own pasts” 
according to their present interests. According to Schudson, three factors limit the freedom to reconstruct the 
past, namely the structure of individual choices, the structure of available past, and the conflicts about the past.  
 
27 
noted, the fluidity of memory and its strong connection with identity make it an excellent 
mechanism to serve the political needs for power legitimation and the quest for social 
unification. Indeed, while politics of memory are not necessarily manipulative instruments for 
ideological strategies, looking at the history of past internal conflicts, we easily recognize 
examples of memory narratives’ manipulation for political ends. 
In the history of ex-Yugoslavia and its fall, for instance, more than once, politics of 
memory played a crucial role. They were used to force and alter the dynamics of power and 
governance within the country, feeding tensions between the groups and legitimizing violence. 
Tito’s regime used the memory of the Second World War as a political strategy to create a 
common identity for the peoples of Yugoslavia, based on the narratives of their common fight 
against fascisms and for freedom. The leading political strategy that was deployed in that 
period systematically worked to greatly de-ethnicize the memories of the war in the official 
account of the history. 
71
 The whole idea of a civil war, involving conflicting ethnic groups, 
was expunged from the official memory of the nation. Instead, narratives of the “national 
liberation war” and the “socialist revolution” were imposed.
72
 These stories recounted a 
glorious past in which the different groups of the nation were fighting together to free the 
Yugoslav people from the fascist domination. While these narratives selected the history of 
WWII to serve Tito’s nationalistic ideology of “brotherhood and unity”, competing unofficial 
memories – both individual and collective – were systematically silenced and neglected. 
After Tito’s death, in the eighties and nineties, politics of memory were again deployed 
to offset the past narratives that had served the socialist ideology. Where an artificial unitary 
memory had previously been constructed to promote the unitary state with its unitary history, 
conflicting and divisive memories came to the surface, being spoken out loud, exacerbating 
national division and reciprocal hate between groups. The seeds of this historical and political 
turnabout had already been planted in the domination over the past that was imposed during 
the socialist regime. According to Hoepken, “the fragmented and selective memory, with all 
its hidden and ignored stories, left niches for ‘subversive’ memories, which, under the 
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circumstances of political disintegration and economic and social crisis, were vulnerable to 
manipulation”.
73
 And indeed, these “subversive memories” were soon exploited to frame the 
new national identities, and to intensify ethnic confrontation. Thus, for the Serbs, when 
Milošević rose to power, an official narrative of victimization and persecution was promoted 
within the society to justify the call to arms against the people who allegedly had inflicted 
suffering on the Serbian people. Following this logic, historical events – such as the Jasenovac 
atrocities –
74
 were powerfully, and systematically portrayed and taught as symbols of the 
genocidal suffering to which Serbs had been submitted. These events were then invoked to 
legitimate the violence against the “others”. 
Similarly, memory manipulation was employed for the re-elaboration of the new 
Croatian identity. There, symbols of oppression were emphasized and hyped to oppose the 
Serbian ones. An ad hoc selection of narratives was included as part of the political strategy to 
tailor the image of the new Croatian nation-state. The Croatian patchworks of memories had 
different sources, which revolved around the image of a dominant, suppressive Serbia. This 
image dated all the way back to the first Yugoslavia (1918-1941), and was a particularly 
powerful narrative for the construction of Croatian identity, based on victimhood. The 
dominant narratives mostly focused on the end of the WWII hostilities, and on the partisan 
massacres of the Croatian population. At the same time, narratives of the massacres committed 
by Serbian Chetniks played an important role in evoking this picture of victimization as well.
75
 
On both sides, additional narratives of historical land rights and power legitimacy were 
also deployed to sustain the political strategies of the conflict. Instead of going through an 
inclusive reading of conflicting memories, the revision of the past after Tito ended, on both 
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sides, with a body-count exercise to establish who had been the worst perpetrators. This led to 
narratives of divisive nationalisms and opposing identities, which were functional for the 
purposes of political disintegration of the communist nation and destruction of the other ethnic 
groups. Memory, again, became a political, but sadly real battlefield. 
However, the shaping of the past through the lens of present interests is not exclusively 
a trait of dictatorial regimes. Even in democratic and pluralistic systems, the public production 
of memory, especially when stemming from governmental institutions, provides a dominant 
version of history because of the authority of the institution from which it emanates. True, as 
Avishai Margalit warns, democratic regimes should anchor their legitimacy “not in the remote 
past, but in current elections”. For a democratic society, he writes, mourning the past is like 
“crying over spilt milk”.
76
 Nevertheless, the presentist approach suggests that, even in these 
systems, the elaboration of the past is not merely a futile mourning split milk, but a political 
strategy for current goals. The deep connections between power-politics and memory-politics 
hence cannot be neglected in either of these systems. That is not to say that democratic 
systems have a hegemonic control over memory-production. Even official memory 
(originating from governmental acts and institutions) should be (and in fact in democratic 
systems usually is) open to contestation and debate within the society. All the same, even 
liberal democracies need to create a shared background to bring together citizens, around the 
same foundational values and principles. Mastering the past is a way to achieve this purpose. 
Perhaps the clearest example of the political use of memory in a democratic system is 
France and its politiques mémorielles. There, the image of the democratic, human-right-
respectful, republican France has been strongly reinforced and supported by the careful 
management of past narratives, and their circulation over time. The representation of history 
has often been adjusted by political leaders better to correspond with this image. Different 
approaches to the most painful dark pages in French history may be read in the light of the 
political needs of the nation in that specific time. For instance, the ways in which the 
narratives of Vichy and the Algerian war have been managed by the political leaders provide 
examples of these manipulative policies over the past. These narratives were clearly at odds 
with the French republican national identity. Vichy represented the shamefully involvement of 
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France in the genocidal Nazi plan. The Algerian war carried stories of systematic torture 
committed by French soldiers. For a long time, therefore, the dominant interpretation of those 
periods tried to cover up this incoherence.
77
 
As for Vichy, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the Gaullist story told the 
consoling myth of the strong opposition of the whole nation united against the Nazi regime. 
78
 
The French collaboration with, and participation in the Holocaust were archived as an 
exceptional interlude, carried out by foreigners, and the Gaullist ordonnance sur 
rétablissement de la légalité républicaine declared the Vichy regime, together with all its acts, 
null and void. 
79
 Similarly, the official story about the Algerian war disregarded the systematic 
use of torture by French soldiers, disseminating the traditional narrative of “exception”. Acts 
of torture, which were undeniably committed, were said to only have taken place as isolated 
incidents perpetrated by a few desperate soldiers, determined by the circumstances of a gory 
war.
80
 In both cases, a sophisticated and complex array of memory policies and laws were 
adopted to support these narratives. These measures eventually contributed to the construction 
of collective memories that matched the official representation of the nation. Hence, the 
instrumental use of collective memory proved to be just a different means of policy-making.
81
 
                                                 
77
 On the memory of Vichy see Löytömäki, S., “Committing the irreparable: Law and dealing with past 
injustice.” (Ph.D. thesis, European University Institute, 2010); on the memory of the Algerian War in France see, 
by the same author, “The Law and Collective Memory of Colonialism: France and the Case of ‘Belated’ 
Transitional Justice”, The International Journal of Transitional Justice 7, no. 2, (2013): 1–19. 
78
 Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory and the Law, 101-102, 159-160; Löytömäki, “Committing 
the irreparable”, 58 – 62. 
79
 Ordonnance du 9 août 1944 relative au rétablissement de la légalité républicaine. Article 1 denied the 
very same experience of the Vichy regime, by stating that “[l]a forme du gouvernement de la France est et 
demeure la République. En droit celle-ci n'a pas cessé d'exister.” As as consequence, Art. 2 declared “nuls et de 
nul effet tous les actes constitutionnels législatifs ou réglementaires, ainsi que les arrêtés pris pour leur exécution, 
sous quelque dénomination que ce soit, promulgués sur le territoire continental postérieurement au 16 juin 1940 
et jusqu'au rétablissement du Gouvernement provisoire de la République française.” Available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr. On this, see Fraser, D., “Law, Lawyers and the Holocaust: The Case Against 
Vichy France” Holocaust Genocide Studies 12, no. 1 (1998): 139-141; and, incidentally, Löytömäki, 
“Committing the irreparable”, 59. 
80
 For an analysis of the memory policies regarding to the French collaboration with the Nazis and its 
involvement in the Holocaust, see also, Rousso, H., The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 
1944, trans. Goldhammer, A. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991). In relation to the memories of the 
French colonial past, see, for instance, Bertrand, R., Mémoires d’empire: La controverse autour du ‘fait colonial’ 
(Bellecombe-en-Bauges: Éditions du Croquant, 2006). In respect of the debate over the torture committed during 
the Algerian war see Rieff, D., “The Bureaucrat of Torture”, World Policy Journal 19, no. 1 (2002): 105-110; 
Löytömäki, “The Law and Collective Memory of Colonialism”; MacMaster, N., “The torture controversy (1998-
2002): Towards a 'new history' of the Algerian war?” Modern & Contemporary France 10, no 4 (2002): 449-459. 
81
 In Pugiotto’s words: “La memoria collettiva, dunque, non è un dato bensì «una posta in gioco» ed il 
suo uso strumentale altro non è che «una consapevole e programmatica prosecuzione della politica con altri 
 
31 
The presentist approach, thus, is relevant for our analysis in that it stresses how current 
political interests and values can inform the records of the past. It should be noted, however, 
that most of the ‘presentist memory studies’ take a state-centric perspective, and focus on the 
relation between memory-management and national power. They therefore scrutinize the 
manner in which the political authorities in power, as in the former Yugoslavia and the French 
cases, master remembering and forgetting in order to select and give meaning to memories – 
be it consciously or unconsciously – with a view to present an account of the past which best 
fits their own political agenda. 
However, following the progressive erosion of the power of nation-states and the rise 
of new forces which impact on social dynamics, the (conscious or unconscious) management - 
or manipulation - of the past is increasingly controlled by new agents and driven by new 
interests. Market economy, independent media, and international institutions nowadays 
concurrently produce different representations of the past, according to their own perspectives, 
which may well compete with the official one(s). It is my argument that the human rights 
discourse, as an external force carrying modern values and principles, influences the process 
of reconstruction of identity for societies emerging from deep institutional and social crisis. It 
does so, I argue, also by influencing the way states, involved in patterns of serious human 
rights violations, manage information about their past. By entering into fields which 
traditionally have been used by governments to select their own collective memories, it seems 
that human rights norms play the role of that agent of interests, in managing collective 
memory, which Hobsbawm and Ranger first associated with the state.
82
 Human rights law and 
international law are the instruments to perform that task. Before further developing this 
thought about the role of international law in shaping collective memories, it is useful to 
explore the relation between memory and law. 
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2. Interdisciplinarity of Memory 
2.1 Memory and Law 
The thorny relationship between memory and law is an ever-existing issue. In 403 b.c., 
after the ‘Thirty Tyrants’ regime, Athenians Democrats took the oath to me mnesikakein – not 
to remember past wrongs. They adopted an amnesty decree, which not only waived the 
prosecution of perpetrators for the crimes committed during the stasis, but also prohibited the 
public remembrance of those atrocities. 
83
 Already in that era, this decision ignited vehement 
protests that considered such a law contrary to both divine and human laws. In more recent 
epochs, blurring the distinction between memory and history, this relation has been often 
explored under the label of the history-juridification process. The legal regulation of the 
connection between past and present within a society poses a number of theoretical and 
philosophical concerns and hurdles that are common to every process in which human and 
social activities are to be regulated by legal norms. The debate on this subject encompasses 
different phenomena, ranging from the role of the legislator in encapsulating principles, 
theories, and methodologies of the scholarly historical research in legal canons to the 
participation of historians in jurisdictional processes aimed at judging history; from the 
possibility (and capability) of the law to do historical justice, i.e. repairing past wrongs, to the 
influence of memory-carrying groups in the decision-making processes and its outcomes. It 
touches upon different legal principles and values – freedom of speech; criminal law canons, 
such as nullum poena sine lege; minority rights; and democratic rules.
84
 
Recently, with the rise of the transitional justice field, the attention to memory in legal 
research – especially in the branches of human rights and international law – has primarily and 
mostly been devoted to the ways societies reckon with past violence and past atrocities. That is 
also the angle of this research. This work’s main focus has been the relation between memory-
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process and legal institutions. Marc Osiel, in Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory and the Law, 
highlights the complexities entailed in the law influencing the collective memory of a nation. 
He analyses how the law (in particular through criminal trials) can be used, either to shape 
specific understandings of the national history – constructed from shared values and consensus 
-, or, on the contrary, to offer an arena of “civil dissensus”, in which individuals and groups 
hear and acknowledge each other’s voices. He argues that, in this storytelling function, the law 
can become an instrument to foster social solidarity in the aftermath of administrative 
massacres.
85
 Following the same path, Savelsberg and King note the role of trials – as writers 
of history and archives of historical records – in motivating and shaping “whether and how 
states respond to intergroup violence and atrocities”. 
86
 Martha Minow considers the mediating 
role of memory in “breaking the cycles of violence” through legal institutions. She recognizes 
the numerous functions legal institutions can have in conveying different voices, collecting 
narratives and stories, and allowing victims to deposit their memories.
87
 Similarly, Susan 
Karstedt understands legal institutions as “enabling structures”. She argues that, because legal 
institution can be used to relay different memories and narratives to the same forum, they can 
facilitate a discussion on the meanings of the past, and thereby contribute to the shaping of 
new collective memories. 
88
 Alexander further constructs legal frameworks as institutional 
arenas for what he calls the “representational process” - that is the social process of assigning 
meanings -, which stretches from a traumatic event to its representation within the collective. 
He notes that, in legal institutions, all the questions that mark the process of collective 
representation of past trauma – what happened; who was affected; how the society relates to 
the victims; who are the perpetrators/responsible – coexist and interact. Law, accordingly, is a 
theatre in which the different voices from the past interact to master new narratives of social 
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 This literature provides the basis upon which I build, and according to which I 
develop the argument of the thesis.
90
 
As we have seen so far, the main characteristic of memory, in general, and that of 
collective memory, in particular, is that memory is fluid, in motion, sensitive to change over 
time, and by the passing of time and generations. That is why, when it comes to dealing with 
the elusive concept of memory, the law struggles. Every law student would agree that law is 
about certainty and determination, about lawful and unlawful. Memory is a conversation 
within the time between present and past, is about individual and social identity, about 
relationships and emotions, about experiences, about life. As such, like every time the law is 
to regulate profoundly human dynamics, tension arises between the language and instruments 
of law and the social language and dynamics. Yet, there is much the law can do about 
memory. 
91
 Its impact on the memory-making process is evident when one considers the main 
means through which memories are forged. Since the usual tools to accomplish the selective 
memory-work and production are memorials, official rituals and commemorations, public 
archives and monuments, but also public education systems and public media, law clearly has 
a direct or indirect influence on regulating each of them. 
Law is the instrument to secure the reciprocal bond between power and memory, both 
in liberal and authoritarian systems. Through legal institutions and legal constraints, 
intentionally or unintentionally, political leaders can master the past with the seal of the law, 
and make this mastering objective and legitimated. 
92
 In the above mentioned French case, for 
instance, the law was the main means used by the government to conceal the colonial 
experience. The passing of amnesty laws and the strategic adoption of a restrictive legal 
definition of crimes against humanity allowed the nation to preserve the exceptional ideal of 
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unity and republicanism, downplaying its responsibility for serious human rights violations. 
93
 
At the same time, however, law can also stimulate a critical reflection on the past, conveying 
conflicting voices in the same theatre, and letting them talk to each other in a democratic play 
of reciprocal listening. Returning again to the French example, the historical trials of Barbie, 
first, and those of Touvier and Papon later, opened fora for discussion about the silenced and 
painful memories of Vichy.
94
 This opening, in turn, paved the way for the formal recognition 
by the French government of (and their apology for) France’s responsibility for its complicity 
in the Nazis’ atrocities. 
95
  
In practical terms, the main contributions of the law to the memory-making processes 
are two-fold. As Savelsberg and King pointedly maintain, on the one hand, the law explicitly 
produces specific understandings of past events through the ritual power of trials and courts 
(faire l’histoire). On the other hand, the law regulates data and information about past events 
by legislating on production, and access to, and distribution of information (maîtriser 
l’histoire). 
96
 Law, therefore, is at the same time a filter through which the past is read and 
interpreted, and an instrument through which specific narratives of the past are selected and 
divulgated. Through the law, governments may acknowledge the abuses committed in the 
past. Through the law, victims of past injustices can receive redress by (economic and 
symbolic) recognition. Through the law, marginalized memories can find a place to speak 
their stories aloud, addressing the society. Through the law, open, critical revision of the past 
can be fostered. Yet, through the law, access to information about the past can be restricted or 
even denied, historical events can be distorted and manipulated with public authority, and past 
injustices can receive a pseudo-historical justification for their having been commissioned in 
public fora. As such, the double-sided sword of law can be either an invaluable tool to 
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promote a frank and honest dialogue on a thorny past, or a rigid instrument to expropriate the 
memory-negotiation process from society and to cast it into the legal realm. 
97
 
Expanding the analysis on the connections between law and memory, in an era of 
supra-national forces, this relation can be further elaborated and complicated through the 
analysis of the increasing role of international frameworks and structures in the processes of 
making memory. I argued above that international law – as a tool for the human rights 
discourse – may play the role of agent of interest which carries present interests that shape 
collective memories.
98
 More precisely, the argument I put forth in this thesis is that 
international law imposes certain behaviours on states that influence the way societies end up 
recollecting, commemorating, or forgetting past events which constituted gross violations of 
human rights. 
It does so in two ways. First, directly, through international institutions, when it 
requires states to adopt memorialization initiatives to commemorate specific events, or when 
they explicitly provide historical accounts of the past. This is the case, for instance, in the 
remedial orders that some human rights bodies have issued as a means of reparation owed to 
victims of severe abuses.
99
 In this first category, there are also included decisions of 
international courts that purport specific interpretations of the past, such as international 
criminal tribunals. These narratives, flowing in from the international level to the local one 
through the work of media and other communication vectors, enter into the local discourse on 
memory within the society. Second, it does so indirectly, by requiring states to comply with 
certain obligations that pushes them to face their past, and to do so with specific means. 
Existing primary and secondary state obligations, such as the obligation to investigate, to 
provide reparations, and to allow access to information - which will be discussed in more 
detail in the thesis - indirectly impact on the processes of memory-making. To comply with 
these obligations, states are compelled to dig into their past and to disseminate information 
about it, with evident effects on the processes of memory at the social and official level. 
The way international law affects the processes of memory within a society, moreover, 
is twofold also from another viewpoint. Not only does it impact on the way states understand 
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their past both directly and indirectly, but it also does so on two levels, namely both at the 
official level and at the social one. On the one hand, when international law leads governments 
to adopt a specific understanding of the past, it impacts upon the manner in which local 
institutions publicly recognize the past. On the other hand, when international law indirectly 
introduces memory narratives within a society, its effects reflect also on the social processes 
of memory. 
100
 When talking about the impact of the law on the memory-making processes, 
one may therefore look both at the official, public memory of a state, and at the collective 
memory of the society within that state. Since this thesis only deals with the international legal 
framework of dealing with the past, its primary concern rests with the impact of international 
norms on states’ conducts, and only incidentally on the way this may affect the social 
processes of negotiating memories. In the course of this thesis, I will generally refer to these 
two forms of memory, using the term collective memory when indicating the social process of 
making sense of the past within a community, and the term official memory (or public 
memory) when talking about narratives of past events that are officially acknowledged and 
supported as true by national institutions. Both of them, however, are observed from the point 
of view of states’ behaviours. The first is intended as something fluid, in the making, 
negotiable, and adaptable. The second, on the contrary, is more static - although not fixed - but 
slow to change -, as institutions are slow in making changes. In the context of countries 
emerging from authoritarian regimes or from mass violence, in transition to democracy, these 
two forms of memory can easily be in contrast. While human rights principles and the rule of 
law push for domestic institutions to quickly tell a story that puts an end to the controversy 
and condemns past violence, the society needs time to understand, compare and confront, 
negotiating the individual experiences and narratives. The memory-processes in these contexts 
reflect the distinctive features of the situations in which they take place. Before moving on to 
explore the ways international law influences states’ conducts with regard to memory 
processes, it is important to reflect upon the peculiarities of the transitional justice discourse. 
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2.2 Memory and Transitional Justice  
The Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity defines transitional 
justice as the field of research and practice that focuses on how societies address the legacies 
of past human rights abuses, and other forms of grave social trauma, in order to wend their 
way towards a “democratic, just and peaceful future”. 
101
 The field has developed since the 
mid-80s, in conjunction with the re-democratization processes in Latin America. It draws upon 
the understanding that peace, justice, and reconciliation cannot be achieved in war-torn 
societies without an open confrontation with the legacy of past violence. As a consequence, 
the issues of accountability, truth, victims’ rights and institutional reforms have led the way 
for studying and developing best practices and guidelines for societies to deal with their past. 
As understood by the 2004 UN Secretary General report on The Rule of Law and 
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, transitional justice includes the 
full range of legal, political, and social processes and mechanisms that are put in place to 
allow a democratic transition toward accountability, justice, and reconciliation.
102
 While the 
legal and political approach of human rights and political science originally informed the 
growth of the field, a wide range of disciplines was subsequently involved in enriching the 
study of this subject with different approaches.
103
 Today, the transitional justice discipline 
provides a holistic framework that encompasses judicial and non-judicial means, both 
institutional and non-institutional, which attempt to build a bridge for the transition between a 
violent past and the future, developing a backward/forward-looking model.
104
 
In dealing with large-scale human rights abuses and their aftermath, studies in the field 
of transitional justice have constantly underscored two main aspects, which I see as great 
contributions to the international and local efforts of social and institutional reconstruction in 
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violence-torn societies. Firstly, transitional justice discourse has advanced the growing 
consensus at the international level that wide patterns of serious human rights abuses cannot 
remain unaddressed. Mass atrocities cannot be silenced and forgotten. Victims’ quest for truth 
and justice must be answered. Societies have to face their violent past by adopting 
comprehensive, multifaceted strategies. This has now become a solid argument within the 
international community, which resists cover-up initiatives and blanket amnesties at the local 
level. 
Secondly, transitional justice has rejected the ‘one-size-fits-all formula’ as inconsistent 
with the bottom-up approach, which it has suggested to enhance the ownership of societies 
over the reconstruction processes. The main understanding is that each society and each 
situation have their own specificities that are to be taken into account. While indicating 
minimum standards and general guidelines, transitional justice calls for an active participation 
of each community in its transitional process. At both the institutional and social level, the 
choice about which the transitional justice mechanism to adopt in each specific case is 
contingent on the local systems of decision-making. Understanding transition as complex, 
multidimensional, fluid processes means accepting a variety of answers to the (apparently) 
same question. Espousing this idea, transitional justice attempts to strike the balance between 
local needs and international concerns. It does so by suggesting a whole set of intertwined 
mechanisms that, as in a complicated recipe, should be accurately dosed and mixed according 
to the local flavour. 
Having briefly looked at what transitional justice is, and having highlighted some 
important aspects that will prove relevant to our discussion, let me clarify what the relevance 
of transitional justice is in the discourse on memory. This thesis addresses transitional justice 
by looking at the dynamics of memory – to the extent that they are influenced by international 
law obligations – in societies which are moving from patterns of systematic and extensive 
human rights violations to democratic systems respectful of human rights. That is, transitional 
justice provides the context within which the relationship between international law and 
memory processes will be explored. Transitional justice, consequently, delimits the scope of 
the examination by delineating the set of legal obligations that will be analysed as being 
relevant in the course of this study. 
40 
But transitional justice does not just delimit the scope of the thesis. It also adds 
additional aspects to the complex process of memory-making which is under consideration. I 
believe the peculiarities of the societies that undertake processes of democratic transition also 
influence the social and political mechanisms of memory-construction. Memory processes in 
transitional justice contexts have different dynamics, and follow different patterns. In those 
situations, the experience of past suffering has temporal-proximity to the present. Perpetrators 
and victims – or at least their next of kin – are often still alive, and they struggle, together with 
the whole society, to make sense of what they experienced. Their memories are voiced 
simultaneously with official narratives, to which they sometimes oppose, and the quest for 
truth and memory may well be at odds with other compelling needs of stability and 
reconstruction. Although the thesis does not deal with the sociological work of unfolding these 
dynamics, it is important to take into account these peculiarities in order to understand, firstly, 
the very concept and features of the kind of memory(/ies) that is/are investigated here, and, 
secondly, the relevance of any external modification of the memory-making process in the 
dynamics of democratic transitions. The relations between memory and transitional justice are 
therefore worth exploring in this chapter. 
Commemorations and memorialization projects are included in the comprehensive 
transitional justice programs. Together with prosecution, truth-telling, reparations, and 
guarantees of non-repetition, memory – in the form of memorialization –
105
 is considered one 
of the pillars of the holistic transitional justice strategy. Previous researches on transitional 
justice have regarded the memory of the violence mainly as a source of (moral and practical) 
lessons from the past, to be cautiously preserved as a guarantee against the repetition of 
previous mistakes. 
106
 At the same time, though, some of these studies have also 
acknowledged the potential danger that the political use of memory and memory-related 
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Nevertheless, compared to the other pillars, memory has been largely ignored by the 
studies on transitional justice – or, at least, it has received only limited attention.
108
 While 
warning about the importance of memorialization in post-conflict and post-violence societies - 
for better or worse -, the literature has mainly focused on assessing the contribution of 
memorials to reconstruction processes and on elaborating guidelines and best practices for 
them.
109
 Although, admittedly, this analysis is important part of understanding and supporting 
democratic transitions, what the transitional justice literature on memory has often left 
underexplored, I think, is the role of the other transitional justice institutions on recollecting 
and making sense of the past, and its consequences on collective memory of the society. The 
transitional justice scholarship has focused on the processes of collecting, elaborating, and 
giving meanings to historical records for creating memorials. It has however been rather 
hesitant to assess the effects on collective memory of these parallel processes when they were 
established, for instance, within the hearings of criminal tribunals and truth commissions. 
110
 
As a consequence, it has partially failed to seriously, comprehensively question the impact of 
the whole transitional justice framework on the processes of historical interpretation of the 
past and memory-making within a society. 
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All the transitional justice components somehow provide accounts of what happened, 
either explicitly or implicitly. In effect, storytelling is an intrinsic part of the transitional 
process. Transitional justice is defined as a “process of negotiation between competing 
imagery that has many internal and external dimensions”, and its mechanisms can be seen as 
sources of that imagery.
111
 Each of the transitional justice tools, to some extent, manages 
historical data and information, and eventually produces images of the past that need to be 
reconciled – or at least placed in relation – with the other vectors of memories. Images of 
victimhood and guilt, and narratives of suffering and abuses are composed and divulgated 
through these mechanisms. This takes place sometimes in a dichotomy discourse on the past – 
typical of transitional justice -, other times producing more nuanced, kaleidoscopic 
understandings that enrich – and complicate – the representation of the past and the possibility 
of giving meanings to the past traumatic events. This ‘storytelling task’ is by definition 
intrinsic to the classical institutions entrusted with telling the story – truth telling bodies and 
jurisdictional courts -, which propose their own accounts of the past tailored to their 
procedures, mandate, competences and timeframes. Also the other transitional justice 
mechanisms, however, elaborate and convey specific messages on the past. For instance, 
reparation programs create categories of victims, and assess their suffering according to the 
political orientation that led to their adoption. In doing so, they implicitly endorse certain 
understandings of past events. Similarly, official apologies, educational programs, and public 
commemorations will promote either one or the other memory, while necessarily repressing 
the competing ones. 
In addition to the previous considerations about the impact of transitional justice 
mechanisms on the memory-making processes, the inherent connection between collective 
memory and national identity, lying at the heart of the transitional justice discourse, should be 
also addressed. The moral and political question of how to deal with past violence, and how to 
reckon with its legacy is central to every society undertaking a national reconstruction process 
in the aftermath of traumatic events. Since the processes of democratic transition have often 
shaken the foundational values and the social dynamics which maintained the pattern of 
violence or conflict – and propose new ones -, the reading and interpretation of the past are 
essential steps on the path towards constructing new identities. In these contexts, as Avishai 
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Margalit writes, “[c]ommunities must make decisions and establish institutions that foster 
forgetting as much as remembering.” 
112
 More so than in any other situation, in these scenarios 
of political instability and social fragmentation, memory plays the above-analysed role of 
political tool to legitimize or delegitimize institutions and powers and to shape social identity. 
Especially in processes of transitional justice, memories of traumatic events have been 
used to foster social cohesion, and enhance the process of adapting and negotiating collective 
identity. In the Latin America context, for instance, the ‘Nunca Mas narrative’ dominated the 
whole process of political and social transition to democracy. It provided the bases on which 
to reconstruct the new social order and identity which primarily recognizes itself in opposition 
to what happened during the military dictatorships in the region. The representation of the 
atrocities of the past regimes in the public opinion proved to be a powerful instrument to 
mobilize the civil society, and to delegitimize the previous leaderships. Vehemently voicing 
the memories of violence that for a long time had been silenced, contributed to awakening the 
social conscience and moving on along the political and social way to the transition. 
These two ties between transitional justice and memory – that is, on the one side, the 
storytelling role of transitional justice mechanisms and its impact on collective memory, and, 
on the other side, the interplay between identity narratives and the transitional justice process - 
reveals, I believe, the strong, reciprocal bond between them. If, on the one hand, the 
transitional justice ‘package’ that governments choose to implement in dealing with violent 
past contributes to forge new memory narratives through the storytelling role of transitional 
justice mechanisms, on the other hand, these narratives contribute to construct a new social 
identity, in which, in turn, those mechanisms find their legitimacy. The political choice to deal 
with the legacy of past abuses through – say - amnesty laws, compensations to victims, and 
reconciliation projects, rather than with prosecutions, vetting, and commemorations, certainly 
influences how a certain society will address and understand its past. At the same time, 
however, a pre-existing, social network of irreconcilable memories may determine political 
elites to reject political options that presuppose any open discussion on the past. Indeed, as 
Francesca Lessa notes, memory narratives emerging in the aftermath of mass violence, create 
“a sort of latent framework for making sense of the past”; in so doing, they may provide 
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widespread legitimacy to the political choices made at the institutional level regarding the 
transitional processes. In this way, eventually, they may both reinforce and gain authority from 





This chapter posited the theoretical bases for the main argumentation of the thesis. It 
discussed the controversial notion of memory, to found a common understanding of it for the 
purpose of this research. In doing so, it first provided a general account of the main issues in, 
and approaches to memory-studies, and pinpointed some main features of the concept of 
memory. After that, the chapter analysed how the intersections between the processes of 
remembering in post-violence and post-conflict societies and disciplines such as law and 
transitional justice can furthermore affect the characteristics and dynamics of memory. 
In particular, this chapter identified what have been called ‘differentiating markers’ of 
the concept of memory. The analysis started from the concept of collective memory and the 
critiques made of it. The interrelation between the social and individual dimension of memory 
came first to the fore. We learnt that collective memory is first and foremost a social process, 
constantly in flux and in evolution, emerging from the constant negotiations among different 
memory-carrying groups within the society, and between them and political institutions. I 
constructed the concept of collective memory not as a monolithic, shared, unitary image of 
past events, but rather as the complex, sometimes problematic coexistence of multiple 
narratives, which need to be acknowledged and included within the social processes of 
memorialization. Alongside this social dimension of collective memory, the role of individual 
agency in the memory-making process was then discussed and accommodated within the 
notion of collective memory. Although referring to a social phenomenon, the understanding of 
memory in this research in fact does not disregard the role played by individuals, in general, 
and victims, in particular, in the processes of coming to terms with past suffering and violence. 
The existence of collective, social narratives, hence, cannot frustrate the private memories of 
the individual. 
Furthermore, I remarked on the crucial connection between collective memory and 
national identity. This intrinsic relation has proved particularly important in contexts of 
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political and social transition, where memory plays a role in the striving for identity (re-
)construction. The discussion on how national governments – both liberal and authoritarian – 
have reconstructed narratives from the past in a fashion that better legitimized their policies, 
however, highlights the risk of memory being used as a tool for political ends, making it 
vulnerable to manipulation by political leaderships and institutions. The presentist approach 
that was discussed in the chapter provided a good basis for further exploration of this 
connection between present interests and images of the past. It claims that perceptions of the 
past are influenced by needs and values that societies share in the present. Law – it was 
observed – can act as a mechanism through which this process of shaping narratives takes 
place. 
Building upon the presentist argument, I extended this theory to the international legal 
context, putting forth the core argument of this thesis. Whilst in the era of nationalisms and 
nation-states, the political shaping of traditions and narratives from the past was mainly a 
prerogative of governments, which used it to justify and legitimize their authority and political 
choices, the current political and social order has complicated the landscape of memory-actors. 
Indeed, in the era of international relations and supra-state institutions, in which more and 
more political and cultural institutions transcend the national domain, the human rights 
discourse enters into many of the spheres of state sovereignty, introducing new narrative 
frameworks into national debates. In this way, I argue, the human rights discourse acts as a 
vehicle for transposing interests from the international community to national societies. In 
doing so, flowing into national systems through the human rights and international law 
methods and tools, it becomes an instrument for influencing the internal dynamics of memory-
making processes. 
To complicate this scenario even more, the chapter pointed out the specificity of 
memory-processes in societies emerging from mass violence and systematic abuses of human 
rights, which are the scope of this thesis. The transitional justice scholarship contributes to 
delineating the concept of memory from two perspectives. First, it conveys two lessons about 
how societies should deal with overcoming patterns of violence. On the one hand, it is said 
that past abuses are to be faced. That is, they cannot be wiped out nor silenced. Memory is to 
be the way. On the other hand, there cannot be a given general formula to deal with the past. 
The ways to face the past and the timing for doing so should rest in the hands of each society 
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themselves. Memory, therefore, should not be imposed from outside. Second, the transitional 
justice discourse brings some specificity to the concept of memory. Indeed, because of the 
crucial role of memory in reconstructing national identities, memory is, in these contexts, 
mainly used as a battlefield for competing political groups to enforce predominance over other 
groups. Moreover, transitional justice mechanisms – as agents of memory narratives - directly 
or indirectly impact on the social process of working through past experiences. 
A number of insights into the concept of memory have been highlighted so far. 
Memory is a complex, variable process, which involves communities as much as individuals, 
moving back and forth like a pendulum from the present to the past.
114
 To talk about memory 
implies that we are dealing with a human and social quality rather than with a measurable 
object; as such, we should be aware of the different stakeholders that interact with, and react to 
each other in order to negotiate and elaborate memory-narratives within a society. The 
political power relations that necessarily influence the memory-making process should also be 
taken into account to grasp all the different forces involved in this process. With all these 
caveats in mind, I can now turn to the proper analytical part of the thesis: identifying the main 
components of the duty of memory. 
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The Duty to Ascertain the Truth 
Introduction 
It has been said that “establishing responsibility for human rights violations, allowing 
justice to be done and victims to know the truth, requires evidence”.
115
 In the aftermath of 
gross violations of human rights, international law firstly demands that responsible 
governments investigate and disclose the events which constituted grave breaches of human 
rights. This calls for states to take appropriate action in order to shed light on the past period 
of violations and offer explanations for abuses. The legal label for this duty is the obligation to 
investigate human rights violations, which has been defined as a “positive and proactive 
obligation.” It necessitates the establishment of mechanisms of truth seeking and the setting-
up of judicial recourses by governments emerging from post-violence and post-conflict 
situations.
116
 This obligation deals with the history of a country – and with its memory – in the 
sense that it imposes the state to face past atrocities committed in its territory and to dig into 
them. In this way, it compels states to confront their past without allowing them amnesia or 
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silence. Understanding the content, purpose, and standards of this duty will allow us better to 
unveil a piece of the puzzle that constitutes the ‘duty of memory’. 
Both the legal foundation and the content of the obligation to investigate are complex 
and rich, as well as the purposes it serves. A number of legal provisions as well as legal bodies 
and institutions have contributed to sketch its contours. In what follows, the foundation and 
content of the obligation to investigate is examined, looking at the practice of human rights 
bodies in order to understand how they have performed and developed it. The chapter opens 
with a theoretical reflection on the relationship between legal investigations and memory, to 
clarify the relevance of the chapter for the whole discussion on memory. After that, there will 
be conducted an analysis of the main legal grounds that have been used by international and 
regional human rights bodies to urge states to respect their obligation to investigate. Then, 
from these legal grounds, specific standards of compliance are inferred, in order to establish 
the general requirements of the obligation to investigate in the case of serious violations of 
human rights. This will allow us to reflect on the extent to which these standards may affect 
the way states look into their past, and, therefore, the extent to which they are free to enlighten 
and disclose or, conversely, to hide and cover up, the factual bases on which a shared vision of 
the past may be founded. The analysis will mostly be performed by means of the jurisprudence 
of the HRC, the ECtHR, and the IACtHR. Finally, in the last part of the chapter, an overview 
is presented of the most common mechanisms which have been implemented by states in post-
conflict and post-violence contexts to comply with this duty. In doing so, the chapter unfolds 
the correlation between the duty to investigate and the processes of memory-making, 
identifying and pointing out the ties that the former imposes on the latter, under international 
human rights law. 
1. Memory and the Duty to Investigate 
The search for, and investigation of, past violations of human rights render the past an 
eternal present, so as to allow the survivors of the violations to earn their future.
117
 
Justice requires truth. If victims and their families are to see justice done, they firstly 
need to have their suffering and harm recognized. Diane Orentlicher observes that uncovering 
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the truth about past atrocities is a “non-negotiable moral obligation of governments”.
118 
The 
lack of investigations into the facts means leaving victims without a name, without dignity. It 
means to re-victimize the victims of atrocities. Meanwhile, to be aware of the horrific events 
that happened in the past, of the political and social dynamics which allowed them to happen, 
is a necessary – although not necessarily sufficient – condition to prevent those events from 
reoccurring in the future. Moreover, when in a context of democratic transition after the 
commission of gross human rights violations, the new government opens investigations, it 
offers a first indication of its political will to come to terms with the past and enter into a new 
commitment to the rule of law and human rights protection. In these terms, the obligation to 
investigate becomes a crucial element of doing justice, in its broadest sense. 
However, at the same time, the process of uncovering and recovering the past records 
of the atrocities – the process of bringing to light and telling ‘what really happened’ – 
determines the writing of narratives. These narratives, in turn, contribute to creating collective 
memories through processes of social elaboration.
119
 Indeed, among other elements, the 
memory-work of a society finds its origins in what has been ascertained, verified, and made 
public about the facts. With a fascinating etymological interpretation, James Booth reminds us 
that the Greek word alētheia (ἀ-λήθεια) – truth – arises from the negation (ἀ) of oblivion 
(λήθη), and therefore defines the process of remembrance as the one of “preserv[ing] the 
truth” of the facts.
120
 By elaborating a narrative of the abuses, claiming the search for truth, 
and marking the crimes with a public stigma, investigations influence what and how the 
society has to remember about the facts that are to be ascertained. Investigations provide an 
account of those facts, which is subsequently ready to be interpreted and judged by the 
competent authorities, and to be discussed within the society. They bring the events which 
lacerated the individuals’ dignity into the public view, and thereby convey them from the 
individual to the social sphere, waiting for public recognition. They convert private knowledge 
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 Certainly, at this stage, the account they give is just a raw 
recollection of facts that needs to be further elaborated, explained and assessed. Yet the 
modalities through which they are investigated influence the way they are represented. 
Actually, those facts become one of the main sources for the society in the acknowledgement 
and discussion of its past. 
Whether the law should be the instrument through which those facts should be 
conveyed into a memory-work process, i.e. the process of ordering and giving meaning to the 
events of the past in the present, is a widely discussed, thorny issue.
122
 The issue belongs in 
the broader theoretical debate about the role of law in influencing and determining social 
constructions that we addressed in the previous chapter.
123
 It also involves the thorny 
relationship between the two different concepts of historical and judicial truth. From that 
debate, it has to be acknowledged here that, when historical narratives of the abuses of the past 
are ascertained through legal instruments, or when the object of those inquiries is established 
in law, for instance by imposing limits on the mandates of courts and truth commissions 
ratione temporis and ratione materiae, the facts ascertained through those legal tools come to 
have a different, more pregnant, social weight compared to the facts which are ascertained 
through other means - from media inquiries to historical research. This is the “institutionalized 
remembrance of the past”.
124
 The legal frame that supports legal (or legally shaped) 
investigations truly bestows these constructed accounts of the past with a degree of authority 
and publicity that elevate them in comparison with other accounts. The law gives the findings 
resulting from those investigations a higher standing which makes them to play a more 
important role in the multifaceted dynamics of the memory-work. 
Therefore, it should remain clear that when international law comes into the modalities 
of investigations, indicating how, what, and when to investigate, it becomes an agent in the 
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collective memory-process of a society. The investigations which are shaped according to the 
instruments and standards prescribed by the corresponding international obligation provide 
data for the society to process its trauma. Admittedly, the data coming from legal 
investigations or official truth-seeking inquiries is certainly neither the only, nor necessarily 
the most important information for the society to develop a commonly shared version of their 
mournful past. Nevertheless, the power and the authority that this data has because of its legal 
qualification, enables it to impact strongly on the memory-work within the society. The 
international obligation to investigate serious human rights abuses is therefore a first aspect in 
which international law and human rights law impact on the process of memory-making. 
2. The Obligation to Investigate Gross Human Rights Violations under Human 
Rights Law 
2.1 Legal Foundation 
Despite the fact there are no explicit provisions in the general human rights instruments 
that specify a legal obligation to conduct investigations, in the human rights arena the 
existence and foundation of the obligation to investigate is nowadays well established. Beside 
the specific human rights and humanitarian law conventions and treaties which enshrine it,
125
 
international and regional bodies and courts have repeatedly affirmed and asserted the need for 
a state to bring to light human rights abuses committed in its territory through official and 
formal investigations. In conjunction, standards and criteria have been elaborated in order to 
define thresholds for governments to discharge their obligation to investigate. While the very 
existence of such a legal duty under human rights law is uncontroversial, the ways in which 
this duty has been rationalized are different. From the analysis of the case law of the 
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supervisory bodies of the main general human rights instruments, four main lines of reasoning 
can be pointed out in order to explain the legal roots of the duty to investigate: i) duty to 
investigate as procedural tool for general protection and enforcement of human rights; ii) 
investigations as a form of effective remedy and access to justice for victims; iii) duty to 
investigate deriving from the right to the truth; iv) duty to investigate as a form of reparation 
in itself for victims of human rights abuses and their families.
126
 These arguments will be used 
below to better conceptualize the legal basis for a duty to investigate under international law. 
2.1.1 “Ensure and protect” clause 
Human rights law imposes a primary, general obligation to respect, ensure, and protect 
rights on states. This general obligation places two main sets of duties on states: obligations to 
abstain from violating substantive rights; and obligations to ensure their effective protection 
and enjoyment by individuals. While the first set of negative obligations entails omissive 
behaviours that states are to maintain, the latter imposes positive actions to be undertaken. As 
a consequence, for states to fulfil their obligations under human rights law, refraining from 
infringing human rights will not suffice. They are also obliged to proactively take steps in 
order to secure and protect those rights. Among the number of positive obligations that human 
rights judicial and quasi-judicial bodies have derived from the extensive interpretation of the 
most fundamental rights, the obligation to conduct investigation has been considered an 
essential instrument of protection.
127
 In fact, the need to have violations appropriately and 
competently investigated and clarified has been considered so essential that it is to be deemed 
a constitutive part of the same rights protected. In this regard, in its General Comment on the 
nature of general legal obligations imposed on states parties, the HRC expressed the view that: 
There may be circumstances in which a failure to ensure Covenant rights as 
required by article 2 would give rise to violations by States Parties of those 
rights, as a result of States Parties’ permitting or failing to take appropriate 
measures or to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress 
the harm caused by such acts by private persons or entities. 
128
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The doctrine of positive obligations thusly provides a first legal basis to found the duty 
to investigate on.
129
 In this conceptualization, the duty to investigate is considered part of the 
procedural dimension of the same substantive right from which it emerges, since it is viewed 
as instrumental for securing its effective implementation.
130
 In this interpretation, therefore, 
the duty to investigate has been considered a matter of primary protection. 
Following the doctrine of positive obligations, both the European and the American 
systems, respectively the ECtHR and the IACtHR have derived the obligation to conduct 
investigations from the conjoined reading of the general guarantee clauses enshrined in the 
regional human rights conventions and the substantive rights included therein.
131
 The IACtHR 
has developed its jurisprudence on this matter extensively. The Court has rooted the rationale 
for the duty to investigate in different arguments, ranging from preventative to remedial 
functions.
132
 The construction of the duty to investigate as a guarantee for the general interest 
of protection of human rights has been put forth since the outset of its jurisprudence. Already 
in Velásquez Rodríguez, the Court recognized that the responsibility of a state can be 
established also for acts which cannot be directly imputed to its organs, because of the failure 
to prevent or to respond to misconducts.
133
 The Court interprets a duty to prevent and respond 
as part of the state obligation to ensure the “free and full exercise of the rights recognized by 
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the Convention”, which, in turn, establishes an obligation to “prevent, investigate and punish 
any violations”, and, when possible, provide for reparations.
134
 Since that decision, the duty to 
investigate has been continuously linked to the content of the general duty to ensure and 
protect. 
Similarly, the ECtHR has inferred the duty to investigate, arguing from the dual 
dimension of human rights. According to the Court, each right entails a substantial and a 
procedural dimension, which are independent from each other.
135
 The duty to investigate 
violations of substantive rights is part of the procedural protection of rights that states owe 
individuals within their jurisdiction.
136
 The independence of the two dimensions allows for a 
conceptual division between two different infringements: the one affecting the victim’s 
substantive right, and the one impinging on the procedural requirements which the substantive 
part dictates. The lack of responsibility for a substantial violation of rights does not necessary 
discharge the full set of obligations that states bear under the European Convention.
137
 This 
argument has greatly extended the protection of human rights in the European system. Indeed, 
it has allowed the Court to establish the liability of a state even when the direct violation of the 
substantive right could not be ascribed to state agents; moreover, in recent developments, it 
has also founded the state responsibility even with regards to abuses which had occurred 
before the date of the entry into force of the European Convention with respect to that state. In 
this sense, the procedural obligation to investigate extends the Court’s jurisdiction ratione 
temporis toward the past. 
138
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Enshrined in this conceptualization, there is a clear general preventative rationale, 
which has proved important for the discourse on the fight against impunity. In the Maritza 
Urrutia judgment, a case on torture, the IACtHR considered that the lack of investigation into 
the facts had allowed the acts of torture to go unpunished. On this basis, it found the 
responsibility of the state in that it failed “to take effective measures to avoid acts of this 
nature being repeated within its jurisdiction”.
139
 Indeed, the Court considers the very same 
definition of impunity as “the absence of any investigation, pursuit, capture, prosecution and 
conviction of those responsible for the violations of rights protected by the American 
Convention”.
140
 As a consequence, “the State has the obligation to combat that situation with 
all available legal means, because impunity leads to the chronic repetition of human rights 
violations and to the total defenselessness of the victims and their next of kin”,
141
 and 
therefore it “is injurious to the victims, their next of kin and society as a whole, and fosters 
chronic recidivism of the human rights violations involved”.
142
 Hence, the general protection 
clause entails appropriate investigations as a matter of prevention. 
Like the Inter-American Court, the European Court of Human Rights has developed 
the general prevention argument as a legal reasoning to enforce the procedural obligation to 
investigate. Adjudicating on a case of alleged unlawful killings by the security forces of the 
UK, the Court affirmed that the lack of established procedures of investigations on the use of 
force by state agents would deprive the substantive right to life of any effectiveness. Based on 
this, the Court notes that  
[t]he obligation to protect the right to life under this provision (art. 2), read in 
conjunction with the State's general duty under Article 1 (art. 2+1) of the 
Convention to "secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in [the] Convention", requires by implication that there should 
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be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been 
killed as a result of the use of force by, inter alia, agents of the State. 
143
 
The Court extended this argument also to violations of other fundamental rights. In an 
alleged case of torture, in which it had been impossible to ascertain the responsibility of state 
agents for acts of torture (Article 3), the Court declared the state responsible for the violation 
of the state duty to conduct an investigation “capable of leading to the identification and 
punishment of those responsible”. The Court argued on the grounds of the procedural 
dimension of Article 3. Unanimously, the Court maintained that in the absence of such an 
obligation to investigate, 
the general legal prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment 
and punishment, despite its fundamental importance (…), would be ineffective 
in practice and it would be possible in some cases for agents of the State to 
abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity.
144
 
Impunity, again, becomes a primary basis on which the duty to investigate comes to 
play an important role of prevention and general guarantee for the whole society. The lack of 
investigation is deemed instrumental in exacerbating situations of continuous impunity. As a 
matter of fact, this would jeopardize the system of rights protection and its effectiveness.
145
 
From this perspective, hence, the procedural dimension of rights requires investigations into 
human rights violations as a form of deterrence from future abuses. 
The conceptualization of the duty to investigate as a matter of human rights protection 
has been interpreted as also including the protection of individual rights in individual claims. 
In this second perspective, the state obligation to ensure rights would entail the right of victims 
to have their violations investigated not only as a matter of general prevention, but also as a 
matter of individual protection, specific to the single victim. When turning from the general 
preventive rationale to the effective protection of individual rights, however, understanding 
the duty to investigate is not so straightforward. It is true that the main human rights bodies 
have easily and often linked the lack or insufficiency of investigative proceedings to the 
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violation of the individual right (e.g. the right to life). In doing so, they have suggested that 
investigations should be conducted in the specific interest of the victim. Nevertheless, the 
conceptualization of the duty to investigate in terms of procedural obligations originating from 
substantive rights is still confusing somehow. Whilst the general prevention argument that 
upholds the duty to investigate is easily understandable on the basis of the deterrent rationale, 
the construction of the duty to investigation as a preventative tool for the specific violation of 
the individual’s substantive right about which it inquiries is not convincing. It is hard to 
understand how a subsequent investigation into the facts that lead to the violation of the 
individual right could ensure or protect the right infringed in the present. Anja Seibert-Fohr 
proposes an explanation for this jurisprudence through the concept of “retrospective 
protection”, that is the application of measures of prevention after the infringement of the 
substantive right (ex post facto), to secure the right of the individual retrospectively.
146
 Even 
though this interpretation sounds very appealing, it too extensively overlaps with the remedial 
rational of the duty to investigate (which I will discuss below). This discourages the need for a 
different and separate conceptualization. It seems therefore preferable to keep the remedial 
interpretation when talking about a duty to investigate from the perspective of victims’ rights. 
Shaping the duty to investigate in terms of either general prevention or individual 
protection has important practical consequences for determining the specific content of the 
duty to investigate. In the first case, if investigations are undertaken in the interest of 
prevention of the general society, individuals cannot claim against the state for failing to 
conduct inquiries, unless it is proven that such a situation of impunity also conditioned the 
violation of substantive rights of the individual. In the second case, if investigations are 
ordered to ensure individual rights, the victims can claim the negligence of the state in 
investigating the violations, but only within the limits of the specific case. 
Bringing these arguments to the specific focus of my dissertation, the consequences of 
such interpretative divergences are likely to have an impact on the memory-making process in 
that the scope of the inquiries changes, and thereby their outcomes as well. Indeed, an 
investigation required for the satisfaction of an individual right would bring to light those 
events which are specifically intended to reaffirm the individual right that was infringed. If 
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other aspects come to light, they would be considered only if, and to the extent to which, they 
support or oppose the individual claim. Conversely, if investigations are performed for the 
sake of the general protection of the society, the aspect of deterrence comes to the fore. 
Investigations are to be undertaken to prevent situations of general impunity, where individual 
rights can be violated without the perpetrators being held accountable. To avoid such a 
situation, for the rule of law to be re-affirmed, the whole framework of illegality has to be 
brought to light and publicly recognized. The society has to know which dynamics led to the 
generalized abuses, and, consequently, the whole historical narrative has to be uncovered and 
publicly conveyed. 
2.1.2 Right to an effective remedy 
In addition to the effective protection clauses spelled out in the main human rights 
instruments, the Human Rights Committee, the Inter-American Commission and Court, and 
the European Court of Human Rights have been consistently deriving a general duty to 
conduct investigations from the individual right to an effective remedy. In fact, this probably 
has been the traditional conceptualization for this duty. As is known, the right to a remedy is 
the individual entitlement of victims to enter accessible and effective procedures and 
mechanisms to vindicate their rights and to obtain redress.
147
 Because it is held to be a 
fundamental guarantee for the effective protection of primary rights, secondary norms that 
establish both substantial and procedural remedies are contained in almost all the multilateral 
human rights treaties.
148
 Besides the textual scope of the provisions, the right to a remedy has 
been expanded by judicial interpretation. It has been considered an absolute right, non 
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 In its broad interpretation, it encompasses both a procedural and a 
substantial dimension. While from the latter viewpoint it mostly refers to the victim’s right to 
obtain reparations, in its procedural dimension it entails the right of individuals to bring a 




The procedural dimension in particular has provided the legal basis of the duty to 
investigate under the remedial rationale. In this sense, the right to a remedy has been 
interpreted as requiring effective, prompt, and impartial investigation as a precondition for 
access to justice, and, therewith, right vindication mechanisms.
151
 The human rights 
supervisory bodies have repeatedly stated that the absence of an official and thorough 
investigation would deprive victims of the possibility to identify those responsible for the 
abuses they suffered, to collect evidence, and consequently successfully bring their claims to 
appropriate fora to obtain redress. 
The ECtHR has created a consistent body of judgments in which it has understood 
Article 13 of the ECHR as embracing the states’ obligation to carry out effective 
investigations on allegations of violations to the rights of the Convention. The Court has 
declared that in the case of the  
most fundamental [rights] on the scheme of the Convention (…) the notion of an 
effective remedy for the purposes of Article 13 entails (…) a thorough and 
effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of 
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By means of this argument, the Court has extended the scope of Article 13 as requiring 
effective investigations in cases involving abuses to Article 2 (right to life),
153
 torture and ill 
treatment (Article 3),
154
 slavery and human trafficking (Article 4),
155
 and forced disappearance 
(Article 5).
156
 Similarly, the HRC has emphasized that “responsibility for investigations falls 
under the State party’s obligation to grant an effective remedy”.
157
 
In the Inter-American system, the duty to investigate as a corollary of the right to a 
remedy has been further developed from the viewpoint of individual rights. The Court has 
elaborated its reasoning by taking its usual victim-centric approach. Since the Durand and 
Ugarte case, it has interpreted the joint reading of Articles 8 (judicial guarantees) and 25 
(judicial protection) as the framework for recognizing a “right to justice” for victims.
158
 
According to the Court, while Article 25 requires states to adopt mechanisms to grant victims 
the effective access to instruments of vindication of rights, Article 8 sets the parameters of the 
due process which these mechanisms are to comply with in cases of the most serious 
violations. As a consequence of that argumentation, the Court has recognized a sort of victims’ 
right to have violations of fundamental rights investigated not only by civil or administrative, 
but also by criminal courts and authorities. This right is now established in the Inter-American 
jurisprudence.
159
 Whether this interpretation also leads to the victims’ right to have their 
perpetrators prosecuted and punished is an interesting line that cannot be dealt with in the 
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 However, it is important to note here that, while the duty to investigate - 
derived from the right to an effective remedy tout court -, is mainly constructed to serve the 
interest of offering restoration for victims, as it is in the case law of the ECtHR and HRC, the 
interpretation provided by the IACtHR makes that, whenever investigations into serious 
human rights abuses are neglected to be carried out or conducted in an inadequate or 
ineffective manner, the state is always responsible for denial of justice, notwithstanding 
whether or not the victims could have access to different remedies.
161
 In this interpretation, 
investigation becomes the object of legitimate claims of victims, even if and when alternative 
mechanisms of redress have been put in place for them. 
The duty to investigate applies not only to the crimes committed by the current 
government, but also to the ones having taken place during previous regimes.
162
 On this basis, 
the Human Rights Committee has used the right to a remedy even to deny the validity of 
amnesty laws enacted in Latin-American countries, since they “prevent(…) relevant 
investigation and punishment of perpetrators of past human rights violations”.
163
 In so doing, 
the Committee says, they hamper any administrative or civil process of adjudication, and deny 
victims the right to pursue any form of reparations.
164
 In the same vein, the IACtHR 
elaborated its jurisprudence on the inadmissibility of amnesties, relying inter alia on the 
argument that  
[t]his type of law precludes the identification of the individuals who are 
responsible for human rights violations, because it obstructs the investigation 
and access to justice and prevents the victims and their next of kin from 
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knowing the truth and receiving the corresponding reparation. For this reasons, 
amnesties violates the right of victims to judicial protection.
165
 
In line with the ‘ensure and protect argument’ presented above, the interpretation of the 
duty to investigate as part of the right to an effective remedy entails that its infringement is 
independent from the abuse of the primary right from which it stems. In this sense, in its 
General Comment on the nature of the general legal obligations imposed on states parties, the 
HRC expressed the view that a “failure to investigate allegations of violations could in and of 
itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant” in relation to the victims right to an 
effective remedy. As a result, in many decisions in which a lack of investigation was found, 
the human rights adjudicatory bodies held states accountable for a double violation, both of 
the substantive right and of the secondary obligation to provide effective remedy.
166
 Contrary 
to the previous reasoning, however, the conceptualization of the duty to investigate as a 
remedy brings it to the framework of secondary norms. Indeed, because the right to a remedy 
arises only after a violation of primary rights occurs, the obligation to investigate is 
constructed as a secondary obligation. Consequently, a failure in investigating the facts can 
cause the state to be held responsible for the violation of the right to a remedy only if and 
when the infringement of the primary right is proven.
167
 Individuals, moreover, cannot claim 
their right to a remedy as a legal basis to expect states to investigate violations committed by 
third parties. 
Deriving an obligation to investigate from the individual right to have access to 
effective remedies is meaningful also in other respects. Firstly, the remedial entitlement being 
the source of the duty, the scope of the latter will be defined by the purpose of the former. 
That is to say that, except in the American system, an investigation is always required to the 
extent of, and limited to, satisfying the right to an effective civil or administrative remedy. In 
this sense, the European Court understands the duty to investigate, inferred from Article 2, 
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broader than the one derived from Article 13, because the scope of the latter is narrowed down 
by the remedial aim it aspires to. That is, investigations carried out on the basis of Article 13 
are limited to ascertaining whether the lack or deficiencies in the investigative proceeding 
have affected the individual right to access to a remedy.
168
 Taken to an extreme, this reasoning 
would lead to arguing that, at least in the European and UN system, when victims can access 
different proceedings to obtain redress for the infringment of their rights, an investigation may 
be considered superfluous, and its lack would not entail a violation of the right to an effective 
remedy. In this case, the lack of investigation would become legally relevant only from the 
viewpoint of the (procedural dimension of the) substantive right which is deemed infringed. 
2.1.3 Right to truth  
The right to truth has been firstly and mostly conceptualized within the Latin American 
continent and its regional institutions of human rights. In the last decades, however, it has 
overcome the geographic boundaries of that region, and has come to take a place within the 
international human rights fora. The legal dimension of the right to truth has been crystallized 
in an increasing number of international legal instruments and national legislations in the last 
decades, and it has been increasingly advocated by human rights bodies and courts. It has 
alternatively been considered a guiding principle or a legal entitlement, and, in the latter case, 
it has either been accounted an autonomous right or, more often, inferred from other rights.
169
 
Since its legal justification arises from different legal sources, the right to the truth describes a 
set of different entitlements for victims, at the same time looking toward the investigation of 
the past and the disclosure of the facts in the present. The full implementation of such a right, 
therefore, imposes a number of different duties on states at different levels. Despite the fact 
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that its contours still remain rather vague, in cases of gross violations of human rights, the 
right to the truth has been included in the set of victims’ entitlements. Indeed, practice shows 
that, when there have been mass patterns of violence where human rights were infringed, 
victims have a right to know the truth. That is to say, in a nutshell, victims are entitled to 
know (…) the full and complete truth as to the events that transpired, their 
specific circumstances, and who participated in them, including knowing the 
circumstances in which the violations took place, as well as the reasons for 
them. In cases of enforced disappearance, missing persons, children abducted or 
during the captivity of a mother subjected to enforced disappearance, secret 
executions and secret burial place, the right to the truth also has a special 
dimension: to know the fate and hereabouts of the victim.
170
 
The obligation to investigate is necessarily an essential element in the satisfaction of 
such entitlement. Conducting investigations to ascertain the facts that amounted to human 
rights abuses is clearly a precondition for ensuring that victims and their families get to know 
those facts, and therefore for allowing them to exercise their right to truth. In spite of the 
intuitive connection between the right to truth and the duty to investigate, their relationship 
has mostly been explored at the level of soft law. In fact, both the European and the UN’s 
(quasi-) adjudicatory bodies of human rights protection have been rather cautious in enforcing 
the protection of this right as such, and, therefore, in establishing a direct nexus between the 
right to truth and the obligation to investigate.
171
 The Inter-American institutions are an 
exception to this approach. Contrary to their international and European colleagues, they have 
been straightforward in drawing a logical and normative link between the two. It will be 
interesting, thus, to start this overview on the correlation between the right to truth and the 
duty to investigate with a survey of the Inter-American case law. 
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Already in Velasquez Rodriguez, one can find some insights of the Court’s approach to 
the right to truth, although still at an embryonic stage. As the reader will remember, in that 
first case, the Court recognized the state’s obligation to investigate, as an instrument to ensure 
the full enjoyment of the rights enshrined in the American Convention. In the light of this, the 
Court demanded that the state “use the means at its disposal to inform the relatives of the fate 
of the victims and, if they have been killed, the location of their remains”.
172
 In that early 
stage, however, the families’ right to know the fate of their next of kin was considered a 
“reasonable expectation” worth being protected.
173
 It was years later, on the wave of the 
international discussion about the nature and foundation of a victims’ right to truth within the 
UN bodies,
174
 that the Court begun to conceptualize this individual interest as a legal 
entitlement. 
Admittedly, however, since Bámaca-Velásquez, the Court has developed a rather 
confusing and inconsistent framework to normatively found the right. Already in that first 
case, the Court recognized that the state’s refusal to allow the family of the victim to learn 
about the facts and to locate the victim’s remains as an act of cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment, therefore in breach of Article 5 of the Convention. At the same time, however, the 
Court constructed the right to truth as subsumed under the victims’ right to obtain clarification 
of both the facts and the corresponding responsibilities regarding the violations “through the 
investigation and prosecution established in Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention”.
175
 
Furthermore, in the corresponding judgment on reparations, it defined the right to the truth as 
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a form of satisfaction in itself, and, therefore, as “an expectation regarding which the state 
must satisfy the next of kin of the victims and society as a whole”. In only one case, thus, the 
right to the truth was considered: i) protected by the general prohibition of torture, inhuman 
and degrading treatments; ii) part of the substantive right “to obtain clarification of the 
events”; iii) a remedial measure; iv) a legitimate expectation of both the victim and the whole 
society. In the subsequent case law, while the victims’ right to the truth was constantly 
reaffirmed and upheld under different interpretations, the Court has not further clarified its line 
of argument with regard to its legal basis. 
Turning away from the American region and its institutions, the relation between the 
right to truth and the duty to investigate has been highlighted in the international system in a 
number of soft law instruments instituted by UN bodies.
176
 Enforced disappearance and the 
fight against impunity have been the two major domains in which this relation has been 
examined. Against this background, the state duty to conduct prompt and effective 
investigations has been conceptualized as a corollary of the victims’ right to know the truth 
about mass and widespread human rights violations. The Set of Principles for the Protection 
and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity, in the updated report 
presented by the independent expert Diane Orentlicher to the former Human Right 
Commission (hereinafter: Principles to Combat Impunity or Set of Principles), after affirming 
that “[e]very people has the inalienable right to know the truth about past events concerning 
the perpetration of heinous crimes and about the circumstances and reasons that led, through 
mass or systematic violations, to the perpetration of those crimes”, meaningfully indicates 
mechanisms of inquiry and investigation under the title of “guarantees to give effect to the 
right to know”.
177
 Under the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law (hereafter Basic Principles on Reparations), the duty to 
investigate is not directly linked to the victims’ entitlement to know the truth, and it is rather 
conceived both as part of the scope of the general duty to ensure, respect, and implement 
rights, and as a remedial form of satisfaction for victims.
178
 The Chicago Principles on Post-
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Conflict Justice, finally, recommend that states conduct formal investigations through a multi-
level system of truth-seeking mechanisms, in primis truth commissions.
179
 This 
recommendation is functional in the broad understanding of the right to truth that the Chicago 
Principles embrace. This goes far beyond the right of victims to get to know about 
circumstances and facts related to the violations they suffered, but also extends to the 
knowledge of “general information regarding patterns of systematic violations, the history of 
the conflict and the identification of those responsible for past violations”, both for the victims 
and their relatives and for the general society. In this approach, the obligation to investigate 
would clearly require states to carry out an extensive clarification of the whole historical 
context in which the abuses took place. 
Also in the practice of international bodies and institutions, the relation between the 
state obligation to investigate and the victims’ right to truth was reinforced. In a number of 
documents and decisions, most human rights bodies - such as the Human Rights Council,
180
 
previously the Commission on Human Rights,
181
 the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights,
182
 the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances,
183
 the OAS 
General Assembly,
184
 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
185
 as well as the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe -
186
 have recognized the victims’ right to 
the truth, both in the context of the crime of enforced disappearance and in relation to other 
serious human rights abuses. Each of these documents refers to the duty to investigate. 
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Admittedly, the borders of these two figures – the obligation to investigate and the 
right to the truth - often blur and overlap; and this makes it difficult to understand the precise 
correlation between them. Considering the continuous oscillation of reasoning and rationales 
in official documents, however, an effort of rationalizing the different approaches does not 
seem relevant for our investigation. Indeed, the deep uncertainty and confusion that 
characterize the conceptualization of the right to the truth in international documents does not 
in any way diminish the evident connection between truth and investigations. Regardless of 
how the relation between the obligation to investigate and the right to truth has been 
understood, and in spite of the specific legal foundation of the latter, these two legal items are 
clearly two sides of the same coin. The duties which fall to states on account of the right to 
truth therefore contribute to delineating the content of the obligation to investigate. 
One of the most relevant aspects of the right to truth, which is common to its different 
conceptualizations, is its dual dimension. On the one hand, the right to the truth is an 
individual entitlement, owed to victims or their family members, to seek and obtain 
information about human rights abuses that led to their victimization. On the other hand, the 
right to the truth is a collective expectation “to know what has happened, generically or 
specifically, during a certain period of collective history”
187
 that is to be protected in the 
interest of the whole society. These two dimensions clearly influence the concrete content of 
the duty to investigate which stems from the right to the truth. In the individual dimension, the 
right to the truth is conceived as the individual right “to have the relevant State authorities to 
find out the truth of the facts that constitute the violations and establish the relevant liability 
through appropriate investigation and prosecution”,
188
 whereas the satisfaction of the 
collective dimension “requires the procedural determination of the most complete historical 
record possible. This determination must include a description of the patterns of joint action 
and should identify all those who participated in various ways in the violations and their 
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 Whilst the remedial rationale underpins the former 
dimension, the latter content, which is clearly broader than the individual facet, explains the 
preventive rationale of the norm. Investigations for the sake of the society are owed in order to 
ensure the prevention of future repetition. “[K]nowing the truth makes it easier for (the) 
society to look for other ways to prevent such kinds of violations in the future”.
190
 While the 
satisfaction of the individual right of victims may be achieved through administrative or 
criminal proceedings, the collective dimension of the right to truth imposes the duty to 
implement wide-ranging mechanisms of fact finding and historical inquiries on states. 
2.1.4 Right to reparation 
As described through the previous analysis, investigation processes are grounded on 
different legal bases and pursue various political and legal aims. Yet, the outcomes of these 
processes have also been understood as a means of satisfaction for victims, and a mechanism 
for preserving the historical memory of the society. While, under the label of the right to an 
effective remedy, investigations have been mainly understood as an instrumental, procedural 
means to ensure that victims may raise substantial legal claims, within the framework of 
reparations they are seen as a value itself. 
The remedial aspect of investigation lies in its symbolic dimensions: acknowledgment 
and recognition. When finding a violation through official inquiry mechanisms, a state 
recognizes the individual as a victim of abuse. In this way, recognition restores the right 
violated in the sense that it re-establishes the dignity of the victim by publicly acknowledging 
his or her suffering. At the same time, bringing the causes and mechanisms of violence to light 
may enable societies to better read and understand patterns of human rights abuses, and, 
hopefully, avoid their repetition in the future. The contribution of these elements to the process 
of memory-elaboration is therefore straightforward. 
Instruments of soft law that spell out the content of the right to reparations in the case 
of serious human rights violations embrace investigations as one of the measures to respect the 
principle of integral redress for the harm. This conceptualization is probably explicated most 
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in the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law,
191
 which will be examined further in the chapter on reparations.
192
 In the 
text, forms of inquiries are contemplated within the broad category of satisfaction, which may 
include: 
Verification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth (...);  
The search for the whereabouts of the disappeared, for the identities of the 
children abducted, and for the bodies of those killed, and assistance in the 
recovery, identification and reburial of the bodies in accordance with the 
expressed or presumed wish of the victims, or the cultural practices of the 
families and communities;  
(...) 
Inclusion of an accurate account of the violations that occurred in international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law training and in educational 
material at all levels.
193
 
Although the Basic Principles “do not entail new international or domestic legal 
obligations but identify mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the 
implementation of existing legal obligations”, they can be understood as indicative of 
emerging tendencies in the field of victims’ rights.
194
 Moreover, the Principles have provided 
guidelines and indications that have influenced the way in which reparation measures have 
been framed and implemented in state practice and judicial decisions in cases of the most 
serious violations. 
In the human rights practice, once again, it was the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights that first conceptualized investigations as a means of reparation. Until the middle of the 
nineties, the Court had considered the violation of the state duty to make appropriate inquiries 
about the abuses of conventional rights as a primary violation of substantive rights and 
guarantees. In fact, aspects related to investigations were usually addressed in the merits of the 
judgments.
195
 Nevertheless, since El Amparo Case, the Court begun to address investigations 
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also as a form of victims’ redress. For this reason, orders prescribing investigations were 
included in the part of the decisions devoted to reparations. 
196
  
In spite of this formal change in the structural conceptualization of the duty to 
investigate, however, for many years the Court continued to justify the state obligation to 
conduct investigations on the basis of primary rights. The right of victims and their next of kin 
to know the truth about what happened; the right to access to effective remedy; the duty to 
prevent impunity; and the general obligation to ensure rights were the legal grounds 
supporting the Court’s orders to effectively inquire into the abuses. As we saw in the previous 
analysis, the Court framed the duty to investigate as an independent, secondary obligation 
stemming from the violation of primary rights, parallel to, and distinct from the legal basis of 
the obligation to provide reparations for victims (Article 63 ACHR). Continuously and 
consistently, the Court has affirmed that “whenever there has been a human rights violation, 
the State has a duty to investigate the facts and to punish those responsible, (…) and this 
obligation must be complied with seriously and not as a mere formality”.
197
 Yet, the inclusion 
of the duty to investigate in the broad universe of reparations has become increasingly 
resolute. 
Further developments of the conceptualization of the duty to investigate as a form of 
reparation were elaborated in the Myrna Mack Chang case.
198
 In that judgment, the Court 
seems to distinguish between the duty to investigate, emerging as a consequence of the 
infringement of substantive primary rights, and the secondary obligation to conduct inquiries 
as a form of redress for victims. In this second perspective, investigations are strictly entwined 
with the right to truth. The Court conceptualized the right of victims to get to know what 
happened to them and to their next of kin as an “important means of reparation” in itself. 
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States must undertake effective investigations to satisfy that need to know, and – in so doing - 
to restore the dignity of victims and their family, especially in contexts of general impunity. 
Since Myrna Mack Chang, the Court has developed the remedial nature of the 
obligation to investigate on two levels, as an instrument of satisfaction for the individual 
victim (or their next of kin) and as a guarantee of non-repetition for the whole society. At the 
root of its reasoning, it lies, once again, the fight against impunity.
199
 For the Court, the lack of 
investigation into the facts “constitutes a source of additional suffering and anguish for the 
victims”,
200
 and at the same time contributes to feeding the general pattern of impunity for 
perpetrators, and thereby of insecurity for the society. This construction of the duty to 
investigate mirrors the above-mentioned dual nature of the right to know the truth, which 
strictly entwines with it. As a matter of fact, in the Court’s words, “not only the next of kin of 
the victims, but also society as a whole” benefit from investigations, since “by knowing the 
truth about such crimes, it can prevent them in the future”.
201
 
In its jurisprudence, the duty to investigate has become one of the most commonly 
issued forms of reparation to “completely redress” the infringements of the victims’ right to 
truth.
202
 And indeed the Court has continuously monitored the state compliance with 
investigative processes after its judgments in the same way it does with the other measures of 
reparations ordered.
203
 Although the Court’s understanding of the right to truth as a 
mechanism of redress leaves room for doubts and confusion, the relation the Court establishes 
between the legitimate expectation of victims and society to know the facts and the consequent 
obligation of the state to conduct investigations as a remedial measure, both at the individual 
and collective level, seems remarkable. 
2.1.5 Rationalizing the duty to investigate 
In the previous sections of this chapter, the duty to investigate has been explored 
according to the legal justifications used by international and regional human rights bodies. 
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The analysis of the different legal bases of the duty to investigate was not merely a doctrinal 
exercise. Actually, for the purposes of our inquiry, inferring the duty to investigate from one 
or another title is relevant for the actual content of the kind of inquiries states are to make. In 
each of the corresponding sections, some considerations have already been advanced. It is 
useful to recall them here, and put them in connection with each other. 
The rationale behind each normative ground affects the ways in which investigations 
must be carried out in order to discharge the corresponding state obligation. So, as has been 
noted, when investigations are sought as a remedy for victims, the ‘amount of truth’ that 
should be investigated is such that it effectively allows the victim to pursue redress for his or 
her harm. This could mean that, if the victim can achieve a remedy through alternative 
measures, the state, in theory, may even refrain from clarifying the facts.
204
 When 
investigations aim at preventing future patterns of mass human rights violations, on the 
contrary, public scrutiny and the eventual punishment of those responsible come to play a 
crucial role in accomplishing the deterrent task. The preventative rationale, moreover, entails 
that investigations are carried out in an extensive and comprehensive way; this means that 
states are expected, through investigations, to shed light on the whole system of illegality – 
and not only on the specific violations, so as to reveal structural frameworks of legal 
uncertainty and impunity in order to avoid future abuses. Public scrutiny also seems to be 
crucial when investigations are conducted to provide some form of satisfaction to the victims. 
In that case, location of the bodies, disclosure of mass graves, and official, public gestures 
enhance the effects of the remedial power of investigations. Moreover, when investigations are 
required to ensure the right to truth, the scope of the duty to investigate extends to providing 
not only a verification of the facts, but also an explanation for them. In particular, the dual 
dimension of the right to know the truth – individual and collective – entails that 
investigations should be conducted not only to uncover the facts that led to the victimization 
of individuals, but also to allow the society to get to know “general information regarding 
patterns of systematic violations, the history of the conflict and the identifications of those 
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 This is not to say that investigations actually differ in their objective or 
outcome according to the legal justification they are based upon, but that the rationale behind 
them influences the viewpoint from which investigations are conducted, first, and assessed, 
second. As a consequence, each investigation uncovers and preserves partial records, specific 
views of the whole historical account, according to the specific rationale it is based upon. 
2.2 Standards 
If we agree with the assertion that investigations are one of the preconditions for the 
creation of a collective memory, as they offer the factual basis from which the process of 
memory-elaboration might start, we have to recognize that the way investigations are 
implemented in practice has a strong impact on the content of the collective memory of 
society. In fact, if investigations are biased, politically distorted, or even just incomplete, the 
historical narratives they tell will be equally incomplete, distorted, and biased. As a result, the 
memory built upon those historical accounts will differ accordingly. Conversely, a full, 
impartial, and effective investigation will provide the society with the broad picture of the 
traumatic event on the basis of which it can negotiate and shape its memory. International 
human rights law can impact on the modalities of fact finding mechanisms by imposing 
specific standards on states which have to be met for the duty to investigate to be fully 
discharged. If we understand the investigative modalities and mechanisms which are required 
in international fora, hence, we can better understand how the duty to investigate may 
influence the way states read and represent the grave abuses committed in the past. Thus, it is 
relevant for our research to analyse the standards that international and regional human rights 
bodies have set over the years on how to investigate and what to investigate. 
There is wide-spread consensus on that there exists not one standard form for carrying 
out investigations. A case by case approach, which takes into account the context and the 
circumstances of each specific situation, is the only possible way to tackle the issue.
206
 
However, the case law of the main international human rights bodies widely converges on the 
general criteria investigations should meet. According to the jurisprudence of the three 
institutions considered above in this chapter – the Human Rights Committee, the European 
Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights –, investigations 
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should be carried out ex officio, i.e. regardless of the victims or their next of kin being able to 
require the state to initiate them on their own initiative (“the responsibility for investigations 
falls under the State party's obligation to grant an effective remedy”),
207
 while at the same time 
it should allow victims and their next of kin to have access to the proceedings.
208
 Furthermore, 
it should be guided by a competent authority,
209
 in an impartial and independent way 
(especially in the case of abuses committed by state officials, for whose disclosure 
independent investigative bodies have been required); 
210
 it should be prompt and effective –
211
 meaning that it should not be “theoretical and illusory”; 
212
 it has to be conducted with the 
due diligence, proportional to the seriousness and gravity of the violations;
213 
and in good 
faith.
214
 The results of the investigations should be transparent and made public.
215
 Overall, the 
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duty to investigate is an obligation of means, not of result.
216
 Yet, it should be at least 
“adequate”, that is, capable of leading to the identification, prosecution, and, be it appropriate, 
conviction and punishment of perpetrators.
217
 Interestingly, the duty to investigate is 
understood as non-delegable to third parties, therefore external fact-finding reports – such as 
the ones put forward by NGOs – are not considered a form of compliance to the duty.
218
 
The Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on eradicating 
impunity for serious human rights violations, while clearly geographically limited and non-
binding in nature, effectively summarize and explain the content of these general principles.
219
 
According to the document, in order for an investigation to be effective, it should be: 
i) Adequate, “capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. 
This does not create an obligation on states to ensure that the investigation leads to a particular 
result, but the authorities must have taken the reasonable steps available to them to secure the 
evidence concerning the incident”; ii) Thorough, “comprehensive in scope and address[ing] all 
of the relevant background circumstances, including any racist or other discriminatory 
motivation. It should be capable of identifying any systematic failures that led to the 
violation”; iii) Impartial and independent, “authorities who are implicated in the events can 
neither lead the taking of evidence nor the preliminary investigation; in particular, the 
investigators cannot be part of the same unit as the officials who are the subject of the 
investigation”; iv) Prompt, “commenced with sufficient promptness in order to obtain the best 
possible amount and quality of evidence available. (…) The investigation must be completed 
within a reasonable time and, in all cases, be conducted with all necessary diligence”; 
v) Subjected to public scrutiny, “to secure accountability, to maintain public confidence in the 
authorities’ adherence to the rule of law and to prevent any appearance of collusion in or 
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tolerance of unlawful acts. Public scrutiny should not endanger the aims of the investigation 
and the fundamental rights of the parties.”
220
 Similarly, the Minnesota Protocol – indicating 
principles on the effective investigation of extrajudicial killings –, and the Istanbul Protocol – 
on the effective investigations of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment –, 
reaffirm the same minimum standards, while adding a thorough indication on how to collect, 
analyse, and assess all documentary, physical, and medical evidence and witnesses’ 
statements.
221
 Courts have applied these soft law instruments in human rights litigation.
222
 
Moreover, taking mostly from the practice on enforced disappearance, judicial and 
quasi-judicial bodies have spelled out good practice in the carrying out of investigations, 
which has been used as criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of the inquiring processes. The 
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (WG EID), in its Comment on the 
Right to the Truth, asked of states that the process of investigation and identification of bodies 
be rigorously and scientifically carried out through valid and reliable techniques and 
methods.
223
 As a result, many states implemented specific policies and pieces of legislation, in 
order to regulate the process of disclosure of the bodies.
224
 Brazil, for instance, established an 
inquiry commission and an inter-ministerial committee, whose aim was to locate and identify 
the remains of those who disappeared during the period of dictatorship.
225
 Argentina created 
the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team, a scientific team of expert anthropologists that 
cooperates with both the government and courts to discover the fate of missing persons. Both 
countries, moreover, established databases of genetic data and biological samples in order to 
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facilitate the process of identification by comparison of missing people and human remains.
226
 
Similar initiatives were also established in the Philippines and Ireland.
227
 At the international 
level, finally, the International Commission on Missing Persons was created with the aim of 
fostering the process of locating and identifying disappeared people in the context of the 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia, thereby enabling governments to implement and protect the 
right to know of the victims’ relatives.
228
 Stepping outside the specific domain of enforced 
disappearance, these criteria have progressively influenced the jurisprudence of human rights 
bodies on the general issue of investigations of gross and systematic human rights and 
humanitarian law violations.
229
 Forensic and anthropologic analyses, scientific methods of 
preservation and records of evidence, clinical evidence and autopsies carried out according to 
international standards are nowadays demanded by courts when assessing the effectiveness of 
investigations undertaken by responsible states.
230
 
In sum, on the basis of these general standards, international human rights law requires 
that investigation to be timely, broad, accurate, effective, and objective. It also specifically 
determines modalities and criteria for investigations to be conducted. Moreover, in the case of 
gross violations of human rights, statutes of limitations, time-bar provisions, and any other 
measures aimed at waiving responsibility have been considered at odds with the main human 
rights provisions, as they prevent the possibility of looking into the abuses.
231
 Now that the 
general guidance given by human rights bodies has been spelled out, we should turn to 
observing how they impact on the specific modalities that governments have implemented to 
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fulfil the duty to investigate, and how those modalities have been addressed by human rights 
bodies. 
3. Implementing the Duty to Ascertain the Truth - Modalities for Investigations 
In principle, states enjoy wide discretion in the choice of the mechanisms to be used in 
ascertaining the facts. Indeed, attempts made to pierce the veil of impunity and to uncover the 
traumatic events of the past abuses by states emerging from periods of mass violations of 
human rights have resulted in a varied collection of mechanisms of inquiry and accountability 
that has been at the centre of the scholarly debate on transitional justice.
232
 All these 
mechanisms, regardless of their structure, have been instituted in order to “accumulate, 
synthesize, and interpret individual memories so as to offer society as a whole an official 
interpretation of its shared past”.
233
 The challenge for emerging governments is to strike the 
balance between the different goals of a transition to democracy. Uncovering the truth, while 
promoting reconciliation; securing accountability for perpetrators, while re-establishing the 
functioning of the administrative and judicial machinery of the state; redressing victims’ 
suffering, while sewing the deep wounds shut in the social fabric; and so on. While the quest 
for an official clarification of the facts is often the primary reason that induces states to create 
such mechanisms, additional expectations from the society and political goals may determine 
the form they take. 
Prosecution and social reconciliation are usually the two main features that 
differentiate the physiognomy of these institutional designs in the traditional dichotomy 
between prosecutorial and non-prosecutorial options. The choice that is made between these 
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two options for assessing the history of past atrocities holds important consequences for the 
narrative which is eventually told and conveyed to the society. Carlos Nino, in a quote 
reported by Mark Osiel, affirmed that 
the public presentation of the truth is much more dramatic when done through a 
trial, with the accused contributing to the development of the story. 
Furthermore, the quality of narration in an adversarial trial can not be fully 
replicated by other means. Even when an amnesty or pardons are issued at the 




In consideration thereof, in the following sections, I observe two of the most common 
legal responses for dealing with the legacy of their past used by governments in the aftermath 
of mass atrocities: judicial mechanisms and truth commissions. 
3.1 Judicial investigations 




Not all human rights abuses are to be ascertained through criminal investigations. 
Alternative forms of inquiry, such as administrative or civil proceedings, or ad hoc 
commissions can generally absolve the state from the duty to investigate as well.
236
 However, 
in cases of the most serious violations, the judicial way is generally required. As we have seen 
above in the case law of the main human rights bodies, they all tend to order states to carry out 
official investigations through appropriate judicial proceedings and to condemn them when 
they fail to do so effectively. We noticed this trend above, in the repeatedly used wording of 
the ECtHR which exhorts states to “conduct investigations capable of leading to the 
identification and punishment of those responsible”.
237
 From this dictum, we can infer that, 
while identification and punishment are not conditions of an effective investigation (as it is an 
obligation of means, but not of result, as said above), the inquiring proceeding should be a 
judicial one, able to potentially lead to the prosecution and sanctioning of the perpetrators. 
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The Court has made this explicit, for instance in the recent decision on the case of 
Janowiec, in which it was called to adjudicate on the responsibility of Russia for the lack of 
investigations into the famous, tragic Katyn massacre of 1940. In that decision, the Court 
indicated “criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings”, whilst excluding those 
inquiries established for the purpose of clarifying a historical truth, such as truth 
commissions.
238
 In choosing from among the different kinds of proceedings, moreover, states 
are not completely free from interference. The Court in fact stipulates that their nature be 
proportionate to the ultimate goal of identifying and punishing those responsible, and 
compensating victims. In Ayder v. Turkey, for instance, the Court deemed the administrative 
proceedings put in place by the state inadequate and inefficient for the determination of the 
responsibility of the members of security forces for the injurious acts. The case related to the 
destruction of properties by security forces in Turkey. By denying the legitimacy of the 
administrative proceedings of investigating the alleged violations carried out by the states, the 




Judicial proceedings have been considered the primary avenue for investigations also 
by the IACtHR. In the cases in which the establishment of truth commissions was indicated as 
proof of its compliance with the obligation to investigate by the state, the Court, while 
welcoming the efforts of historical and truth commissions in the fact-finding processes, has 
repeatedly considered them insufficient to meet the requirements necessary for discharging the 
obligation to conduct investigations through judicial proceedings.
240
 In point of fact, in the 
case of the denial of justice for the extrajudicial execution of a Chilean citizen, Mr Almonacid-
Arellano, by the Chilean authorities, the Court remarked that 
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the “historical truth” included in the reports of the above mentioned 
Commissions is no substitute for the duty of the State to reach the truth through 
judicial proceedings. In this sense, Articles 1(1), 8 and 25 of the Convention 
protect truth as a whole, and hence, the Chilean State must carry out a judicial 
investigation of the facts related to Mr. Almonacid-Arellano’s death, attribute 
responsibilities, and punish all those who turn out to be participants.
241
 
Accordingly, while it is still debated whether criminal prosecution and punishment of 
perpetrators are affirmative state obligations under international law,
242
 it is certain that 
international law calls for international crimes at least being criminalized under domestic law, 
and for effective judicial machinery being implemented to guarantee the clarification and 
disclosure of facts at the very least. 
Indeed, criminal justice is one of the most common instruments through which old and 
new democracies comply with their duty to investigate mass crimes, through which they deal 
– or are blamed not to deal – with the accountability for past abuses, assessing individual 
responsibility. However, the use of criminal measures as a primary source for the clarification 
of the facts can be problematic. The limits and rules that regulate criminal inquiries might 
determine their outcome. The assessment of the evidence is completed to ascertain the 
individual responsibility of the perpetrators, while testimonies and individual narratives are 
heard insofar they are functional to that aim. The focus is on the perpetrators, and the social 
and historical context of the violence that surrounded the specific crimes are considered only 
to the extent to which they are necessary to contribute to hold those responsible 
accountable.
243
 The Prosecutor of the ICTY, Carla Del Ponte, in addressing the role of the 
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Tribunal in front of the Security Council, remarked that “our task is not to prepare a complete 
list of war casualties. Our primary task is to gather evidence relevant to criminal charges”.
244
 
Especially in the case of wide-spread patterns of structural violence and systematic 
violations to fundamental human rights, the accounts resulting from criminal inquiries are not 
necessarily representative of the full picture of the complex network of social and political 
forces, and individual dynamics and stories, which led to those situations. It would not even be 
fair to expect criminal inquiries to perform and satisfy an historical clarification mission. 
Moreover, the issue of time is crucial in assessing the role of trials in judging history through 
placing criminal responsibilities. Osiel correctly observes that courts, normally operating in 
the immediate aftermaths of crimes, lack historical hindsight. The passing of time is essential 
in order that a broader historical reflection may develop in which the events can be carefully 
placed and assessed. Yet, for trials to be effective and to ensure a fair process, appropriate 




The limits of criminal proceedings in judging the history of mass atrocities are well 
reflected in the words of the General Attorney in the Eichmann case before the Israeli 
Supreme Court. With those words, he modestly, but honestly, acknowledged and recognized 
the scope and limits of a criminal trial in judging unthinkable atrocities. 
The desire was felt – readily understandable in itself- to give, within the limits 
of this trial, a comprehensive and exhaustive historical account of the events of 
the catastrophe, and, in so doing, to emphasize also the signal feats of heroism 
of the Ghetto-fighters (...) Others again sought to regard this trial as a forum to 
clarify questions of great import (...)  
[But] the Court (...) must not allow itself to be enticed to stray into provinces 
which are outside its sphere. The judicial process has ways of its own (...) 
whatever the subject-matter of the trial. Were it not so, (...) the trial would 
otherwise resemble a rudderless ship tossed about on the waves. 
(...) The Court does not possess the facilities required for investigating general 
questions of the kind referred to above. For example, to describe the historical 
background of the catastrophe, a great mass of documents and evidence had 
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been submitted to us, collected most painstakingly and certainly out of a 
genuine desire to delineate as complete a picture as possible. Even so, all this 
material is but a tiny fraction of the extant sources on the subject (...) As for 
questions of principle which are outside the realm of law, no one has made us 
judges of them and therefore our opinion on the carries no greater weight than 
that of any person who has devoted study and thought to these questions.
246
 
Yet, does the General Attorney’s statement in the Eichmann really correspond to the 
actual state of the art on the role of criminal trials in writing history? Indeed, the boom of 
international criminal tribunals, the demand made at the international level for prosecution of 
perpetrators of mass crimes, and the consequent development of the branch of international 
criminal law, have further expanded the role of criminal justice in the process of writing the 
history of mass crimes through law. Different theories of punishment underpin the deployment 
of the criminal machinery. Retributive justice theory highlights the value of punishment itself 
as an instrument to maintain the legal order. The preventionist approach stresses the deterrent 
effect of criminal trials. Restorative theory understands punishment as a tool for offering 
victims a certain degree of satisfaction for the injuries suffered. Expressivists, finally, 
recognize in criminal prosecution a means of serving the rule of law, embracing a number of 
subordinated functions to achieve that final goal. All these dimensions come to fore when 
criminal mechanisms are called to shed light on patterns of mass and systematic violence. 
In relation to the Eichmann process, Hannah Arendt famously claimed: “The purpose 
of the trial is to render justice, and nothing else; even the noblest ulterior purposes – ‘the 
making of a record of the Hitler regime (…)’ can only detract from the law's main business: to 
weigh the charges brought against the accused, to render judgment and to mete out due 
punishment.” 
247
 While this claim, in line with the opinion of the Israeli Supreme Court in 
Eichmann, in theory may be considered undisputable, de facto, the effects that criminal 
proceedings for mass crimes have on the national processes of coming to terms with the period 
of violence are – be it desired or not - much more extensive. These go well beyond the 
purpose of ‘render[ing] justice’, in Arendtian terms. Despite the fact that the resolutions 
creating international criminal tribunals declare to establish “international tribunal(s) for the 
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sole purpose of prosecuting”,
248
 prosecution for international criminal inquiries and trials in 
fact serve a number of different objectives. The Statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal, for 
instance, lays down the rationales behind the creation of the Tribunal: i) exposing the crimes 
committed in Iraq during Saddam’s repressive regime; ii) laying down rules and punishments 
to condemn perpetrators; iii) forming a specialized Iraqi high criminal court; iii) revealing the 




In fact, the main purposes that underpin ‘ordinary’ criminal justice - i.e. the 
punishment of those responsible and deterrence from future crimes - in cases of mass atrocities 
may even be undermined by the intrinsic limits of criminal law principles and means. The 
unaccountable acts of violence and number of individuals potentially involved in the 
proceedings cannot be fully investigated and assessed by the limited possibilities and 
resources of the judicial machinery, both at the national and at the international level. The 
trade-off between seeking justice for all the crimes, and the effort to preserve the effectiveness 
of the judicial system and the cohesion of the social fabric has often led to choosing the 
selective policy of punishing only the most responsible ones.
250
 And perhaps this is why it has 
been said that “trials involving genocide or crimes against humanity are less about judging a 
person than about establishing the truth of the events”.
251
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Indeed, in cases of serious human rights abuses, criminal trials of perpetrators have 
produced widespread impact, both over the transition of violence-torn societies towards a 
democratic system, and in the international public opinion and institutional responses, whether 
or not they were conducted in international or domestic fora. There is no need to recall the 
great social impact of the Argentinean processes against the members of the Junta Militar – 
‘los Juicios por la Verdad’ –, or the flow of reactions that came in response to the Eichmann’s 
process. The trials of Milosevic, Tadíc, Pinochet, and the other proceedings against the 
symbols of dictatorships and terror, were all followed with great anticipation and concern by 
the national and the international public. They were perceived as signalling a moral reproach 
of the atrocities that had been perpetrated and the sufferings that had been inflicted, and as 
providing closure.
252
 Criminal trials have become exemplar trials.
253
 They have become the 
public place of blame and shame, a cathartic drama where societies apologize for their sins, 
where victims satisfy their revenge, and history is written. In these dynamics, the results from 
criminal proceedings for mass crimes are clearly constructed in a way to impact on the 
creation of the collective memory of societies. 
3.2 Truth Commissions 
Besides the foregoing considerations on the role of criminal justice in the cases of 
widespread and most serious abuses, the landscape of the practice in the domain of transitional 
justice indicates that the duty to investigate stretches beyond the mere judicial verification of 
events, asking for mechanisms that allow meaningful and effective inquiries, regardless of the 
form they take. Whilst the actual scope of this duty undeniably first and foremost has been 
interpreted as requiring states to establish judicial proceedings, as noted above,
254
 the 
shortcomings of judicial-limited approaches to patterns of systematic and widespread 
violence, together with the development of theoretical reflections in the field of transitional 
justice, have encouraged both states and international bodies to carefully consider alternative 
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mechanisms of fact finding.
255
 Among them, truth commissions are certainly the most 
common, although a few other measures for ascertaining past atrocities have been sporadically 
experimented with in some countries. 
256
  
Their implementation in state practice has been supported by a number of soft law 
instruments and international resolutions and recommendations, which encouraged 
governments to set them up, either separately or complementary to jurisdictional means of 
investigation.
257
 The above mentioned Set of Principles to Combat Impunity, for instance, 
includes the creation of fact-finding mechanisms among the measures to guarantee the 
victims’ right to know, and emphasizes the importance of the processes of truth disclosure in 
healing societies that have experienced periods of mass violence.
258
 The implementation of 
truth seeking mechanisms by states has been also favoured and encouraged by the IACtHR. 
As noted above, while stressing the need for judicial proceedings to fully discharge the state 
obligation to investigate, the Court has recognized the importance of non-judicial mechanisms 
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of truth-seeking in the effort of clarifying mass violations.
259
 Their reports have been used in 
courts as objective evidence of the historical context in which the specific cases took place.
260
 
In comparison with judicial proceedings, these commissions differ greatly in both the 
aim they pursue and the type of investigation they apply. On the first aspect, they mostly aim 
at the clarification and disclosure of historical facts of a violent past. They are responsible to 
construct the broadest picture of the pattern of violence, digging out causes and roots and 
understanding the social dynamics behind the abuses. The focus is on the victims, first and 
foremost, and then on the society in general. Although they may name names, to establish 
individual accountabilities is not their main task, rather they establish “collective guilt”. 
261
 An 
additional, but frequent aim is the reconciliation mission, which is grounded on the idea that 
obtaining a clear understanding of the past, would allow said past to be composed and 
overcome. Victims’ testimonies are crucial, both for the investigation purpose and for a 
cathartic effect on the victims’ lives. Truth commissions deal with facts, emotions, and social 
ties. 
The greatest challenge for these bodies is to analyse the years of violence, and to offer 
an inclusive narrative that is capable of bringing together different memories and visions of 
the past - respectful of the differences yet striving for common elements of agreement - in a 
dialogical understanding.
262
 The link of their work with the construction of collective 
memories is straightforward. The need for fostering the individual and collective processes of 
memory-elaboration and negotiation from the perspective of social healing has frequently 
been addressed explicitly, constituting a specific focus in most of the commissions’ reports. In 
these reports, states have often been requested to adopt memory-related measures as 
instruments of reparations for victims, assurances for preventing the reoccurrence of violence 
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An interesting account of the role of truth commissions on the creation of collective 
memory is put forth in a study by two young scholars, Diana Fuentes Becerra and Gustavo 
Cote Barco.
264
 They apply the Halbwachian concept of “points of reference” in the creation of 
memory to the reports of truth commissions. On this basis, they understand these reports as 
memory-markers, which create a memory-frame to read and preserve the past. Undeniably, 
this argument perfectly fits into our discourse. Truth commissions, as well as judicial 
proceedings, become agents of memory both in time and in space. Contrary to judicial 
proceedings, however, they go beyond the verification of facts. They physically host 
individual testimonies, and store their memories. These individual memories are then placed 
within the broader historical narrative, and sewed together to compose the patchwork 
representing the collective experience of violence. Looking at the past, but working to create 
“points of reference” in the present, those commissions become vehicles for the creation of 
collective memories, and, through their mandate, they control the selection of ‘which truth’ is 
to be transmitted and remembered. The product they forge is more than history in that it adds 
individual narratives, memories, emotions, symbols, and meanings to the historical analysis of 
the fact. At the same time, however, it is not collective memory yet, for it still misses the 
process of social acknowledgment and elaboration of that narrative as a part of the social 
common heritage. Although in transitional justice contexts, truth commissions are often not 
the only channel of memory, they undeniably offer a significant contribution to the creation – 
o re-creation -, of collective memory. 
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Concluding remarks 
The chapter explored the duty to investigate as a first item through which international 
law and its branches may influence and shape the memory of a society. In this regard, it is 
submitted that: i) Human rights law binds states to investigate into gross human rights abuses. 
Even in the controversial hypothesis of an admissible conditional amnesty, investigation must 
be ensured. This means, for our argument, that the clarification of the historical facts 
constituting abuses is an obligation under human rights law. ii) Human rights law provides 
indications on how investigation should be conducted. Standards, criteria and mechanisms of 
investigations are spelled out by human rights bodies. In the case of systematic and massive 
human rights abuses, in particular, beyond the specific violations, they tend to ask 
governments also to disclose the whole pattern of violence in which the abuses were 
committed and to make the results of the investigative processes public and accessible both to 
the victims and to the whole society. iii) In order to comply with these standards and criteria, 
states usually implement measures – criminal trials and truth commissions – that by their 
nature are able to impact on the memory-construction process. 
Several aspects of the way in which the legal framework of the duty to investigate 
under human rights law affects the collective memory process should be noted. Firstly, from a 
theoretical point of view, it has been observed that courts and monitoring bodies justify the 
duty to investigate through strong legal claims that emerge from the transitional justice 
contexts. The fight against impunity, access to justice, and reparations for victims are all 
powerful arguments to justify a legal intervention on the political decision of governments to 
choose whether to deal or not with their past. Moreover, these legal rationales introduce a first 
layer of restrictions to the actual scope of the duty to investigate. As a consequence, the 
classification of the main legal justifications of duty may affect the concrete outcomes of the 
inquiries by filtering the accounts of the facts through the viewpoint of the rationale that 
upholds the duty, and thereby producing partial accounts of the past that circulate among the 
society. 
Secondly, by elaborating criteria and modalities that states are to follow in order to 
meet the international standards of effective investigations, human rights law guides the 
manner in which inquiries should be conducted, and therefore impacts on the accounts they 
produce. Looking at the case law, the chapter has indicated the set of standards and criteria 
developed in international fora. Generally speaking, investigations are to be well timed, 
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expeditious, and complete. Scientific means of inquiry should be used. Moreover, the 
inclusion of public scrutiny as a condition for an effective investigation, and the requirement 
of public dissemination of the findings turn investigations into instruments of memory-
making. By requiring investigations to be public and widely accessible to the society, human 
rights bodies ensure that the events they revealed are not silenced. They call not only for 
recognition and acknowledgment of the past, but also for its public dissemination. States are to 
look into the atrocities they committed in order to explain them and make their history 
available to the society. The duty to investigate imposes two steps on the process of dealing 
with the past: discovering the facts, and conveying them to the future to be remembered. 
Silence and oblivion are not permissible. 
Thirdly, looking at the practice of investigations, it has been noted that, in the case of 
the most serious human rights abuses, judicial proceedings have mostly been required. 
Criminal law, in particular, has been used as the main instruments to comply with the 
obligation to investigate. As a consequence, in the framework of the fight against impunity in 
the context of mass violence, criminal law investigations resulted to be the main instrument 
for clarifying not only the specific facts which supported the legal claims in courts, but also 
the whole historical configuration in which those abuses took place. This means that the 
records of mass crimes and their whole context are filtered by criminal law procedures and 
mechanisms. Yet, as has been noted, criminal law is primarily meant for establishing 
individual responsibility. It is about certainty and binary solutions. It is about one, established, 
uncontroversial, judicial truth. Rules of evidence and testimonies, time-bars, principles of 
criminal responsibility, and the other criminal justice means are established precisely for these 
aims. The application of these instruments in the analysis of the past may offer only a partial, 
judicial reading of all facets of the violence, and it can thus alter the creation of historical 
records which are capable of determining the collective memory within the society. While 
alternative measures of investigation and truth seeking have been encouraged, the trend in 
human rights law is to simultaneously crystallize a legal obligation to criminal investigation 
for serious human rights violations. However, if the duty to investigate is mandatory for 
criminal justice measures, but is not compulsory for non-judicial mechanisms for the historical 
clarification of the context, there is a risk of human rights favouring the “judicial truth” over 
the “historical truth” in the processes of transitional justice. While the establishment of a 
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“judicial truth” is in fact an international legal duty, the inquiry into the historical facts 
through historical means is a political choice of the governments. As a consequence, the past 
is mandatorily reviewed and interpreted through the lens of judicial proceedings, but not 
necessary through other, and perhaps more appropriate mechanisms of historical research. 
Fourthly, the favor of human rights law for the creation of transitional justice 
mechanisms of truth seeking, such as truth commissions, which are considered to complement 
the work of judicial mechanisms, encourages states to implement these mechanisms in the 
aftermath of mass violations. This chapter has assessed this practice, highlighting the effects 
these bodies have on the determination of memory. It has been noted that public hearings – 
including both truth commissions and trials – are sites in which past injustices are conveyed as 
present memories through testimonies.
265
 However, while the synergy between truth 
commissions and trials in many cases has proven successful in strengthening the process of 
democratic transition, from the standpoint of memory, the coexistence of different bodies may 
complicate the process of providing a comprehensive and shared account of the past. Some 
individual claims may find legal standing in courts, while others may be rejected on the basis 
of procedural arguments. The voices of some witnesses who were heard in the rooms of truth 
commissions might be excluded from the courtrooms, and therefore may receive a different 
degree of recognition and authority in the socially acknowledged accounts of the events. 
Similarly, some events that occurred in the remote past may have had an impact on the 
subsequent dynamics of the abuses, but at the same time they may be omitted from the 
investigations of judicial proceedings for lack of competence ratione temporis, or simply 
because they do not meet the threshold of criminal acts. Such events will consequently be 
excluded from the judicial account of the history, but perhaps included in the account provided 
by truth commissions. These differences may eventually cause the risk of creating hierarchies 
of truths.
266
 They may well affect the way a society perceives traumatic past events that it has 
experienced, and therefore the way these events are processed and included in (or excluded 
from) the record of the historical heritage of the society. All the same, however, the 
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coexistence of different voices that read into the events, together with the publicity that the 
law needs for such readings within the society, may enrich the set of points of reference for the 
social process of memory-making. In this sense, if different narratives come to light at the 
same time, with comparable authority, they may contribute equally to the fluid creation of 
different memories, all with the same dignity. In the different voices, different individual 
memories can be reflected, and find identity and recognition. In that case, it will be up to the 







The Duty to Disclose 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I argued that a precondition for allowing a society to produce 
faithful representations of the history of gross human rights violations as images of memories 
is the clarification of the facts that constituted those violations. The duty to ascertain the truth, 
in this sense, is the first step in the construction of memories of a violent past that international 
law interferes with. Yet, investigations would be pointless if the information they provide is 
not accessible to the victims, first and foremost, and subsequently to the whole society. Hence, 
the second step that international law takes in influencing the process of memory making is to 
encourage states to make this information available to victims and other individuals. To do so, 
it guides states – in a more or less compulsory way – in their behaviours concerning the 
management and dissemination of knowledge about the past, and develops standards and 
guidelines to this effect. These behaviours range from ensuring access to state-held documents 
related to human rights violations
 
to disclosing information on the abuses and making it 
public, and from creating efficient systems to process information requests to implementing 
specific legislation to achieve these goals. This set of behaviours, I argue, constitutes an 
additional aspect of the content of the duty of memory, which aims at providing and disclosing 
state information concerning patterns of systematic violence and illegality. In synthesis, I will 
refer to this feature as to the ‘duty to disclose’. This will be the object of the present chapter. 
The chapter aims at clarifying the legal regime of the duty to disclose under 
international law, in order to grasp its impact on the memory processes of representing mass 
human rights abuses of the past. It is divided into four main parts. The first part aims at 
clarifying the connections between the legal regime of the duty to disclose information 
concerning gross human rights violations and the processes of memory-making. It provides 
some considerations about the relevance of international norms in regulating the public 
circulation of state-held information related to past human rights abuses for the dissemination 
of historical knowledge within the society. The second part presents the legal analysis of the 
state duty to disclose and its development under international law. In this part, several aspects 
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of the duty to disclose are analysed: its legal foundation – the right to access information; the 
recognition it has received in human rights instruments and practice; international principles 
and standards which refine it. The third part specifies the features of the state duty to disclose 
in the case of information concerning gross violations of human rights committed in the past. 
In doing so, this part introduces the discussion about the legitimacy under human rights 
provisions of secret state archives and state policies which shield documents concerning past 
violence from public scrutiny. The fourth part, finally, presents the emerging practice adopted 
by transitional states aimed at opening secret archives of past regimes, and it points out the 
consequences thereof for the dynamics of memory. 
1. Memory and the Duty to Disclose Information 
Disclosing state records related to patterns of systematic violence and human rights 
abuses in the past means nourishing the collective memory of a society with original 
information about its collective history. Documents are sources for history, but also for 
memory.
267
 With the passage of time, individual narratives that recount personal experiences 
fade away, and memories rely on lieux de memoire to overcome the time and to navigate 
through generations.
268
 Historical documents are lieux de memoire par excellence, in that they 
embody points of references in the past. The opening of the files related to violations 
committed in the past undoubtedly firstly aims at truth revelation.
269
 However, the amount and 
type of data publicly accessible also influences which narratives about the past will circulate 
within society, and how they will be perceived. 
The way in which international law frames a state duty to disclose information is 
therefore relevant for the way collective and official memories take shape and circulate in the 
society. When international judgments and legal provisions require that states apply specific 
standards and principles in disclosing information, they construct a framework for memories-
production. When complying with these rules, states are not longer free to decide to what 
extent knowledge about the past can circulate in the society, and who is entitled to access 
information on the past. The state’s control over the interpretations and representations of the 
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past shrinks, and officially-constructed narratives are counter-balanced by the creation of 
independent accounts. 
In this sense, Stan argues that access to information - in particular to secret information 
- “democratizes truth seeking by allowing victims to control the process and ordinary citizens 
to contrast the truth contained in the files with their own recollection of past events”.
 270
 This 
process, I believe, at the same time democratizes memory too. In opening the files, 
governments confer the right of interpreting the past to everyone who is entitled to access 
them. And this free and public interpretation of information produces independent narratives, 
which circulate in the public space. Individual memories come to face data that corroborate or 
discredit them. Moreover, in case of full disclosure of information, official narratives also 
suffer the same fate, since the disclosed documents may be used by independent narratives to 
challenge them. Conversely, when access is limited, restricted, or manipulated, or when 
specific categories of individuals receive preferred access, the information that will leak to the 
public will unequally affect the extant narratives. In doing so, undemocratic or non-transparent 
regulations on access to information consequently manipulate – consciously or unconsciously 
– the dynamics of collective memories. 
 In this process of democratization of the past – or, more precisely, democratization of 
the access to the past –, memory fully expresses its fluid nature, which opens it up to 
discussion and comparison. Hegemonic narratives are hard to support when full access to 
information can be exercised by individuals. As Stan puts it, “the state cannot control how 
documents are interpreted by those who read them”. Affirming a positive state duty to disclose 
information therefore means, for the cases of past human rights violations, that states are 
expected to allow their citizens to scrutinize the past freely, to measure their memories against 
objective data, and ultimately to develop independent representations of the history. Moreover, 
the disclosure of personal files and documents - as in the case of the communist secret files 
that will be explored later in this chapter - contributes to the dialogue between the collective 
dimension of memory and the personal experiences of individuals by facilitating the 
introduction of individual stories to a broader historical reading of the violent past. 
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At the same time, however, public disclosure of information may complicate the 
relationship between memory and history. On the one hand, the democratic access to historical 
documents concerning past periods of systematic violence enhances the proactive discussion 
and development of memories regarding particularly traumatic events in the society. On the 
other hand, in doing so, it blurs the line between professional interpretation of the past through 
the conventional methods of the historiographical research and personal assessment of 
historical sources by ordinary individuals for personal and public use.
271
 In other words, the 
risk exists that historical documents and data will be read and presented to the society through 
the language of memory – mediated by emotions and individual experience – which is, by 
nature, always disputable and evolving.
 272
 Whilst this may enrich the multiplicity of voices 
that read the past, at the same time it could impact on how history is understood and 
reconstructed, and, again, on how memory-narratives are produced within, and spread 
throughout the society. Strong, democratic, legal frameworks should be able to ensure 
effective protection of freedom of expression and freedom of information, and therefore create 
different channels for expressing and challenging competing accounts. In such systems, the 
ordinary mechanisms of democracy should naturally lead to open discussions about 
controversial subjects, including historical debates, and let different opinions coexist. 
However, as I will argue further in Chapter IV, the inaccurate management of information 
related to the past may create the risk of manipulation of data and documents. This, in turn, 
may well lead to worrisome misinterpretation and revisionist readings of the past. 
Hence, it should remain clear that by elaborating and regulating a state duty to disclose 
information about the past, international law regulates a specific dimension of the link 
between a state and its past, which relates to the complicated interplay between history and 
memory. This aspect brings many thorny issues with it. Therefore, it is important for this 
investigation to understand the concrete scope and standards of a possible obligation to 
disclose under international law. 
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2. The legal basis to the Duty to Disclose: The Right to Access to Information 
2.1 Legal Foundation 
The duty to disclose is a controversial item. Although it has received great attention at 
the international level, and many developments point toward its establishment in the legal 
system of human rights protection, it has not been fully and unanimously recognized by the 
main international adjudication fora yet. The international legal scholarship is similarly 
divided between interpretations suggesting possible conceptualizations under the current legal 
framework, and sceptical analyses which deny it any legal ground. In the light of this doctrinal 
and jurisprudential uncertainty, this section attempts to offer some clarification on the legal 
foundations of a state duty to disclose in the human rights framework. 
The legal bases for the state duty to provide and disclose information can be traced to 
the right to access to information. In spite of the various doctrinal discussions about its nature 
and status, access to information is nowadays a well-established right in human rights law. 
While there is only one official, binding international convention that explicitly recognizes an 
autonomous right of access to official documents held by public authorities,
273
 most of the 
general human rights instruments in fact refer to such an entitlement. It is firstly 
conceptualized as a corollary of freedom of information, which in turn is part of the 
fundamental freedom of opinion and expression. In the universal systems of human rights 
protection, freedom of information is firstly enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which recognizes that everyone has the right to “seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”.
274
 Similarly, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) sanctions the fundamental right to 
information, and subsumes it under the content of freedom of expression.
275
 In the regional 
systems of human rights protection, Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 
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Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights also recognize and protect the right to information in 
similar terms. At the domestic level, most legal systems provide the citizens’ right to obtain 
public information as a fundamental right, either explicitly enshrined in constitutional texts or 
incorporated in ad hoc information laws.
276
 From these provisions, national courts have 
repeatedly derived and upheld the consequent obligation of public bodies to provide, disclose, 
and release government-held information.
277
 The right to access to information has therefore 
gradually been recognized as a fundamental right in domestic, regional, and international legal 
texts. 
Access to information is an important tool to exercise a number of individual rights, 
and to protect collective interests. It is instrumental in the enjoyment of the right to privacy, 
the right to health, and the right to a fair trial - just to mention some. Hence, its recognition 
often has been presented as ancillary to the full enjoyment of other, different fundamental 
rights. Precisely because of this instrumental feature, and because of the different right holders 
who may enjoy its empowerment, both the literature and the practice of national and 
international human rights adjudicatory and quasi-adjudicatory bodies have proposed different 
theoretical conceptualizations for the right to access to information. Since these two aspects – 
the personal element of the beneficiaries and the theoretical legal conceptualizations of the 
right – are closely entwined, in the next paragraph I will analyse the latter in relation to the 
former. 
2.1.1 Beneficiaries and Rationales of the Right to Access to Information. Different 
Conceptualizations. 
As noted by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, the right to 
information includes different layers. 
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It encompasses both the general right of the public to have access to information 
of public interest from a variety of sources and the right of the media to access 
information, in addition to the right of individuals to request and receive 
information of public interest and information concerning themselves that may 
affect their individual rights. 
278
 




 At the individual level, the right to information firstly entails the individual right to 
access state-held documents concerning personal files and data, or other information that may 
affect individual rights. The existence of personal information in the hands of public bodies 
implies the individual’s interest in accessing them. As a consequence, no further evidence 
should be required for the individual to obtain access to personal information.
 280
 This entails, 
in turn, that public bodies, in principle, have an obligation to disclose that information upon 
request. Any refusal or restriction has to be justified and motivated. 
In the case of human rights violations, the individual dimension is further specified in 
the victims’ right to access personal files. In these cases, especially in situations of serious and 
widespread violations, different grounds have been used to strengthen the victims’ right to get 
to know the circumstances and conditions in which their rights – or those of their next of kin – 
were violated. First of all, especially in the Inter-American context, the right to the truth has 
provided the basis for the assertion of a state duty to provide victims and their relatives with 
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all the information necessary.
281
 In this conceptualization, the rationales for advocating a 
victims’ right to information range from the general prohibition of torture, inhuman and 
degrading treatments
282
 to the state obligation to investigate;
283
 and from the remedial 
rationale
284
 to the protection of a legitimate social expectation.
 285
 
In relation to serious human rights breaches, besides the grounds provided by the right 
to the truth, access to information has been also understood as a form of satisfaction for 
victims and their families. In this regard, both the HRCBiH and the IACtHR linked it to the 
victims’ right to reparations. In the judgment on the Srebrenica cases, as a form of reparation, 
the Human Rights Chamber ordered the Republika Srpska “to release all information (…) 
within its possession, control, and knowledge’ regarding the fate and whereabouts of the 
missing persons”.
286
 Similarly, in the Claude Reyes decision – in which the IACtHR 
condemned Chile for the unjustified failure to provide victims with information -, the Court 
ordered that the required information be made available to the victims as a measure of 
satisfaction and guarantee of non-repetition. At the same time, the Court urged the state to 
implement adequate measures to protect the general right to access to official documents, 
including appropriate administrative systems to manage victims’ requests for information in 
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an effective manner. Lastly, the state was required to set up ad hoc training programs for 
public officers in this matter.
287
  
From the perspective of satisfaction, especially in cases of mass human rights abuses, 
victims’ access to information is further enriched by the element of publicity. The victims’ 
right to know entails a certain degree of recognition from the state. In order for this 
recognition to cause some healing effects for victims, the disclosure of information has to be 
public and official. This is why judicial orders that recommend governments to make public 
and disseminate findings of judicial investigations and truth seeking bodies, often in the 
context of public and official ceremonies, prove especially meaningful with regard to 
memory-making dynamics. In this sense, the legal basis of the victims’ right to access 
information overlaps with the content of the victims’ right to reparation.
 288
  
The individual dimension of the right to access information also encompasses the 
individual right to get to know information of public relevance. This means that, if information 
concerns matters of general interest to the society, it should be made available to each citizen. 
This aspect proves particularly relevant for our discussion because it creates a bridge between 
the individual and the collective dimension of the right to information. When the required 
information concerns matters of general interest, in fact, not only the individual has a 
legitimate justification for accessing it, but also the society has a legitimate interest in 
receiving that information. From this viewpoint, the individual right to information is closely 
entwined with the collective dimension of the right to information in that it provides a basis 
for protecting the public right to know. 
In the practice of human rights bodies, the individual right to public information has 
been used to enable the society’s right to know by according special protection for accessing 
information to specific categories of requesters. As we will see in the forthcoming analysis, 
judicial and quasi-judicial human rights bodies have recognized the ‘vital role’ of specific 
categories of individuals - such as the press and other media, but also civil society 
organizations and other categories serving functions of public information (like historians) – in 
making information of public interest circulate within the society. By their activities, these 
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individuals enable members of the public to exercise their rights, and to develop and elaborate 
free and informed opinions in democratic fora. In the dynamics of memory-making, this 
interplay between the individual and collective dimensions of access to information clearly 
facilitates interchanges between personal and public narratives about the past. Because of the 
relevance of this interplay in the processes of memory-making, the rest of the analysis will 
focus on this specific dimension of the right to access to information, as the main legal basis 
for the state duty to disclose information of public interest. 
3. Inferring a State Duty to Disclose from the Public Right to Access to 
Information? The State of the Art 
As argued, the right to access to information is now considered well established in the 
human rights legal framework. Yet, whether a corresponding, positive obligation of states to 
disclose state-held information arises in international law as a consequence of the right to 
access to information is controversial. Most of the literature in this regard is rather sceptical of 
recognizing such a positive obligation.
289
 Indeed, for a long time, the right to information, 
when derived from the legal basis of freedom of expression, has been constructed as the 
general individual freedom to seek and receive information, which would merely entail a 
negative obligation for governments not to interfere with the individual efforts to gather public 
information and to refrain from limiting information flows. In other words, the recognition of 
freedom of information is not considered to imply that states have a corresponding obligation 
to disclose such information proactively. 
Nonetheless, from a glance at the interpretation and protection of the right to 
information in the case law of human rights bodies and in international and regional legal texts 
and documents, one can observe that, at least in some specific circumstances, there is an 
emerging trend recognizing such a positive obligation. In what follows, I will present the 
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relevant cases and documents, in order to clarify the status of the duty to disclose information 
in human rights law, and to specify its features and standards. 
3.1 The Duty to Disclose in the case law 
The main human rights monitoring bodies and courts have addressed the issue of the 
public access to information from different angles, adopting different approaches. As 
mentioned above, different legal bases have been used to protect the individual interest to 
obtain state-held information, although the provisions on freedom of information have offered 
the main grounds in the argument for the existence of a state obligation to provide and disclose 
information to the public. Although overall there are signals pointing toward the progressive 
recognition of such an obligation, human rights bodies have progressed at different speeds in 
asserting its existence. 
The most cautious approach to the recognition of a state obligation to disclose 
information is used by the European Court of Human Rights. The Court, while protecting the 
individual right to personal information on different legal bases, consistently upheld the view 
that Article10 ECHR could not “be constructed as imposing on a State (…) positive 
obligations to collect and disseminate information of its own motion”
 
for a long time. 
290
 Since 
the Leander case, and until more recent developments, the Court was reluctant to even grant 
the public a general right of access to government-held information.
291
 This hesitancy 
naturally also extended to the recognition of a state obligation to disclose. Indeed, the Court 
had repeatedly denied that freedom of information would entail a corresponding state 
obligation to disclose information.
292
 
More recently, however, the Court has changed its approach slightly. In 2009, in 
Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, the Court stressed the judicial advances made 
towards a broader interpretation of the notion of “freedom to receive information”, and 
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therefore “towards the recognition of a right of access to information”.
293
 The Társaság case 
concerned a claim against the government by a Hungarian NGO on the basis of the 
Constitutional Court’s refusal to grant access to information it held. The contested information 
concerned a complaint, presented by a member of the Hungarian parliament, about the 
constitutional revision of criminal legislation on drug-related offences. The Constitutional 
Court had justified the restriction to that piece of information with the need to protect the 
MP’s personal data included in the complaint. The ECtHR preliminary recalled that it had 
“consistently recognised that the public has a right to receive information of general interest”. 
It further held that “the law cannot allow arbitrary restrictions which may become a form of 
indirect censorship should the authorities create obstacles to the gathering of information”.
294
 
As a result, states have an obligation “not to impede the flow of information” within a society. 
The Court concluded that the contested denial of information was an interference with the 
rights protected by Article 10, and consequently found the state responsible for the violation of 
that provision. Yet, we are still far from a recognition of the state duty to disclose information. 
However, in Társaság, the Court admittedly did not decide on the basis of a “general 
right of access to official documents”, which the Court seems to reject,
295
 but rather on the 
basis of the specific function of “social watchdog” that the NGO played within the society.
296
 
The special nature of the requester, as mentioned before, is a crucial element in the recognition 
of the state duty to disclose, and - as will become apparent from the overview of the case law - 
it is common to most of the human rights decisions recognizing a right to information of 
public interest. The Court reinforced this reading in the subsequent Kenedi v. Hungary 
decision.
297
 In that decision, the Court adjudicated on the case of a Hungarian historian 
conducting research on the national secret service, whose request to access state-held files was 
denied. The Court held that “access to original documentary sources for legitimate historical 
research [is] an essential element of the applicant’s right to freedom of expression”.
298
 Again, 
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the recognition of such a right seems to be subordinated to a general public interest in the 
information, namely “the objective study on the functioning of the Hungarian State Security 
Service” that the researcher would have published on the basis of the requested documents.
299
 
These developments in the case law seem to indicate that the Court, while not recognizing a 
positive state duty to proactively disclose information, is however moving toward a broader 
understanding of a public right to access to state-held information, at least in cases where the 
information is required by special categories of individuals for disseminating public 
information. 
The HRC and IACtHR have developed a more favourable approach toward the 
recognition of a duty to disclose information as a corollary of the right to public information. 
While the Committee has dealt with the public right to access to state-held information in a 
limited number of cases, the Inter-American Court has developed a more robust jurisprudence 
on the matter. The Human Right Committee firstly recognized the right to access to 
information in a case related to the press members’ right to have access to press facilities in 
parliament. In those circumstances, it asserted the citizens’ right to have “wide access to 
information”, and recognized the role of the media in providing and disseminating it.
300
 In 
subsequent decisions, the Committee further elaborated on the nature and content of the right 
to access to information. Let us consider the reasoning of the Committee in the Toktakunov v. 
Kyrgyzstan decision.
301
 In that case, the applicant was a human rights association’s legal 
consultant. The public authority had refused to give him access to national data on the use of 
the death penalty in the country, claiming the confidential nature of that information. The 
Committed found that the government’s denial had infringed his rights under Article 19. 
To justify its decision, the Committee mostly relied on the nature of the restricted 
information, and on the applicant’s capacity. Regarding the first aspect – the nature of the 
information -, the Committee considered the information on the death penalty a “[matter] of 
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legitimate public concern”, societal discussion of which should be considered worthy of 
protection.
302
 On this basis, it asserted a state obligation to provide information to the 
requester. With regard to the second argument - the special capacity of the requester -, the 
Committee emphasized that the individual right to information is instrumental in the societal 
interest to receive information. It found that “the delivery of information to an individual can 
(...) permit it to circulate in society, so that the latter can become acquainted with it, have 
access to it, and assess it”.
303
 On the one hand, the right to information empowers the 
individual to receive information he or she is interested in – without the need to specify a 
direct interest or personal involvement in it.
304
 On the other hand, this right is a precondition 
for allowing a society to fully exercise its freedom of opinion and expression about public 
affairs, and thereby take active part in the democratic decision-making process.
305
 An 
uninformed society, it seems to imply, lacks the essential instruments for constructing 
opinions capable of leading to democratic debates. Because of the importance of ensuring this 
flow of information, individuals performing a special informative function within the society 
should be granted an exhaustive protection of their right to information, because of their 
particularly relevant social function. In this case, the applicant was considered to have this 
“special ‘watchdog’ function”, facilitating the societal debate, because of his position within 
the human rights association. As a consequence, the Committee concluded that, in those 
circumstances, “the state party had an obligation either to provide the author with the 
requested information or to justify any restrictions of the right to receive State-held 
information under article 19, paragraph 3”. 
We can draw specific conclusions from this decision. Firstly, the Committee 
recognizes not only an individual right to seek information, but also the positive state 
obligation to provide it. Secondly, this positive obligation is subordinated to a sort of public 
interest requirement. In other words, states are required to disclose information when this 
information is especially relevant for matters of public interest. In these cases, restrictions to 
the right to access to information should be carefully evaluated according to the test provided 
by paragraph 3, Article 19. 
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On the American continent, the connection between the right to access to information 
and the state duty to disclose has been straightforward. The Inter-American institutions have 
been at the forefront in recognizing both a general right for the public to receive state-held 
information, and the corresponding state duty to provide and disclose such information. The 
milestone for recognizing and framing the content of the public right to access is certainly the 
oft-quoted Claude Reyes case, in which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, for the 
first time, explicitly inferred the right to information as a necessary part of freedom of 
expression.
306
 From this, the Court also inferred a consequent, positive state obligation to 
provide information. The case originated in the refusal to disclose requested state-held 
information by the Chilean authorities. The requesters were members of an environmental 
group, and the information related to a deforestation project. The case was firstly adjudicated 
by the Inter American Commission on Human Rights, which found Chile guilty of violating of 
Article 13 of the American Convention – freedom of expression -, and recommended the 
country to disclose the required information.
307
 Since the state failed to comply with the 
Commission’s recommendation, the case was brought before the Court. 
Assessing the merits of the case, with regard to the alleged violation of Article 13, the 
Court framed the terms in which the right to information was understood. Since then, those 
terms have consistently informed the subsequent developments of the Inter-American 
jurisprudence on the matter. The Court has broadly conceptualized the right to receive state-
held information, from which it has derived the corresponding positive obligation to provide 
it. The requester does not need to prove direct interest or personal involvement in order to 
obtain information, unless the information is legitimately restricted. On the contrary, the Court 
has reversed the onus probandi on the state, so that it has to prove the legitimacy of every 
exception to this principle. Although restrictions are allowed in principle, every denial of 
information must always be explicitly justified by the state, and has to meet the requirements 
for exceptions provided by Article 13.
308
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The Claude Reyes judgment anticipated the stance taken subsequently by the HRC in 
the Kyrgyzstan case. It clearly articulated the double dimension of the right to access to 
information, individual and social. These two dimensions of the right to access to information, 
according to the Court, “must be guaranteed simultaneously by the State”.
309
 To substantiate 
its argument, the Court mostly relied on the principles of democracy and transparency in state 
governance. It invoked the principle of disclosure in the public administration, and upheld 
social participation and governments’ accountability as underlying values ensured by the right 
to access to information. Similar to the ECtHRs argument in Toktakunov v. Kyrgyzstan, yet 
more explicitly, this decision seems to hold that limits to the state obligation to disclose 
information of public interest should reach a higher threshold of legitimacy in order to be 
considered admissible in comparison to those applicable to information of personal nature. 
3.1.1 Assessing the case law 
Some intermediate conclusions can be drawn with regard to the status of a state 
obligation to disclose information in the current framework of international law from the 
preceding glance at the case law. First of all, it can be said that, in the current jurisprudence of 
the main human rights courts and monitoring bodies, there is consensus on deriving an 
individual right to access to state-held information from the provisions protecting freedom of 
expression. From this right, certainly a negative state obligation to refrain from interfering 
with the individual access to public documents in the hands of the governments can be 
derived.
310
 Hence, states do not have a positive obligation to proactively disclose all 
information, but restrictions to state-held information must meet the requirements established 
for restrictions to freedom of information. 
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In addition, however, a positive states obligation to proactively provide state-held 
information is progressively emerging, at least in specific circumstances. Two main elements 
have been prerequisite in the case law for a state obligation to disclose to be found, an 
objective and a subjective one. The objective condition requires that there is a specific public 
interest in the information to be disclosed. In fact, all three bodies we examined above use 
similar rationales to protect the right to information and the corresponding duty to inform. 
General interest of the society, the importance of fostering an informed debate in democratic 
society, the need to ensure transparency, and participation of the population in the democratic 
life of the nation are some of the arguments that are used. The subjective condition takes into 
account the role played by the requester in society. Indeed, in cases in which a violation to the 
right to access to information was subsumed under the provisions on freedom of information, 
a more expansive right was recognized to individuals who had a particular social capacity of 
disseminating and circulating information within the society. In other words, in addition to the 
individual interest in the specific information, human rights bodies have aimed to protect and 
strengthen the general interest of the societies to be informed about matters that are 
particularly relevant for the democratic life of their governments through the special protection 
of the individual right to information in their case law. Accordingly, in circumstances of 
particular interest for the societies, the collective dimension of the right to know emerges 
under the umbrella of freedom of information, and justifies the claim for a state positive 
obligation to disclose. 
3.2 The Duty to Disclose in Soft Law 
A strong argument in favour of a positive obligation to disclose information is 
provided by the consistent international and regional soft law body of declarations, 
recommendations, guidelines, and reports. At the international level, the Human Rights 
Committee provides an authoritative interpretation of freedom of information provisions as 
entailing a corresponding state duty to provide state-held information. In its General Comment 
N° 34 on Article 19 ICCPR, the Committee calls for governments to proactively “put in the 
public domain government information of public interest”, and spells out the concrete duties 
that stem from the public right to access to information. According to the Committee, easy, 
prompt, and effective access to this information should be guaranteed by states, which are to 
adopt legislation and implement mechanisms and procedures to ensure that individuals have 
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their requests for information processed in a timely manner. Public authorities should be 
bound to expressly justify any denial to access; procedures for appeal and reconsideration of 
refusals should be established; and fees for processing requests should be sustainable and 
reasonable.
311
 Although the Comment - as a soft law document – is not binding in nature, it 
has already been widely used by both national and international bodies to indicate guidelines 
and gain support for arguing the duties of governments in protecting the right to information. 
In a number of reports, the UN Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression have further contributed to outlining the state duty to disclose and provide public 
information at the international level. Already in 1998, the Special Rapporteur Abid Hussain 
expressed the view that the right to information entails “a positive obligation on States to 
ensure access to information, particularly with regard to information held by Government”.
 312
 
Building upon this statement, in the 2000 Report, after claiming the nature of access to 
information not merely as a freedom of information, but as “a right in and of itself”, the 
Special Rapporteur explicitly argued that “public bodies have an obligation to disclose 
information and every member of the public has a corresponding right to receive 
information”.
313
 In complying with their obligations to respect and protect freedom of 
information, – so it goes the report –, governments shall therefore publicly and widely 
disseminate “documents of significant public interest”.
314
 Subsequent reports confirmed this 
position.
315
 Principles of transparency and good governance, essential to democratic systems, 
are used to rationalize the public right to information, and consequently the corresponding 
duty to provide and disclose it, in all these documents. 
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At the regional level, moreover, the bodies of the Inter-American system of human 
rights protection have contributed to the construction of a positive state obligation to provide 
and disclose public information with a considerable corpus of non-binding legal documents. 
Since 2003, OAS Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression has issued a 
number of reports and comprehensive studies, which have progressively defined the content 
and scope of the right to information and spelt out the positive state obligations that come with 
it.
316
 In doing so, they have gradually elaborated a set of standards and criteria that push 
toward the recognition of a broad obligation to provide information in a proactive way. In 
2010, these efforts have resulted in the adoption of a regional model law on access to public 
information, which aims to provide guidance to states on implementing legislation on the 
matter.
317
 The Model Law, the elaboration of which was promoted by the OAS General 
Assembly,
318
 claims to reflect the existing practice of states, and international and regional 
bodies in the Americas. It states in clear terms that even in the absence of a specific request, 
public authorities should disseminate information on a regular and proactive basis, and in a 
manner that assures the information is accessible and understandable to the public. 
On the other regions, the European and African systems are progressively moving 
toward aligning their standards with the international ones. Although a state duty to 
proactively disclose and provide all information is not explicitly enshrined in binding 
documents, in effect, regional human rights bodies have been strengthening the content of the 
public right to have access to state-held information via interpretation of the existing norms. 
This process resulted in the elaboration of a number of declarations and good practices that 
encourage governments to proactively act in order to ensure that information of public interest 
circulates in the society.
319
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4. Standards and Principles of the Duty to Disclose 
All the previously mentioned soft law instruments, besides contributing to the 
progressive emergence of a state obligation to disclose information, indicate standards, 
guidelines, and criteria that states should follow to comply with this obligation. Recently, at 
the regional level, human rights bodies have carried out some important work which gathers 
and summarizes international and national practice in order to draw up general guidelines and 
standards – such as the just mentioned Inter-American Model Law.
320
 These principles have 
been progressively adopted by institutions and bodies in their decisions. The legal basis, again, 
is the public right to access to information, enshrined in the provisions on freedom of 
information. In most of the documents, the rationales are principles of transparency, 
democracy, and good governance. Since these works tend to reflect the current trend in 
defining the contours of a duty to provide and disclose state-held information, both at the 
regional and at the international level, in what follows I will address the main principles that 
are common to the different documents in order to identify the main characteristics of such an 
emerging duty. 
4.1 The Principle of maximum disclosure 
The principle of maximum disclosure has been emerging as the key principle for a 
desirable legal regime regulating the public right to state-held information. It finds recognition 
in a number of resolutions issued by the Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Expression,
321
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 and regional instruments.
323
 The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, on the legal basis of Article 13 ACHR (freedom of expression), applies and interprets 
this principle as an essential benchmark that must govern all the activities of state bodies in 
any democratic society.
324
 At the European level, although, as we have seen above, institutions 
have been more cautious in requiring full disclosure, there is a tendency developing to foster 
disclosure of public information.
325
 
The principle of maximum disclosure entails the presumption that all the information 
held by public bodies is accessible to the public. In procedural terms, it creates a presumption 
of disclosure, which can be overcome only by a strict system of exceptions prescribed by the 
law. This determines the inversion of the burden of proof from the requester-citizen to the 
public information-holder, which has to demonstrate the legitimacy of any refusal of 
disclosure. This principle triggers a broad interpretation of the concepts and the actors 
involved in the process of disclosure. The concept of information, as stressed by the Human 
Rights Committee, should be understood as including any form of record in the hands of 
public authorities, regardless of the source and date of production.
326
 By the same token, all 
the public authorities - be it at the national, regional and local level - that are empowered to 
hold the state responsible for their acts should be encompassed in the concept of public bodies 
- as public information-holders.
327
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4.2 Limits and exceptions 
Since the right to access information - as derived from the provisions on freedom of 
information - is not an absolute right, restrictions to its content are, in principle, admissible. To 
be admissible, restrictions must meet the criteria of legality, legitimacy, and necessity. In other 
words, every restriction has to be expressly prescribed by law, serve a legitimate aim, and be 
necessary to achieve that aim. Each human rights system has listed a number of general 
exceptions that can justify a refusal to disclose. The most common ones are: national security; 
public order; public health; morals; and respect for other individuals’ rights, honour, or 
reputation.
328
 Moreover, when one of these justifications exists, public authorities also have to 
prove the proportionality between the imposed restriction and the harm caused to the public or 
private interest receiving the information. 
The list of exceptions that may justify restriction to public access to information, 
admittedly, is long and broadly interpretable. In general, governments have a margin of 
discretion in assessing the existence of one or more justifications. Nonetheless, the principle of 
maximum disclosure necessarily informs also the regime of restrictions, and has as a corollary 
that, in the case of information of public interest, restrictions must be limited. Furthermore, as 
I will argue further in the next paragraph, the proportionality test that restrictions are to meet 
to be legitimate proves particularly stringent in cases of information involving especially 
important issues for the public. In fact, in these cases, public authorities are to prove that the 
reason behind the restriction is so pressing as to justify the harm to the corresponding public 




4.3 Principle of public interest override  
The principle of public interest override has been especially stressed in the case law. It 
determines that, when the information concerns matters that are important for the whole 
society – and therefore matters in which the society in general has a proper interest –, 
limitations should be carefully considered. As was addressed before in the chapter, many cases 
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in which human rights courts and bodies rejected restrictions to the public right to information 
are justified on the basis of the public nature of the information sought. Public information, in 
this sense, has been considered a public good. 
This was the case, for instance, for data related to the use of the death penalty in the 
Toktakunov v. Kyrgyzstan decision that I considered above. Considering that such information 
was of general public concern and essential to the encouragement of an informed public 
debate on issues of public interest, the Committee stated that restrictions to this kind of 
information could not “be deemed necessary for the protection of national security or of public 
order (ordre public), public health or morals, or for respect of the rights or reputations of 
others”, unless public authorities can demonstrate the opposite.
330
 Similarly, in the above 
mentioned Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, the European Court of Human Rights 
considered that the obstacle put in the path of access to information related to a MP’s 
complaint on drug-related legislation by the Hungarian Constitutional Court jeopardized the 
interest of the society in receiving information on matters of public relevance, notwithstanding 
the counter-interest of the MP’s right to privacy. While the government’s interference 
complied with both the criteria of legality and legitimacy, the Court still deemed it unjustified 
since it negatively affected the possibility of the society to receive “accurate and reliable 
information”. The Court therefore concluded that the restriction was not “necessary in a 
democratic society”.
331
 Generally speaking, therefore, it seems that the suppression of 
information of public interest is to meet a stricter test of admissibility in order to be justified. 
5. Duty to disclose information concerning Gross Violations of Human Rights 
The discussion above has sketched the contours of the state duty to disclose as derived 
from the legal framework of the public access to information in general. As we have seen in 
the previous analysis, public authorities must, in principle, provide information when a 
legitimate interest of the requester exists. Although transparency and good governance 
arguments necessitate that all the information should, in principle, be accessible (principle of 
maximum disclosure), restrictions to information are admissible when they are provided for by 
law, legitimate – corresponding to a specific, acceptable justification –, and necessary for the 
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functioning of democratic society. On matters of general concern, however, public interest has 
primacy over legitimate restrictions to information. In such cases, there is a presumption of 
disclosure for the information that is relevant for the public. Public bodies must provide this 
kind of information when requested to do so, without the claimant needing to prove a direct 
interest or a personal involvement. In the American system, as well as in the comprehensive 
body of soft law, the obligation to provide requested information of public interest is coupled 
with a positive obligation to proactively disclose this kind of information, even in the absence 
of an explicit request. Moreover, for this kind of information, the proportionality test to assess 
the legality of restrictions on information of public interest should be interpreted narrowly. 
In the case of gross violations of human rights, the right to access to information also 
offers a legal ground to hold the state to disclosing information concerning past abuses. As the 
UN Special Rapporteur notes in the 2013 Report, countries that have experienced gross and 
systematic violations in the past are especially concerned with the public demand to disclose 
information.
332
 In these contexts, states are required to provide information on what happened 
not only to the victims and their families, but also to the whole society.
333 
As discussed above, 
the conceptualization of the right to access information concerning serious human rights 
violations – and therefore the corresponding state duty to disclose -, has mainly been 
constructed on the basis of the right to truth in its dual dimensions: the victims’ right to know 
full and complete information about the facts on, circumstances of, and responsibilities in the 
events that constituted violations to their fundamental rights; and the collective right of the 
society to know what happened during a certain period of time in the community. In this dual 
dimension, hence, protection of access to information gives victims a clear legal basis to 
ground their claim for truth. At the same time, it protects the general interest of the society to 
know the truth about periods of its history that are particularly meaningful for its identity.
334
 
Because of the specific features of these situations, however, the contours of the duty 
to disclose information in cases of gross human rights violations need some further 
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 My argument is that, because information concerning grave and systematic 
human rights violations - especially those carried by state agents is of uttermost concern to the 
whole society, this kind of information should be treated with the highest level of priority 
according to the reinforced regime that applies to information of public interest. This means 
that, in line with the developments in human rights law, in these situations public authorities 
should disclose information even without any specific request for disclosure. 
The case-law of international human rights bodies supports this line of argumentation. 
These bodies have particularly reinforced the presumption of disclosure for the documentation 
related to mass human rights violations, and thus charged the state with a burden of proving 
the legitimacy of any restriction imposed on it.
336
 The stronger presumption of disclosure 
makes it more difficult for governments to limit access to this kind of information in these 
cases. This is because, while restrictions to state-held information, in line with the general 
principles, may be admissible when meeting the criteria of legitimacy, legality, and necessity, 
in the case of fundamental rights’ violations in general, and those of particularly heinous 
nature in particular, it is highly unlikely that these criteria can be met. 
In the discussion on the memory of past human rights violations, the legal regime of 
the duty to disclose in the case of gross human rights violations frames the discussion about 
the legitimacy of state-held secret archives and classified documents concerning the abuses. 
The relevance of this regime is evident given the fact that the main rationale that has been 
used to justify policies of classification and secrecy of state-held information concerning 
patterns of mass and systematic state-sponsored violence in state practice has been the 
protection of national security – itself a rather broad, and open to interpretation, concept. In 
these cases, the legal regime of access to information and the characteristics of the duty to 
disclose delineate the assessment of the legitimacy of this kind of state policies. 
In cases of gross and systematic human rights abuses, the counter-values to be 
balanced against the government’s interest of national security are victims’ right to justice, 
reparation, and truth, as well as the general interest of societies to know what happened in 
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their countries and to obtain guarantees of non-repetition from the government.
337
 Principles 
of democracy and good governance, which entail transparency in the management of 
information, should also guide governments in adopting legislation to deal with their violent 
past, opposing national policies of secrecy. Human rights bodies have been determined in 
promoting these values over national security claims. In the above mentioned report of 2013, 
the UN Special Rapporteur asserted that, in relation to violations that took place in the past - 
especially when committed by previous regimes -, the national security argument has “little 
credibility”.
338
 Similarly, with regard to classification of information concealed during 
previous regimes, the European Court of Human Rights, dealing with a lustration proceeding 
in Turek v. Slovakia, stated that restrictions to access materials that were classified as 
confidential under previous regimes could not be justified on the basis of a “continuing and 
actual public interest” in keeping that information secret, since that interest could not be 
assumed. 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights addressed this issue comprehensively in 
Gomes Lund et al. v. Brazil. The case concerned the question of the legitimacy of amnesty 
laws that shield those responsible for serious crimes committed during authoritarian regimes 
from prosecution.
339
 Following its previous jurisprudence, the Court declared the 1979 
Brazilian amnesty law incompatible with the American Convention.
340
 The Court found that 
the denial of, and delay in providing information to the victims and their relatives by the 
public authority constituted a violation of article 13. Interestingly, this violation, according to 
the Court, amounted to an infringement of the victim’s right to the truth. 
An Amicus Curiae brief on the right to truth and access to information, submitted to the 
Court by a group of human rights organizations led by the Open Society Justice Initiative, 
suggested that, in the case of gross and systematic human rights abuses, a “human rights super 
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access clause” should apply. This clause would provide an interpretation of the content of the 
right to information which would entail that access to documents concerning serious human 
rights breaches requested by victims or their relatives should not be subject to any kind of 
restriction.
341
 The brief puts forth this argument on the basis of the analysis of national 
legislations on freedom of information in the American region, as well as the OAS Model Law 
on Access to Public Information’s provisions. In spite of the convincing reasoning articulated 
in the brief, the Court did not embrace this interpretation, and instead confirmed the 
admissibility of restrictions to the right to access to public information.
342
 Nonetheless, it 
significantly declared that neither classified information and state secrets nor limitations, such 
as reasons of public order or national security, can be used by public authorities as a means of 
refusing to disclose information related to human rights breaches.
343
 This standpoint is in line 
with the growing body of soft law that I considered above.
344
 Indeed, all those non-binding 
documents strongly oppose the possibility of imposing secrecy on information involving 
serious human rights violations, and require that, with regard to information related to such 
abuses, exceptions should not be admitted.
345
 
In the light of these trends, it is reasonable to assume that when states are responsible 
for serious human rights violations, legitimate restrictions on relevant information are hardly 
conceivable in the current international framework of human rights protection. While not 
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absolute, the public right to access to information seems to require states to act with a higher 
degree of transparency and openness in disclosing information related to those abuses. It can 
therefore be argued that, with regard to information concerning past periods of systematic state 
violence, the duty to disclose information requires states to refrain from shielding documents 
concerning the past from the public eye. It therefore delegitimizes the creation of secret 
archives, and encourages governments to open the existing ones. 
6. State Practice 
From the previous analysis of the human rights instruments and case law, I inferred 
that, in the international law framework, a positive state obligation is progressively developing 
to allow access to information concerning gross human rights violations when requested, and 
to disclose this information to the public. The rationales beside this duty are the right to 
information – in the individual and collective dimension – and the general principles of 
democracy and good governance. These latter two, in particular, are derived from the 
protection of freedom of information. It entails that societies be informed about matters of 
general interest to fully exercise the citizens’ rights and duties to participate in public life, and 
to exercise control over the work of public authorities. As argued, patterns of systematic 
abuses certainly fall into the category of information of public concern. On these arguments, 
classification policies directed to shield information concerning serious abuses from public 
scrutiny should be interpreted as contrary to international norms. 
It should be assessed whether the development of this trend at the international level 
finds a correspondence in national practice. With regard to the state duty to disclose the results 
of investigations and make findings public, I already discussed the role of truth commissions 
and truth-seeking mechanisms.
346
 In this regard, it is interesting to remark that the final reports 
of these bodies generally require governments to disseminate the final account of the 
investigations as widely as possible through media and public information mechanisms. States 
have generally deemed this request binding, and have therefore generally provided for the 
publication and dissemination of the final reports. Apart from this, another form of state 
practice should be considered as an example of the connections between the state duty to 
disclose information of public interest under international law, and national processes of 
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memory making. This practice involves the open policies on classified files concerning serious 
human rights abuses committed in the past. 
At the domestic level, the public right to access information, as grounding a state duty 
to disclose, has provided justification for governments reckoning with an abusive past to adopt 
declassification policies of secret information related to the period of violations. Post-
communist countries were pioneers of this practice. Since the nineties, Hungary, Czech 
Republic, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have adopted legislation 
which has progressively opened up most of the secret archives of the previous communist 
regimes.
347
 The Latin-American countries – also in the light of the proactive approach adopted 
by OAS bodies - have incorporated a state duty to disclose information about patterns of 
serious human rights violations committed in the past in the national access regulations. In 
fact, most of the access laws of these countries include clauses that prohibit restrictions to 
information concerning cases of gross human rights violations. The Mexican Federal Act on 
Transparency and Access to Official Information (Lei Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a la 
Información Pública Gubernamental) explicitly prohibits the classification of information 
related to serious breaches.
348
 The Access to Public Information Laws of Peru and Guatemala 
also include provisions that enshrine the principle of maximum disclosure for information 
concerning serious violations.
349
 Likewise, the Brazilian legal framework on access to 
information, recently revised, rules that no limitation can be imposed on documents related to 
human rights violations committed by state agents.
350
 As a result of this trend, many countries 
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in the region have progressively disclosed many pieces of information on the years of 
dictatorships, authoritarianisms, and state-sponsored violence, which are now available to the 
public through the creation of public archives.
351
 
This state practice supports the emergence of the duty to disclose in human rights law. 
Nevertheless, when looking specifically at the single pieces of legislation on access to secret 
files and their implementation in practice, one can see that there are still many steps to be 
taken before the gap between, on the one hand, the theoretical recognition of such a duty in 
international and domestic legal instruments, and, on the other hand, its concrete fulfilment in 
practice, is closed. In the Eastern European landscape, for instance, most of the national access 
laws still include important restrictions to access to information concerning secret documents 
of the State Security and the Intelligence Services during the communist regimes.
352
 These 
provisions often vest citizens only with the right to access personal files. Hence, a general 
right to access information for the public is disregarded. Requesters can access information 
which does not directly concern her or him only if a specific interest is proven.
 353
 However, 
even in the latter case, the documents actually disclosed to professional historians and 
researchers upon request are often selected and evaluated by the public authority.
354
 Moreover, 
since the concept of national security is never specified by law, public authorities have an 
important degree of discretion in according access to those files.
355
 In practical terms, 
furthermore, most of these legislations entrust ad hoc bodies with the task of processing 
requests for access. Although these bodies are formally independent from political parties, in 
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some cases big scandals exploded due to the political involvement of their functionaries.
356
 
These practical obstacles clearly hinder the effectiveness of a general disclosure of 
information of public concern. From the point of view of memory-processes, moreover, in 
limiting the flow of information on traumatic events from the past within the society, they 
influence a direct or indirect alteration in the creation of memory narratives concerning those 
events. 
The case of Romania, through the analysis provided by Lavinia Stan, offers a good 
example of how, in spite of the formal opening up of the secret archives of the communist 
regime, the management of secret files has altered the collective process of representing the 
past within the society. Stan provides an overview of the political and legislative steps that 
were taken in the country to declassify documents owned by the secret political police – the 
Securitate - during the years of the authoritarian rule.
357
 Since 1999, when Law 187 first 
opened the Securitate files for citizens, the disclosure process of secret documents had an 
alternative fate.
358
 Despite the formal opening up of secret files by Law 187/99, Romanian 
legislation actually did not bring about full disclosure. According to the legal framework set 
up by Law 187/99, access to secret files is granted to all the Romanians and EU citizens upon 
request, but is limited only to personal files. Other specific categories of individuals, which in 
the human rights language could be grouped as those exercising “a special watchdog function” 
or specific public functions, can also have access to information of public interest concerning 
individuals who are – or aim to be – in charge of high political and civil positions in the 
society.
359
 Researchers and professional historians can access documents through formal 
request, but the relevance of their application and the proportionality between the research 
interest and the requested materials have to be assessed and validated.
360
 Although legislative 
proposals aimed at broadening the scope of accessible material have been put forth,
 
some files 
still remain closed and classified. Requests for access to documents that are classified as 
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dangerous for the national interest are to be validated by the managing institution,
361
 together 
with the national information services and the competent political authorities. This process 
clearly involves a highly political assessment.
362
 Moreover, Stan argues that the inconsistent 
practical management of files by the responsible institution and the political interferences with 
its work not only have made the effective access to files difficult, but have also undermined 
the public trust in the whole disclosure process.
363
 
These pitfalls in the process of disclosure of secret information by the Romanian 
government have clearly had an impact on shaping collective memories in the country. Stan 
observes this impact on the memory processes. She notes that the use of the political police 
secret files determined the creation of different narratives, both before and after they became 
accessible. As long as the files remained secrets, the history of the communist regime could be 
told and interpreted as the story of the personal dictatorship of Ceausescu. Former 
collaborators were presented as victims of the regime, and systematic human rights violations 
were told as episodic excesses. The narrative of the great nation was presented to strengthen 
the nationalist soul of the country, and to grant legitimacy to the new leadership. Even after 
Ceausescu’s fall, the secret files were used as powerful political tools against the parties of the 
opposition. Therefore, no incentive existed for the new leadership to pierce the veil of silence 
over those documents.
364
 The author notes that, with the progressive disclosure of secret 
information, a greater flow of information came to the scrutiny of the public, challenging past 
narratives. She argues that the flaws in the process of disclosure have, however, caused the 
circulating of new partial and bias narratives within the society. The partial reading of 
individual files by victims stimulated the creation of personal narratives that could not be 
contrasted by collective memories, because of the limitations to access information for the 
general public. Furthermore, the lack of credibility of the managing institution in reading and 
disclosing the secret files, made other categories of individuals who had better access to the 
files – such as journalists, media agents, civil society actors, but also politicians – authoritative 
voices in the constructing of historical narratives. This experience makes apparent, I believe, 
the manner in which management of information translates into management of narratives, 
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and thereby of memories. Hence, principles of law informing state policies on information 
management clearly influence the management of memories. 
Concluding remarks 
The chapter explored the state duty to disclose information concerning past gross 
violations of human rights committed on a large scale. This duty was firstly investigated in its 
legal dimension; access to information was considered the main legal basis from which the 
duty to disclose was inferred. Access to information pertains to both victims and society, at 
different levels. While in the former case, the right to the truth requires states to provide 
personal information related to the facts that led to the infringement of individual fundamental 
rights, in the latter case there is a presumption that societies have a legitimate special interest 
in knowing information on patterns of systematic violence in which state agents were 
involved. As a consequence, states should have a positive obligation not to interfere with the 
circulation of such information within the society and to provide requested information, as 
well as to promote its disclosure through open policies on state-held documents and secret 
files. Human rights bodies have strengthened the protection of access to this kind of 
information for special categories of individuals who play a “social watchdog role” within the 
society. In doing so, they enable this information to circulate within the society, therefore 
complying with the public right to know. 
From the review of the main legal instruments and the practice of the Human Rights 
Committee, and the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights, however, it results 
that a positive state obligation to proactively disclose all information is not yet consistently 
established in international law. While the Inter-American system has clearly developed a 
practice supporting it, the European Court is still more cautious in recognizing such a positive 
obligation on states. Nevertheless, there is a clear trend toward the recognition of the duty to 
disclose at least with regard to information of particular importance for the public. Information 
related to gross human rights violations committed in the past is to be considered to fall into 
this category. This trend is supported by a consistent body of soft law. In these cases, the 
principles of maximum disclosure and public interest override define the contours of the state 
duty to disclose. As a consequence, restrictions to information concerning serious human 
rights violations are hardly ever admissible. These principles and standards have been 
128 
progressively confirmed by the case law of human rights bodies as well, and also found 
support in emerging state practice, albeit not without difficulties. 
When the information to be disclosed relates to documents concerning past atrocities, 
however, imposing a state duty to disclose as an obligation under international law may have 
problematic outcomes. In fact, the reviewed state practice has shown how, in spite of open 
polices to disclose classified information concerning past crimes, the management of 
information regarding traumatic events occurred in the past still remains challenging. Open 
access to historical documents has an impact on how collective and individual narratives form 
and circulate, and therefore on how history is read and memory is shaped. At the same time, 
moreover, the existence of a duty to disclose under international law, through the elaboration 
and promotion of principles and standards, be it by enforceable instruments (judicial 
decisions) or less binding measures (soft law declarations and documents), may provide an 
obstacle for governments in the exercising of political selection of information on the past. In 
doing so, it may facilitate the creation – or protection – of a democratic and pluralistic network 
of individual and collective narratives that bloom and circulate in the society. In this way, 
international law, by means of the regulation of the duty to disclose, may act on two different 
levels: First, it may provide guidelines for states on how to relate to the records of an abusive 
past; and second, it may protect the societal ownership of the memory-negotiation processes 
from the control of the political leadership. From this perspective, international law may 





The Duty to Preserve Memory 
Introduction 
The first domain in which international and human rights law provisions interfere with 
the processes of memory making is the production and dissemination of information about the 
past. In the previous chapters, I have examined how human rights law requires states, first, to 
inquiry about, and clarify the past when marked by events which constitute serious offences to 
fundamental rights (through the obligation to investigate, chapter II), and second, to ensure 
that the information emerging from those investigations is made accessible to victims and 
society (through the right to access to information and the corresponding emerging duty to 
disclose, chapter III). In this way, the law regulates the production of, and access to 
knowledge about the past. The duties examined so far – the duty to ascertain the historical 
facts constituting human rights violations and the duty to disclose information related to those 
violations –, by the way they are regulated under human rights law and the way they have 
been implemented in practice, eventually influence how history is interpreted and the past is 
represented, and thereby impact on how individual and collective memories shape and 
circulate. 
The next step that international law encourages states to take when dealing with mass 
atrocities in the past is to collect and preserve items – documents and other kinds of records – 
related to past violations from the passage of time. To do so, states are expected to create 
archives and collections, which in fact result in storages of memories. This practice points at 
the next duty that influences the production and dissemination of knowledge of the past, which 
will be discussed in this chapter: The duty to collect and preserve documents and records 
related to past violations. As in the previous chapters, this chapter explores the contours, 
content, and standards of the duty under scrutiny, and highlights its relevance for the processes 
of memory-making. Unlike in the previous chapters, however, the chapter will not analyse the 
legal foundation of the duty at issue in depth, as it was done for the previous components of 
the duty of memory. This is because the duty to collect and preserve information mostly shares 
its legal foundation with the legal grounds of the duty to disclose. The right to access to 
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information, which I have discussed at length in the previous chapter, is in fact the primary 
basis on which the duty to collect and preserve has been argued, both in the conceptualization 
of the right to know and as instrumental to the protection of other individual rights. Since 
these legal grounds have already been discussed previously in the thesis, I will not specifically 




Hence, in what follows, I will mainly focus on recollecting and systematizing the 
relevant practice that supports the emergence of such a duty. In the analysis of the practice, 
nevertheless, the different conceptualizations will be highlighted that have been used by the 
different international legal actors to frame and theorize such a duty. At the same time, I will 
indicate major standards and guidelines elaborated in the practice that influence how 
memories of the past are produced and delivered. The chapter therefore opens with a 
discussion about the relevance of the duty to preserve for the processes of memory-making. In 
this part, I first present a reflection on the role of archives – as the main expression of the duty 
to preserve - in the processes of memory-making, and then I sketch the theoretical framework 
to conceptualize the emerging duty to preserve. The second part of the chapter reviews and 
systematizes the practice of international bodies and states, in order to assess the state of the 
art of the duty to preserve in the international system. Finally, the last part indicates guidelines 
and principles that emerge from the analysis of the practice, and that offer insights about the 
concrete implementation of the duty. 
1. Memory and the Duty to Preserve 
1.1 The Role of Archives 
Human rights archives are the main expression of the state duty to collect and preserve 
documents in situations of mass and widespread violence.
366
 These institutions become “sites 
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of memory” for the custody of those records.
367
 It was said that “[a]rchives are repositories of 
memory, providing reliable evidence for examining the past.”
368
 They are established to 
enable a systematic recollection of the different narratives that come to be the bigger story of 
violence. As Margalit puts it, they are vehicles for memories travelling from a person to 
another, enabling the construction of shared memory.
369
 Human rights archives, preserving 
evidence and traces of human rights abuses, aim to defend the stories they tell from the 
passage of time. They create a bridge between past and future, ensuring that those stories can 
be read also by the next generations. Beyond that, they try to provide an account – “some 
sense of the truth” – for something that “very often seems (…) meaningless”.
370
 Historians 
often rely on their collections to shape the historical account they will present. Judges and 
courts often rely on their databases to clarify historical events which are relevant for their 
decisions.
371
 Journalists often rely on the information they store to tell stories about the past 
and disseminate them in the public opinion. They are therefore sources of collective 
memories. 
Yet, archives are selective. The questions of which records to include and which ones 
to destroy, and – even before that – who makes that decision, determine which stories are told 
and how they are shaped. The way documents related to past abuses are managed – selected, 
collected, processed, stored, and preserved – in archives influences how those traumatic events 
will be remembered by future generations, when no direct witness will be able to tell them 
anymore. The official management of archives on human rights abuses, hence, may allow 
governments to shape official narrative to be circulated in the society. Archives, in this sense, 
are instruments in the hands of governments for manipulating how the past is read and 
                                                 
367
 Nora, “Between memory and history: Les lieux de mémoire”, 127-24. To Nora, sites of memory are 
lieux de mémoire “where memory crystallizes and secretes itself”; as such, they are opposed to milieux de 
mémoire, which are, instead “real environments of memory” (ibid., at 7). See also Winter, Sites of memory, sites 
of mourning. 
368
 Jimerson, R., “Archives and memory”, OCLC Systems & Services: International digital library 
perspectives 19, no. 3 (2003): 89 – 95. 
369
 Margalit, The Ethics of Memory, 63. 
370
 Cox, “Archives, War, and Memory”, 22. 
371
 See, for instance, the role of truth commissions’ archives in the decisions of the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights. E.g. IACtHR, Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala, paras. 134.8-134-17; Castro Castro Prison v. 
Peru. 
132 
represented. Archival policies have been crucial, in fact, in the political agenda of 
undemocratic regimes. By the same token, destruction of archives – because of their strong 
identity component - has long been used as weapon in warfare, especially in ethnic conflicts. 
As it was noted,  
[the destruction of archives in war] is not “collateral damage.” This is the active 
and often systematic destruction of particular building types or architectural 
traditions that happens in conflicts where the erasure of the memories, history 
and identity attached to architecture and place—enforced forgetting—is the goal 
itself. These buildings are attacked not because they are in the path of a military 
objective: to their destroyers they are the objective.
372
 
Taking into account all these aspects, the crucial role of archives in shaping the 
memory of the past should remain clear. As a consequence, international provisions and 
guidelines that influence and orient archival policies of states necessary alter the relation 
between a state and its past. In light of this strict connection between the management of 
historical documents in archives and the production of collective memories, the state duty to 
create archives and collections to document past human rights abuses has, in fact, been 
labelled the “duty to preserve memory”.
373
 This is also the label that I will use in this thesis to 
refer to such a duty. Indeed, when the documentation that states are asked to gather and store 
relates to historical periods of pervasive human rights abuses, the duty to collect and preserve 
information seems to require states to preserve and maintain materials that produce narratives 
about past atrocities. In this sense, the duty to preserve is a third component of the duty of 
memory under international law. 
1.2 Duty to Preserve - Contours 
The duty to gather and preserve documents and records has been implemented in 
different fields, including public administration management, access to personal information, 
regimes of criminal detention, internet regulation, etc. In all these domains, states bear the 
responsibility to implement storage and retrieval systems to collect and preserve relevant 
information. It has its roots in the right to know – in its individual and collective dimension –, 
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and entails the creation and management of databases, archives, and collections. Its main 
function consists in enabling individuals to effectively enjoy their civil and political rights 
during their physiological stage, i.e., in the normal phase of respect, protection, and fulfilment 
of those rights by states.
374
 However, when it comes to the pathological stage of human rights 
violations, the implementation of the duty to collect and preserve evidence of the abuses 
becomes especially important in enabling victims to protect and vindicate their rights. In fact, 
holding states responsible for collecting and maintaining evidences and materials related to 
human rights violations, in addition to the enforcement mechanisms of the right to access to 
documents, such as habeas data, effectively allows victims to get to know relevant 
information about the violations they suffered, and therefore to access remedial proceedings to 
vindicate their rights. 
Beyond this functional character, moreover, in patterns of systematic and serious 
human rights violations, the state duty to collect and preserve documents serves other goals. In 
these situations, in fact, archives are not only repository of information, but also sacred spaces 
which are crucial to the struggling social (or official) process of reconstruction of one truth.
375
 
Also in these contexts, the individual and collective dimension should be acknowledged. From 
the victims’ perspective, the individual right to access information about abuses suffered in the 
past would logically entail a corresponding state duty to gather and preserve documents and 
records related to those violations. In fact, if one admits that victims have a right to know the 
truth about what they suffered, and that this right also entails the victims’ right to access 
information concerning the historical circumstances in which those violations occurred,
376
 the 
consequent state duty to collect, gather, and preserve documents in fact results in collecting 
and preserving records which give a (or one?) historical account of those violations, in order to 
ensure the effective enjoyment of the victims’ right to know. The victims’ right to information, 
hence, entails that states are responsible for managing evidence related to the violations, which 
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will then become materials to reconstruct and represent the past. This, in turn, influences how 
that past is told and remembered. 
On the other hand, in patterns of widespread violence, the theoretical conceptualization 
of the right to access information from the collective dimension of the right to know also adds 
more features to the state duty to gather and protect information of public interest. The 
creation of archives and collections that document mass human rights abuses serves the 
society’s general interest of access to information of public importance, and members of the 
society in the verification of accounts of the periods of violence.
377
 From this perspective, 
hence, the duty to collect and preserve records becomes a tool for protecting the societal 
interest in getting to know information about historical events that are relevant for a people’s 
history and identity. This is to say, in other words, that states not only have the duty to make 
information in their hands available and accessible (as it was argued in Chapter III), but they 
also bear the responsibility to collect and preserve records to allow those abuses to be 
represented and remembered. 
2. The Practice 
Both at the international and domestic level, the practice seems to support the 
emergence of a duty to preserve in the aftermath of serious and widespread human rights 
abuses. International and regional institutions and non-governmental bodies have repeatedly 
invoked the state duty to create archival systems to collect and preserve documents and 
information related to the violations that occurred in the past in both their statements and legal 
instruments. As a result, the guidelines developed at the international level have been 
implemented by governments dealing with past violence, which have adopted pieces of 
legislation for the creation of archives and collections on the periods of violence.
378
 In what 
follows, I will discuss the relevant practice, which have emerged at both the supranational 
(international and regional) and national level. 
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2.1 The duty to preserve in international practice 
At the international level, a first recognition of the state duty to preserve archives in 
conventional provisions can be found in the Vienna Convention on State Succession in respect 
of State Property, Archives and Debts.
379
 Albeit limited to the scope of states’ succession, the 
Convention affirms the state obligation to prevent damage to, and destruction of archives, in 
order to ensure the appropriate transfer of archives from the predecessor state to the successor 
state.
380
 Besides that, other provisions in the Convention suggest a general favor for preserving 
and maintaining the integrity and security of state archives.
381
 It is important to note, 
moreover, the conceptual tie that the Convention draws between the management of archives 
and the people’s right to information about their history and their cultural heritage. In this 




Besides this explicit (be it limited) recognition, the duty to preserve is not recognized, 
as such, in any binding human rights document. Yet, some of its features can be further 
deduced from international soft law instruments and practice. The Set of Principles to Combat 
Impunity, first and foremost, provides an enlightening contribution to this discussion, by 
explicitly asserting the existence of the duty to preserve documents and delineating its 
substantive scope. Principle 3 describes the “duty to preserve memory” as the state duty to 
“preserve archives and other evidence concerning violations of human rights and humanitarian 
law”.
383
 The accompanying commentary bestows on this duty “universal relevance”, although 
it does not further explain what this would concretely entail.
384
 In this framework, the duty to 
preserve memory is conceptualized as a corollary of the right to know. In line with the 
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theoretical conceptualization sketched above, while the legal basis suggested by the Principles 
is univocally the right to know tout court,
385
 the rationale they suggest is twofold. On the one 
hand, from the collective perspective, the duty to preserve memory aims at allowing violence-
torn society to acknowledge the history of its oppression, as part of its heritage.
386
 On the other 
hand, from the victims’ perspective, the preservation of evidence related to violations enables 
victims to exercise and vindicate several individual rights.
387
 Here again, the regulation of 
modalities for access to, and management of information on the past has a double impact: 
collective and individual. The double dimension of the duty to preserve records of past 
atrocities suggested by the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity, has been subsequently 
upheld in reports and resolutions issued by international human rights bodies, which have 
further contributed to identifying its legal grounds and defining its content. 
Also within the practice of human rights bodies, the duty to preserve has been 
presented in different conceptualizations. In the UN system, for the most part, the discussion 
on archives and the duty to create and preserve them is included in the debate on the right to 
truth. The Human Rights Council, for instance, has encouraged states “that have not yet done 
so to establish a national archival policy that ensures that all archives pertaining to human 
rights are preserved and protected, and to enact legislation that declares that the nation’s 
documentary heritage is to be retained and preserved, and creates the framework for managing 
State records from their creation to destruction or preservation”.
388
 This duty is seen as a 
corollary of the right to truth, which requires states “to take the necessary steps to preserve the 
collective memory of gross human rights violations”.
389
 Also in this conceptualization, the 
duty to preserve is intrinsically connected to the individual right to information – as “the 
fundamental right of each individual to have access to information on the public record 
relating to himself or herself” –
390
 as well as to the societal interest “to an undistorted written 
record, and the right of each people to know the truth about its past”.
391
 In the light of this, the 
issue of the “[p]reservation of and access to archives on human rights violations and the 
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question of memory” has received the attention of the OHCHR in a number reports, which 




More conceptualizations have been provided beside the right-to-truth argument. The 
duty to collect and preserve records related to human rights violations has frequently been 
considered in the functional dimension that we highlighted above, namely as an instrument to 
enable individuals to exercise a number of primary rights.
393
 In this sense, international soft 
law instruments have also linked the state duty to collect and preserve documents concerning 
human rights violation to the victims’ right to an effective remedy with the obligation to 
investigate and prosecute. On the right to the truth, Resolution 2005/66 of the Commission on 
Human Rights stated that  
States should preserve archives and other evidence concerning gross violations 
of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law to 
facilitate knowledge of such violations, to investigate allegations and to provide 




The same wording has been restated in every subsequent resolution adopted by UN 
bodies related to the right to the truth.
395
 From this perspective, the preservation of memory – 
in the sense of keeping and maintaining records that enable narratives to be created and 
disseminated – is just a side effect of the duty to collect and preserve documents. Regionally, 
the duty to collect and preserve records has found further support in the practice of the Inter-
American Commission for Human Rights. In this context, the previously mentioned Inter-
American Framework on the right of access to information proves particularly relevant in the 
clarification of the roots, and content of such a duty, since it provides a detailed analysis of 
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 As we have seen in the previous chapter, that document aims at outlining the state of the 
art about the individuals’ right to access to information in the Americas. In so doing, it also 
identifies guidelines and best practice to implement that right. In this framework, the duty to 
preserve and maintain records stems from two main obligations, which both fall on states from 
the individuals’ right to information: i) the obligation to produce or gather the documentation 
that individuals require to have access to; and ii) the obligation to put in place implementing 
mechanisms to ensure the protection of the right to information.
397
 As it comes to the specific 
pattern of human rights abuses committed on a mass scale, the document further interprets the 
content of the victims’ right to information as entailing a corresponding state obligation to 
create and preserve archives, and to facilitate access to them. The text could not have been 
more explicit in stating this duty, and its relation with the victims’ right to know. 
As a part of the right to information and its character as a tool necessary for 
guaranteeing knowledge of serious violations of human rights, the States also 
have the duty to create and preserve public archives designed to collect and 
organize information on gross violations of human rights that took place in their 
countries. The collection of this information, the creation of archives and their 
preservation are precisely State obligations derived from the right of access to 
information as an instrument to guarantee the rights of victims of gross 
violations of human rights.
398
 
The Commission upheld such a duty in cases on access to information. In Gomez Lund 
v. Brazil, for instance, the Commission affirmed that the state had a “positive obligation to 
produce and conserve information”, and therefore inferred the consequent obligation to 
implement measures to keep such information safe in archives and manage it there.
399
 In that 
case, Brazil claimed the destruction of documents and archives to justify their refusal to 
provide victims with information about the facts which led to the enforced disappearance of 
the victims and their fate. Moreover, it brought all the policies on archives and records 
management that the government had implemented in the years following the abuses before 
the Court, as evidence of its compliance with its obligations under the American Convention, 
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and, in particular, as a means of discharging its obligation to provide information. The Court 
showed appreciation for those policies, yet nonetheless dismissed the destruction of the 
required information as a legitimate justification for upholding the refusal. The Court 
considered that the state had to prove that it had undertaken “all the measures under its power” 
to keep the information in its hands, and warned the state to go further in the implementation 
of archival policies related to the period of grave human rights abuses in the country.
400
 
Hence, the creation and appropriate management of archives and collections, in the Court’s 
reasoning, are modalities for the state to comply with its conventional obligations. In this way, 
the Court seems to suggest the responsibility of the state for the preservation of documents and 
materials about past events constituting human rights violations. 
Even if more cautiously, also the European and African systems have concurrently 
upheld the responsibility of states in preserving and maintaining archives, especially those 
related to human rights violations. The African Commission, for instance, in its Model Law on 
Access to Information, included the duty of information-holders to create, keep, organize, and 
maintain information appropriately and efficiently, and to keep documents in good condition 
in order to guarantee their safety and integrity.
401
 The European Convention on Access to 
Official Documents (ECAOD), similarly, includes the duty to efficiently manage documents 
and to regulate the modalities for their preservation and destruction among the 




Furthermore, the Committee of Ministers has taken on the task of developing 
principles and standards for guiding and harmonizing archival policies in the Member 
States.
403
 Recommendation n. R(2000)13 marks a milestone in the European archival policy. It 
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endorses the right to access to archives and sets out minimum standards that member states 
should meet in their archival legislations. Moreover, it is worth noting that Recommendation 
R(2000)13 mainly approaches the right to access to archives, and the consequent duty to 
preserve documents stored therein, from the collective perspective. After affirming that 
archives “ensure the survival of human memory” and that they “preserve the memory of 
nations”, the Recommendation grounds the duty to protect and manage archives on the need to 
foster a European identity through the protection of memory. In these terms, it recalls the 
public interests in knowing history and historical research. On these grounds, member states 
are encouraged to allocate appropriate human and financial resources for the creation and 
maintenance of effective and efficient systems of preservation and management of archives. 
Governments should ensure the proper physical conservation of documents stored in historical 
archives, so as to allow the public the exercising of its right to access them. Hence, in these 
terms, the duty to preserve memory requires that states ensure the physical integrity of records 
about the past. In these regional systems, however, none of the adjudicatory bodies have 
enforced such a duty yet. 
2.2 The duty to preserve in state practice 
So far, we have endorsed the recognition of the emerging duty to gather and preserve 
records in the international and regional systems of human rights protection, mostly in soft law 
documents. As we have seen, soft law provides an argument in favour of such a duty, and 
indicates the right to know – through the enforceable right to access to information - as a legal 
basis to support it. However, since most of the previously examined soft law instruments – by 
definition - are not binding, their statements per se would not be sufficient to assert the 
existence of a duty to preserve records under international and human rights law.
404
 
Nevertheless, the principles they reflect have been widely supported by state practice, 
developed especially by governments that are undergoing transitional processes to democracy 
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or as a result of the work of truth commissions. Most of the countries that have implemented 
de-classification policies of documents related to past authoritarian regimes that I have 
presented in the previous chapter, for instance, put in place legal, as well as administrative, 
procedures in order to collect and store that information. As we observed when we examined 
that trend, those countries included the state duty not only to provide access to documents, but 
also to ensure and preserve their integrity over time, in their access to information laws. 
This practice is also wide-spread on the Latin-American continent. Over the last two 
decades, governments have increasingly developed their archival legislations, strengthening 
the importance of human rights archives which document the periods of violence. Brazil, for 
instance, has put forward a set of initiatives aimed at preserving and strengthening the national 
archival system, especially with regard to records related to the period of military 
dictatorship.
405
 Not by chance, this legislative and administrative process arrived in the 
country almost at the same time as the process of de-classification.
406
 After the work carried 
out by the Special Commission on Political Deaths and Disappearances, the Commission on 
the Archive on the Struggle against Dictatorship (Comissão do Acervo da Luta Contra a 
Ditadura) was established in 1999 under the supervision of the Secretary for Culture and 
Historical Archives. The Commission was established for the purpose of creating a historical 
collection of materials related to the violations committed in the region during the 1964 – 
1985 timeframe.
407
 Since then, the government has enacted decisions that led to the 
progressive compilation of a large documental heritage of material on that tragic period. 
Ultimately, in 2009, the Reference Center for the Political Struggles in Brazil was created 
within the project Memórias Reveladas, to provide coordination and supervision of the record-
keeping process.
408
 The project aimed, inter alia, at creating an online databank in which 
digitalized documents and records have been made accessible to the public. The majority of 
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the Federal States, as well as the Federal District, have contributed their public archives to the 
project.
409
 These archives and collections have played a crucial role in putting together and 
reading the history of the former authoritarian regime, and in the endeavour of making sense 
of the experience of violence. Many other governments in the region have progressively 
adopted comparable record-keeping policies with the same aim.
410
 
As in the case of Brazil, pieces of legislation that prescribe the collection and 
preservation of records of past abuses have been often coupled with the creation of ad hoc 
bodies in charge of managing the relevant documentation. In their statutes, these bodies are 
always somehow entrusted with the management and preservation of ‘memory’, and therefore 
involved in the organization and coordination of memory-related initiatives. The Polish 
Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) is a good example of this kind of memory-related 
institution. The institute was established by the government in 1998, with the founding goal to 
protect the memory of the crimes committed during WWII and post-war period in the 
county.
411
 It operates from the moral and political assumption that state-sponsored human 
rights violations cannot be withheld or forgotten, and it was created to fulfil the state’s 
obligations to prosecute state crimes and to heal victims’ harms. The IPN is in charge of 
collecting, securing, storing, disclosing, and disseminating the documentation regarding 
crimes committed in the period of the War, and during the subsequent regime of political 
repression.
412
 To that aim, an ad hoc department is responsible for managing and safekeeping 
archival records of that period. Similar to Poland, the Bulgarian Law for Access and 
Disclosure of Documents and Announcing Affiliation of Bulgarian Citizens to State Security 
and the Intelligence Services of the Bulgarian National Army
413
 set up an oversight body in 
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charge of searching, collecting, investigating, analysing, and evaluating that material. To 
comply with its responsibilities, the Committee decided to create a special archive to keep 
records of the communist experience. Similar bodies have been created in the majority of 
Eastern European countries dealing with authoritarian pasts.
414
 
To understand the relevance of this widespread state practice for the progressive 
affirmation of a legal duty to preserve memory, we should wonder to what extent this practice 
is also supported by some degree of opinio juris; that is to say, in other words, whether states 
adopt legal instruments to implement systems to preserve and safeguard records concerning 
human rights abuses with “a sense of legal obligation”.
415
 In fact, most of the above-
mentioned pieces of legislation – reflecting the state of the art in the international practice - 
anchor the need for creating and preserving archives not only in good practices, but also in 
genuine legal obligations on states, mainly rooted in the victims’ right to access to 
information, as a modality of their right to know or the right to truth. 
In this regard, the Colombian case is emblematic. Article 57 of the Law on Justice and 
Peace (Ley de Justicia y Paz) states: “[t]he right to truth implies that archives are 
preserved”.
416
 As a consequence, according to the law, public institutions are under the 
obligation to adopt measures to impede theft, destruction or falsification of archives, and to 
facilitate victims’ access to them in order that they may claim their rights.
417
 The 
Constitutional Court of Colombia has further strengthened these principles, confirming the 
legal nature of this duty. Since 2003, the Court has recognized the obligation of every public 
body to adopt public policies to safeguard and preserve information, arguing from the 
fundamental citizens’ right to access public information, in particular to information related to 
mass human rights violations.
418
 The Court has linked the duty to preserve records about past 
human rights violations with the victims’ rights “to justice, reparation and, in particular, to 
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 and has stressed the instrumental role of the duty to preserve in enhancing 
the “fundamental right to the truth for victims of human rights violations and the right to 
memory for the Colombian society”.
420 
Consequently, the Court has urged the government to 
undertake actions to ensure the protection of classified documents, in order to allow their 
publication in the future. To that aim, the Court required the state to establish criminal and 
administrative sanctions for acts that may threaten the security of that information during the 
period they were covered by the secrecy clause, as well as to adopt administrative procedures 
to preserve the integrity of records.
421
 National courts of other countries, albeit in less explicit 
terms, have ruled along similar lines.
422
 
The combined reading of this national practice and the repeated statements of 
international bodies on this matter, ultimately encourages the attachment of legal value to the 
‘duty to preserve memory’ to be recognized as a logical precondition for the effective 
implementation of the right to access to information. 
3. Standards of the Duty to Preserve 
Besides its recognition in practice and its theoretical conceptualizations, what is the 
actual content of the duty to preserve memory in the context of gross human rights abuses? In 
other words, in what ways do international principles influence states’ conduct in the 
regulation of the duty to preserve documents and materials related to human rights violations? 
As demonstrated in the foregoing discussion, it is clear that archives and collections are the 
most immediate expression of the duty to preserve memory. Above, I have already discussed 
the intrinsic relation between human rights archives and the memories of the abuses they 
document.
423
 I also showed that the importance of this kind of archives is generally recognized 
and acknowledged by most of the instruments related to the victims’ right to access to 
information in cases of gross human rights violations.
424
 On the basis of the practice of 
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international human rights bodies and state practice, I therefore argued the progressive 
emergence of a state duty to create and preserve human rights archives. 
Many of the revised international instruments also offer states further guidelines on 
how to regulate and manage such records.
425
 The UN Special Rapporteur Mr. Joinet’s final 
report on the question of impunity, for instance, suggests a set of technical measures designed 
to ensure preservation of, and access to archives containing information on human rights 
abuses.
426
 The 2009 OHCRH Report on the right to truth - which recommends best practices 
for the effective implementation of the right to the truth -, as well as the report on experiences 
of archives as a means of guaranteeing the right to the truth provide specific guidance on how 
to use records in transitional justice processes and how to manage records collected by 
transitional justice institutions.
427
 Furthermore, especially since 2009, UN bodies have 
promoted a work of supervision, recollection, and harmonization of best practice in the 
management of, and access to archives on human rights abuses. Within this trend, in 2012, the 
Human Right Council requested that states report on good practice,
428
 and in 2013, the 
OHCHR sent follow up questionnaires to states. An official document that collects and 
promotes good practices and guidelines is expected in the near future.
429
 In addition to these 
official international documents, the International Council on Archives (ICA), together with 
UNESCO, has played a key role in developing best practices on managing human rights 
archives, which subsequently have been endorsed by states and international bodies. In 
particular the ICA-UNESCO report on the management of archives of security services of 
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former repressive regimes has to be mentioned, which has become a point of reference for 
governments and institutions dealing with the records of former totalitarian regimes.
430
 
All these guidelines and principles offer indications about the way states should behave 
when dealing with records related to past periods of mass violence. While they cannot be 
considered evidence of an existing legal obligation to create and maintain archives,
431
 they 
inform state conduct, and thereby contribute to refining the content of such an emerging duty. 
Hence, even though they are not binding, from a glance at these instruments one can 
extrapolate international standards that states are encouraged to embody in their legislative and 
administrative policies on documents management. In general, these instruments place the 
responsibility of providing an adequate legislative framework and sufficient financial support 
to ensure the creation and maintenance of human rights archives on states, whilst preserving 
the intellectual freedom of archivists regarding the selection and administration of documents. 
The duty to preserve, in this sense, mainly looks like a duty to enable, ensure and monitor the 
adequate preservation and management of records, by means of, inter alia, providing 
appropriate education programs for training professional archivists on the specificities of 
records related to human rights abuses. Eventually, the ultimate responsibility for the 
appropriate management of resources rests with archival institutions and professionals. 
In particular, international guidelines encourage states to do the following: 
i. To gather and collect documentation related to periods of human rights crises, and 
repression from national and local governmental departments and public 
administrations which were involved in the violations.
432
 
ii. To create a legal and administrative framework to systematize information by 
“archiving systems and registries that allow the past to be known”;
 433
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iii. To ensure that records of human rights violations are efficiently managed by 
impartial, professional institutions. To that aim, in situations in which national 
institutions are weak or the public does not have confidence in them, transitional 
records centres should be established, to ensure that human rights archives are 
preserved, and there is accountability for their chain of custody;
434
 




v. To establish dedicated oversight bodies or agencies in charge of supervising the 
compliance with best practice in data-collection and archive management;
436
 
vi. To allocate funds for adequate facilities, equipment, and tools to ensure access to, 
and consultation of stored data;  
vii. To implement and fund professional training courses and ad hoc education 
programs for archive staff;  
viii. To adopt protective and punitive measures against the removal, destruction, or 
misuse of records stored in archives.
437
 
Finally, regarding the scope of the application of these duties, the definition of archives 
and the consequent duty to preserve them should be understood broadly, as suggested by 
Orentlicher’s report. Since the rationale behind the duty to preserve historical documents relies 
on the collective interest in reading about the past, besides public archives managed by state 
bodies, governments should also be considered responsible for the protection of human rights 
records collected through the work of transitional institutions, as well as for private and non-
governmental collections. When adopting this view, the duty to preserve memory expands to 
requiring that states preserve and maintain archives and databases of truth commissions and 
special tribunals, as well as “respect and protect the right of non-State organizations and 
individuals to collect, preserve and make available relevant documents concerning such 
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 In these cases, however, the public role is limited to ensuring the protection and 





This chapter has explored an additional burden that international human rights bodies 
place on states concerning the way they interpret and represent knowledge about the past. The 
chapter has uncovered principles and provisions related to the preservation and management 
of documents referring to periods of mass violence and human rights abuses. I argued that 
these provisions and guidelines, when considered all together, hold states responsible for 
collecting and preserving documentary sources that allow individuals and society to consider 
the past. In the aftermath of mass violence, such a duty mainly expresses itself in the duty to 
create and preserve human rights archives documenting the periods of violence. This duty has 
been also meaningfully named “the duty to preserve memory”,
440
 to indicate the way archives 
closely relate with the creation and circulation of memories and the interpretation of history. 
International provisions regulating how human rights archives should be managed therefore 
necessarily influence the official and collective representations of the events they embody. In 
this sense, the duty to preserve adds a third piece to the puzzle that composes the duty of 
memory under international law: the duty to preserve. 
The legal foundation of such a duty has been rooted mainly in the right to access 
information, in both its individual and collective dimensions. This dual dimension of the legal 
basis is also reflected in the duty to preserve and its conceptualizations. On the one hand, the 
individual dimension relates such a duty to the individual right to know. From this perspective, 
the duty to preserve documents is an instrument to enable victims to exercise their individual 
rights. On the other hand, the collective dimension of the duty to preserve underpins the 
interest of the society in knowing information about historical events which are milestones in 
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the history of a community, underlying its identity. In this sense, the duty to preserve proves 
an extremely powerful tool in influencing the historical representation of the past within a 
society. 
Even if it is admittedly still too early to speak of a binding character of the duty to 
preserve in the current state of the art, the practice of international and regional bodies has 
widely supported the argument in favour of its progressive emergence in human rights law. 
States have been encouraged to implement adequate archival policies and effective 
management systems in a number of declarations and resolutions of international organs. 
Different conceptualizations have been used, although most of these instances refer to the 
twofold dimension of the right to access information. Part of this practice, moreover, has 
stressed the identity profile of such a duty, opening the way for exploring the duty to preserve 
also from the field of preservation of cultural identity and heritage. 
The practice of states dealing with the legacy of mass violations or authoritarian 
regimes is also a point in case of attaching legal value to behaviours that relate to whether – 
and how – governments should preserve materials on human rights abuses. In these contexts, 
in fact, states not only have frequently implemented pieces of legislation and administrative 
systems for retrieval of human rights records, but they have done so with a sense of legal 
obligation to comply with their international commitments. In order for the duty to preserve to 
evolve from soft law declaration to effectively recognized human rights law, however, a more 
explicit coordination between international and national practice is required, especially with 
regard to the enforcement of such a duty. Hence, at this stage, it seems that while a state 
obligation to protect human rights archives has been progressively embedded in the human 
rights practice and discourse, the implementation of such an obligation has yet to evolve. 
From the point of view of memory, finally, the emergence of a duty to preserve would 
have considerable implications. In fact, the affirmation of its emergence would entail the 
acknowledgement of the progressive restriction of state power in determining the fate of 
historical records, and thereby the management of the knowledge about the past. If archives 
are sacred spaces of memory, the duty to preserve entails that states are expected to preserve 
that memory from the passage of time, preventing the destruction of, or damage to the 
documents in their custody. However, although the intervention of international law in 
regulating the relation between a state and the records of its past may prevent governments 
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from using archives as tools for historical revision and political manipulation of the past, the 
overregulation of such a duty in accordance to international principles may unduly deprive the 
professional category of archivists of their ethical task of interpreting, selecting, and managing 
resources. Again, such an intervention may eventually result in the paralysis of the local, 
social processes of interpreting and negotiating the past. However, so far it seems that, in its 
approach to the state duty to preserve, international law is only emphasizing a general duty to 
set up appropriate legal and administrative frameworks and to provide for adequate resources 
to guarantee the preservation of records. In fact, the minimum standards developed by 
international bodies leave a significant margin of discretion as to the concrete implementation 
of such a duty. At this stage, however, the recognition of the duty to preserve under 
international law arguably takes a step further in affirming the state duty to allow and preserve 








This chapter conceptualizes an additional component of the duty of memory from the 
perspective of International and human rights law: the duty to commemorate as a form of 
reparation. It analyses and systematizes, through a critical approach, the use of 
commemoration and memorialisation initiatives as reparatory practices in contexts of 
transition from internal conflicts and authoritarian regimes. After drawing the contours of the 
duty to commemorate and its relation with memory processes, it explores the legal foundation 
of this duty, presenting the legal regime of the state’s obligation to provide victims with 
reparations under international law and international human rights law. From this perspective, 
the chapter shows the need to adjust the classical framework of reparations to situations of 
massive and systematic violations of human rights, and introduce the role of memory-related 
initiatives in such a renovated system. Second, it critically analyses how memory-related 
initiatives have been concretely framed and implemented as remedial measures in the Latin 
American region. To this end, state practice and the case law of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, the only judicial body that has ordered binding memory-related decisions as a 
form of reparation, are assessed. Lastly, in the final part, the chapter problematizes the use of 
commemorations as reparation tools. To do so, it presents the Peruvian case study of the 
memorial “El Ojo que Llora”, in Lima, in order to reflect on possible implications and 
problems of including memory-related initiatives in reparation orders issued by supranational 
bodies. 
1. Memory and the Duty to Commemorate 
In the theoretical framework of this thesis,
442
 I argued that the law, in general, and 
international law, in particular, impacts on memory-making processes in two ways: directly 
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 On the one hand, it can concretely introduce specific narratives into the 
social processes of memories-negotiation– often in the form of judicial decisions, but also 
through declarative laws that officialise a certain interpretation of history.
444
 On the other 
hand, it can influence the official mechanisms of production of knowledge about the past, 
therefore indirectly altering the processes of production, circulation, and preservation of 
narratives. While the components of the duty of memory examined in the previous chapters 
belong to the latter category, the duty to commemorate that is defined in this chapter falls 
within the first one. 
In fact, the duty to commemorate is perhaps the most straightforward duty connected to 
memory-practices that international law places on states in the aftermath of mass violence. It 
requires that governments, in compliance with their international obligations, realize public 
acts of commemoration and acknowledgment – either material or non-material – in order to 
keep alive the memory of past traumatic events, and ensure that the remembrance of those 
experiences is transmitted to future generations. As such, it is clearly the most intrusive one in 
the processes of memory-making, since it explicitly and directly interferes with the content of 
official memories by forcing states to inscribe certain narratives of the past in the official 
history of a country. 
 The duty is inferred from human rights instruments - judicial decisions of human 
rights bodies, declarations, recommendations, and other soft-law documents –, as well as from 
the observation of the state practice of governments that bear the burden of a past of 
systematic violence and serious human rights abuses. As I will demonstrate through the 
examination of the relevant law and practice, the rationale behind these measures is two-sided. 
On the one hand, commemorations have been considered symbolic measures to redress the 
non-material component of victims’ harm in the case of the most serious abuses; on the other 
hand, these measures have been conceived as guarantees for preventing the repetition of 
atrocities of the past in the future. In both these conceptualizations, commemorations have 
been framed in legal terms within the framework of reparations for gross and systematic 
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human rights violations. It is from this viewpoint that this chapter analyzes and systematizes 
them. 
2. The Legal Basis to the Duty to Commemorate: The Obligation to Provide 
Reparations 
2.1 Legal Foundation 
The practice of human rights bodies and states that support the emergence of a duty to 
commemorate past human rights abuses finds its legal basis mainly in the state obligation to 
provide reparations to victims. It is therefore this legal basis that has to be explored to 
establish a framework for clarifying scope, content, and standards that characterize the duty to 
commemorate. 
2.1.1 The obligation to repair under the Law of State Responsibility 
Already in 1646, Grotius affirmed that “every fault creates the obligation to make good 
the losses”. This fundamental tort law principle, embedded in most of the modern legal 
systems, entails that “every act by which a person causes damage to another makes the person 
whose fault the damage occurred liable to make reparation”.
445
 That is, when a wrong is 
committed and harm is caused, the wrongdoer is obliged to compensate for the damage, and, 
specularly, the injured part is entitled to receive redress.
446
 
Under international law, reparations have been traditionally conceptualized from the 
classical perspective of inter-state relations. international law was traditionally understood as 
the body of laws which governs relations among states. It is based upon accepted rules, either 
voluntarily posited by states in their mutual agreements, or emerging from widespread 
customs regarded as binding. Setting these rules generates a complex normative framework 
that directs states’ behaviours in their mutual relations. The reciprocal obligations which 
originate from this system describe the content of the primary rules which bind states in the 
dense net of international relations. When a state fails to comply with a primary obligation it 
owes another state – whether customary or conventional -, a new, independent relation arises 
                                                 
445 Code Napoléon, 1804, Article 1382.  
446
 For a comparative analysis of Tort Law systems, see Limpens, J. et al., “Liability for One’s Own 
Act”, in International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, ed. Tunc, A., (Tübingen: Mohr, 1979), Vol. XI, 5. 
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between the responsible state and the injured party.
447
 The content of this new relation is 
regulated by the branch of international law governing the legal consequences of international 
unlawful acts, that is, the Law of State Responsibility. Most of the principles governing this 
field are nowadays codified in the UN Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (hereinafter Articles on State Responsibility), which provide the basis for the 
forthcoming analysis of the system of reparation under general international law.
448
 
 In such a system, the obligation of the responsible state to make reparations for the 
harm done to another state is a component of the set of legal consequences which arise from 
the commission of an international wrong.
449
 Principles and standards of reparations were 
therefore originally conceived to adapt to the specific dynamics of inter-state wrongs. In the 
regime of state responsibility, the content of the obligation to reparation is informed by the 
principle of full reparation. The PCIJ, back in 1928, defined this principle as the state 
obligation “to wipe out all the consequence of the illegal act”,
450
 either by restoring the pre-
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existing state of affairs before the violation was committed, or providing full redress of the 
harms through monetary compensation. 
As emerges from the Commentaries to the Articles on State Responsibility and the 
international practice, restitution of the status quo ante and compensation are certainly the two 
preferred forms of reparations under classical international law.
451
 Although satisfaction is 
also included in the overarching system as a remedial modality, this category plays only a 
subsidiary role.
452
 In fact, satisfaction was primarily drafted to cover “not financially 
assessable” damages - mostly those of a symbolical nature. Considering the specific nature of 
inter-state wrongs, nonetheless, its relevance in the overall set of measures to redress damages 
appears rather marginal. Hence, states shall implement actions of satisfaction only when, and 
if the first two modalities cannot achieve full reparation.
453
 Guarantees of non-repetition, 
instead, are not considered a modality of redress. Since they do not directly aim at redressing 
injury, but rather at preventing the future recurrence of the violation, they are understood as an 
autonomous and separate consequence that flows from the wrongful act.
454 
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 Articles on States Responsibility, Art. 30, which reads:  
The State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation: 
(a) to cease that act, if it is continuing;  
(b) to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require. 
The longstanding doctrinal debate about the nature of assurances of non-repetition is well-known. On 
the one hand, it has been argued that this obligation is rooted in the level of secondary obligations emerging from 
the violation of primary norms. According to this interpretation, the obligation to provide guarantees of non-
156 
2.1.2 The Human Rights Framework of Reparations 
The distinguishing features of state-individual relations logically justify some 
deviations from the traditional rules of international law in the regulation of these dynamics.
455
 
In this relation, states take a legal position of guarantee, which places specific obligations of 
protection on states. In order to understand the specificity of human rights obligations on 
states, it is important to keep in mind the structure of human rights law. Every human rights 
norm has two main components: a positive recognition of the right itself, which implies the 
negative obligation of states to refrain from undermining its enjoyment; and a positive 
obligation to protect it, and ensure its effective enjoyment for the right holders.
456
 In practice, 
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the general obligation to protect and ensure requires the adoption of measures of safeguard, 
the duty to investigate the facts, and, ultimately, to make good the injury caused to victims.
457
 
The obligation that states bear to provide reparation as a consequence of a human rights 
breach therefore finds its origins in this relation of protection.
458
  
On these grounds, even at the inter-state level, there has been a progressive recognition 
of the victims’ right to reparation.
459
 The increasing practice of creating ad hoc compensation 
commissions to redress victims of past injustices for the wrongs they – or their heirs – 
suffered, are a clear point in case. War reparations is a fruitful field in which this practice has 
been first developed. In this domain, we can recall, inter alia, the UN Compensation 
Commission, established by the Security Council in the aftermath of the nineties Gulf War to 
deal with the damage caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait;
460
 as well as the Eritrea-Ethiopia 
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Claims Commission, established in 2000 to settle the relevant compensation claims.
461
 
Reparation claims from Holocaust victims have also given rise to a number of different 
reparatory mechanisms at the supranational level, which have taken different forms, to ensure 
that those claims did not go unheard.
462
 Over the last years, the ad hoc Reparation for Victims 
of Armed Conflict Committee of the International Law Association (ILA) has conducted a 
thorough study on reparations for victims of war in which the main elements and principles of 
these different reparation mechanisms have been analysed and compared. As a result of this 
study, the ILA has eventually adopted the Declaration of International Law Principles for 
Victims of Armed Conflict, in which it explicitly recognizes the victims’ right to reparation 
and delineates the substantive aspects of this entitlement.
463
 
The different nature of human rights obligations and the specific relation of protection 
in which they are inscribed, however, make it difficult to apply traditional principles of inter-
state responsibility to the special system of human rights protection, especially when grave 
violations are committed on a large scale. Dinah Shelton has discussed the limits of the Law of 
State Responsibility in confronting these kinds of violations (e.g. the magnitude of reparation 
claims; the precarious financial and political conditions of governments emerging from 
context of mass violence; the complexity of the harm to be redressed; etc.).
464
 The special 
nature of human rights breaches – and in particular of the most serious ones - raises the issue 
of whether the typical forms codified in the Articles on State Responsibility by the ILC suffice 
to determine the actual content of the state obligation to repair also in case of serious breaches 
of human rights obligations. Especially in these cases, beyond the need to redress the serious 
harm suffered by individuals, remedies have to serve other different political and social 
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functions, e.g. to prevent the recurrence of similar violations, to reinforce and restore the 
institutional political system, to offer guarantees to the society and the international 




The obligation to provide victims with remedies is enshrined in most international 
human rights instruments, which require states to provide remedies for violations committed 
against individuals by their agents. Whilst these provisions rarely indicate specific modalities 
of redress, most of them require remedies to be effective, adequate, or appropriate.
466
 Because 
of the broad parameters they indicate, states enjoy a wide margin of discretion in drafting and 
implementing remedial measures. Yet, the question arises what can be considered an 
appropriate remedy, especially in contexts of systematic and unspeakably brutal abuses of 
human rights. 
Scholars have attempted to define the concept of adequacy from different 
perspectives.
467
 Lenzerini, among others, suggests two useful elements to assess the degree of 
adequacy of reparation measures: an objective criterion and a subjective one.
468
 The first 
criterion relies upon the notion of proportionality, which relates reparations to the gravity of 
the harm in the specific case. For this condition, reparation measures are adequate when they 
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are proportionate to the seriousness of the harm.
469
 The second criterion calls for an internal 
evaluation of the reparation modalities that have been undertaken by states. This evaluation 
should be assessed by the injured individuals; accordingly, reparation measures are adequate 
when victims perceive them as being adequate. The combination of these two criteria 
ultimately allows it to adjust the concept of adequate reparation to specific situations and 
conditions, both objectively and subjectively.
470
 In other words, it essentially suggests a 




With this perspective in mind when facing the inadequacy of the traditional reparation 
system, both human rights instruments and judicial and quasi-judicial institutions dealing with 
situations of grave and widespread violations have embraced a more generous and creative 
understanding of the obligation to provide reparations to victims.
472
 Two trends in the practice 
of human rights bodies and transitional states have proven important in opening up the 
traditional remedial framework for adapting to gross and systematic abuses: the increasing 
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adoption of non-monetary forms of reparations and the creation of collective-based measures 
of redress. Straddling these two trends, commemorative measures take place in the emerging 
system of redress for victims of gross and systematic violations. Before looking at the practice 
of commemorations as a remedial tool, we should therefore consider this renovated remedial 
system. 
2.1.2.1 Reparations for Victims of Gross and Systematic violations: The UN 
Principles on the Right to a Remedy and the inclusion of a duty to 
commemorate  
The starting point to put forth and systematize a new approach to reparations in cases 
of mass violence are the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy for Victims 
of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law. Adopted by consensus in Resolution 60/147 of the UN 
General Assembly in December 2005, the Basic Principles result from a long process of 
collection, study, analysis, and revision of practices of, and provisions on the issue of 
reparations for victims of mass violence, which the UN Special Rapporteur van Boven and the 
independent expert Cherif Bassiouni undertook from 1989 to 2005.
473
 Today, they constitute 
the point of reference for both governments and human rights bodies that deal with the 
challenging task of establishing reparations in the aftermath of serious and systematic human 
rights abuses. Although as any General Assembly resolution, by their very nature they cannot 
impose legally binding obligations on states, they are relevant in that they “identify 
mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the implementation of existing legal 
obligations”.
474
 And indeed, despite this non-binding status, the Basic Principles have already 
quite strongly influenced trends and behaviours of national and international bodies. While a 
detailed review of the Basic Principles is beyond the scope of this chapter, this section 
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provides a brief overview of the aspects that are most relevant for our discussion. This will 
provide the background for discussing the role of memory-related measures as reparative 
means, and to understand the position that these measures can have within this system. 
The Principles derive the state obligation to provide reparations from the broader state 
duty to provide victims with effective remedies, in itself a part of the general obligation to 
respect and protect human rights.
475
 Under the umbrella of the victims’ right to remedies, the 
right to reparations is included in the set of victims’ rights which arise as a consequence of 
gross and systematic violations, together with the rights to access to justice and information.
476
  
The content of the victims’ right to “adequate, effective and prompt reparation” is 
filled in with a rich set of measures that specify its different components. They are divided 
into five remedial categories: restitutio in integrum (restitution), compensation, rehabilitation, 
satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition.
477
 Thus, in comparison with the classical 
international law framework of reparations, the Basic Principles keep the traditional measures 
of restitutio in integrum, compensation and satisfaction, and enrich the content of the state 
obligation to repair with new forms of redress – rehabilitation and guarantees of non-
repetition. Unlike the classical IL regime, moreover, the Principles bestow satisfaction with 
great relevance, which in turn plays a crucial role in the whole system of reparations. In fact, 
the category of satisfaction becomes a tool box containing a variety of reparative measures. 
According to principle 18, measures of satisfaction include: (a) actions aimed at putting an end 
to the violations; (b) the establishment of inquiries and truth seeking mechanisms; (c) the 
search and identification of the disappeared and reburial of bodies; (d) official recognition of, 
and (e) public apologies for the violations; (f) punishment of those responsible; 
(g) commemorations and tributes to the victims; and (h) publicity concerning the events 
constituting the violations in education training and programs. Memory-related initiatives, 
hence, have a role to play. 
Overall, the Basic Principles support the idea that in cases of mass violence neither 
restitution nor monetary compensation are sufficient means for providing effective response to 
victims’ suffering. The different forms of reparation embraced by the Basic Principles, taken 
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all together, aim to address the complexity of the harm in situations of widespread and gross 
human rights abuses better. As Dinah Shelton rightly notes, their combination, together with 
the criterion of proportionality suggested by the text, allows (quasi-)judicial bodies the 
necessary discretion to tailor appropriate forms of redress to specific cases.
478
 This multi-
dimensional approach has offered a model for shaping national reparation programs, making 
them more effective and accurate in responding to victims’ harms. The central role given to 
satisfaction, together with the inclusion of rehabilitation and guarantees of non-repetition in 
the list of victims’ remedies, eventually seems to suggest new standards of adequacy, shifting 
the traditional understanding of reparation and embracing a more casuistic and victim-oriented 
approach.
479
 It is within this renovated redress framework that the duty to commemorate 
accurs as an instrument to provide healing for victims. 
The UN Principles is not the only international human rights document that includes 
commemorations in the list of remedial tools for victims of serious abuses. Similar indications 
are also included in other soft law instruments – declarations, comments, resolutions, etc. – 
that, for addressing the victims’ right to reparations, embrace the standards suggested by the 
Basic Principles. The HRC General Comment No. 31 on the nature of the general legal 
obligation imposed on state parties, for instance, after recalling that the obligation to provide 
victims with reparations is an essential modality for states to discharge their obligation to 
provide an effective remedy, indicates a list of measures that states should adopt “where 
appropriate” in compliance with their obligation to repair. Public commemorations – such as 
memorials and public apologies - are included in the list.
480
 Proactive measures to honour 
victims’ memory and preserving the remembrance of past violations are also encouraged by 
the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, which call for reparations for acts of 
racism and racial anti-discrimination.
481
 Similarly, in the framework of the fight against 
enforced disappearance, a number of documents have frequently urged states to adopt 
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From the way these measures are phrased and on account of the non-binding nature of 
soft law instruments, it should remain clear that the inclusion of commemorations in the realm 
of remedies does not entail a formal obligation on responsible states to undertake 
commemorations for remedying every serious violation. The creation of memorials is one of 
the possible forms of satisfaction that should be given. The discretion in this system, by virtue 
of its multidimensionality, allows governments to decide if, and when commemorations are 
appropriate to offer consolation to victims. However, the inclusion of commemorations among 
the modalities for achieving an adequate system of reparations creates an incentive for states 
to promote and implement commemorative policies to comply with human rights standards.
483
 
Moreover, on the other side, it grants supervisory and monitoring bodies the power to 
influence these policies, therefore interfering with the local processes of interpreting and 
remembering the past. 
2.2 The Role of Commemorations in rethinking the legal regime of reparations 
The formal inclusion of a duty to commemorate in the list of measures of reparations 
for gross and systematic human rights violations is meaningful. Frédéric Mégret, in an article 
on the possibility and feasibility of the International Criminal Court recommending the 
construction of “sites of conscience”, offers a meaningful analysis of the effects of 
commemorative measures as transitional justice tools, and it stresses the different functions 
that these initiatives can fulfil in the healing process of victims.
484
 Mégret highlights the many 
functions that monuments – broadly understood – can perform in reparation schemes aimed at 
addressing the aftermath of mass violence. Their functions include the restoration of the good 
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name of the victims; providing a forum for mourning, discussion, and reflection about the 
past; paving the way for social reconciliation; and warning future generations against the 
repetition of similar atrocities. 
Indeed, from a theoretical point of view, memory-related measures that have an impact 
on individual as well as collective processes of dealing with the past and which are closely 
linked to the very concepts of time and identity, appear uniquely suited to thoroughly rethink 
the concept of reparation. The inclusion of memory-related measures in the realm of remedies 
broadens the principle of full reparation so that it no longer coincides with the obligation “to 
wipe out all the consequences” of the violence. In the aftermath of mass atrocities, nothing can 
or has to be wiped out, but rather the harm must be acknowledged, brought to light, and 
commemorated, both to restore victims’ dignity in suffering and to convey a warning to future 
generations.
485
 Reparation, in this way, loses its meaning of closure, and opens up a new link 
between past, present, and future.
486
 The inclusion of memory, as the presence of the past, in 
the dynamics of reparation may allow the idea of reparation to move from meaning closure of 
the past toward the idea of reparation as a means of “transformative justice” - in the sense of 
development, progress, advancement.
487
 Although these theoretical developments have not 
been fully explored yet, as I will show in the next section, there is a trend clearly moving in 
that direction in the practice of reparations for victims of mass and systematic violence. 
3. The Duty to Commemorate in the Practice 
After considering the system of reparations for victims of grave violations, which 
offers the paradigm for framing the duty to commemorate in legal terms, and having observed 
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the progressive inclusion of commemorations as means of redress in legal instruments 
(although not binding), we should now consider how these commemorative initiatives have 
been implemented as forms of reparations in practice. The forthcoming analysis offers an 
empirical overview, and aims to achieve two main goals in particular: 
 To offer a picture of the current practice regarding the use of commemorations in 
post-violence contexts; 
 To clarify the systematization of this practice in the general framework of 
reparations. 
This overview presents commemoration initiatives put forward by states and issued by 
judicial bodies as remedial tools in the aftermaths of mass human rights violations. It looks at 
the Latin-American experience in particular. Latin-America is, in fact, a fertile ground for this 
kind of research. The violence experienced in the past by most of the states there has 
compelled governments to face their past in order to activate transitional processes. Moreover, 
the active participation of the civil society in the process of reparations has significantly 
contributed to the discussion about the adequacy of remedial mechanisms in the region. This 
aspect, together with the inclusion of commemoration measures in reparatory schemes, has 
further contributed to the processes of negotiation that characterize the endeavour of working 
through the past. This makes this region an especially interesting field of research. Besides 
that, as we will discuss later in this chapter, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights that 
operates in the region has played, more than any other judicial body, a central role in framing 
commemorations as legal remedies. As a matter of fact, its case law provides a significant 
number of cases in which commemorations have been included in the reparation orders issued 
by the tribunal. In consideration of this, this geographic region seems the most fruitful for 
observing the phenomenon of shaping memories – through commemorations – in the form of 
secondary rights of victims.
488
 Since the calls for memory and reparations are loud and 
pressing in the region, commemoration initiatives by governments are increasingly numerous 
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and varied. Consequently - and obviously -, this overview will provide only a sketch of the 
most relevant examples. Nonetheless, by studying the most relevant cases, it will be possible 
to gain some insight into this process and assess the general trend. 
3.1 The Duty to Commemorate in state practice 
In the aftermath of mass violence, most of the states in the region have undertaken a 
number of initiatives for the public commemoration of past atrocities. A significant part of 
these measures consists in what have been called “sites of memory”, that is, symbolic spaces 
devoted to bereavement and mourning to keep alive the remembrance of grievous events.
489
 
Pierre Nora introduced the concept of lieux de memoire, which he defines as “any significant 
entity, whether material or non-material in nature, which by dint of human will or the work of 
time has become a symbolic element of the memorial heritage of any community”.
490
 They 
can take different forms, such as commemorative plaques, monuments, museums, artworks, 
public ceremonies, and rites. They may also include sites and dates that bore a negative 
symbolic meaning for victims – such as former centres of torture or public places where 
abuses were committed –, which are subsequently transformed in structures, spaces, or 
symbols filled with a positive meaning – human rights centres, education institutes, spaces of 
commemoration, memorial days, and so on. 
The analysis of the memory-related initiatives put in place by Latin-American 
governments revealed a great variety of actions, undertaken at different stages of the 
transitional processes and with different rationales. For the purpose of our investigation, we 
consider only official initiatives of commemorations, which have been organized by the state 
organs through legal decisions. These initiatives can be classified by different criteria. 
Considered from the point of view of the authority which set them up – the source -, these 
measures can be classified either as local initiatives (that is, put in place by local authorities, 
such as municipalities, cities, local administrations, etc.) or as national initiatives (carried out 
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by central institutions and defined by state laws). Considered from a different perspective, 
they can distinguish between autonomous initiatives and measures decided within the 
framework of more comprehensive programs. Finally, in spite of the heterogeneity of these 
actions, they can be grouped according to the rationale which underlies them, either remedial 
or preventative. The last criterion seems to suit the purpose of our investigation better, since it 
allows us to achieve two main results. Firstl, from an empirical point of view, we will obtain a 
general overview of the different commemorations that have been used by states; second, from 
a legal perspective, we will be able to single out the different rationales behind these 
measures, and to arrange them within the framework of reparations. 
3.1.1 Commemorations as symbolic reparations for victims 
Commemorations provide public recognition to private suffering. Through these 
initiatives, victims find a space – either material or symbolic - in which to express their pain. 
The public condemnation of the violations they suffered redeems, through memorials, victims’ 
violated dignity before the society.
491
 In this sense, commemorations seems especially suited 
to providing some form of comfort to the profound suffering caused to victims by the most 
serious violence.
492
 On this basis, most of the states in the region have included 
commemoration measures as means of satisfaction in national reparation programs that 
address victims of past violations. 
Colombian national reparation schemes offer an emblematic case study. During the 
years of the struggle to overcome the civil conflict in the country from the middle of the last 
decade, the victims’ demands for memory and reparations have entwined and developed along 
the same legal path. Hence, memory and reparations have been considered two faces of the 
same coin of transition, and as such have been included in the legal measures adopted by the 
government to facilitate the process toward peace. The Justice and Peace Law (Ley de Justicia 
y Paz) established the first comprehensive reparation program for victims of the internal 
conflict. It was adopted in 2005 by the Uribe government to facilitate the peace process 
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through the promotion of the victims’ rights to truth, justice, and reparations.
493
 The Law takes 
a broad approach to reparations, which reflects the international standards envisioned by the 
UN Basic Principles, and includes the five categories envisioned therein:
494
restitution, 
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition.
495
 Reparations are 
both material and symbolic measures, and encompass both individual and collective forms. 
Public policies of commemorations are explicitly included in the symbolic dimension of the 
remedial machine. Indeed, memory is presented as an overarching goal of symbolic redress. 
Symbolic reparations, in fact, are initiatives that intend “to ensure preservation of historical 
memory, non-repetition of the abuses, public acknowledgment of the facts, public forgivenesss 
and restoration of the victims’ dignity”.
496
  
The state duty to undertake commemorations in order to ensure the victims’ right to 
reparations determined the creation of several bodies specifically working in the area of 
memory-preservation. The Grupo de Memoria Historica (GMH), for instance, was created 
within the National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation (Comisión Nacional de 
Reparación y Reconciliación, CNRR), which was entrusted, among other functions, with 
following-up and assessing the reparation process, making recommendations for its adequate 
implementation, and indicating criteria for reparations.
497
 GMH was created to supervise the 
thematic working area meaningfully called “Area de Memoria Historica”, and was mandated 
to implement, coordinate, and supervise memory-related initiatives.
498
  
Even after the abolishment of the CNRR mandate, the centrality of memory-related 
measures in this remedial framework was maintained and advanced thanks to the adoption of 
the Victims’ Law, Ley de Victimas, in 2011.
499
 The Law sets the criteria and parameters for 
the government to implement – inter alia – the victims’ right to reparation. The general 
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provisions that regulate the remedial framework share the same holistic, integrated approach 
that was adopted by the Ley de Justicia y Paz, in line with international standards, and calls for 
an “effective and transformative” system of reparation. Accordingly, a long section of the Law 
of Victims is devoted to symbolic measures of satisfaction, in which memorialization 
initiatives are included and promoted. Article 139 lists some examples of commemorative 
acts: public acts of acknowledgment; public homage to victims; and construction of “public 
monuments with the perspective of reparation and reconciliation”.
500
Interestingly, the Law 
also lists among the satisfaction measures a commemorative day for victims, during which the 
state is called to realize commemorations to the victims of violence in the country.
501
 The 
remedial system is further strengthened by the creation of the Historical Memory Centre 
(Centro de Memoria Historica – CMH) as part of the National System for Comprehensive 
Attention and Reparation of Victims; the Centre is entrusted with the task – inter alia - to 
coordinate and formulate symbolic reparations.
502
 The CMH, in collaboration with other 
public bodies and ministries, has promoted and coordinated a great number of local initiatives 
toward the elaboration and preservation of historical memory. 
Far from being merely political initiatives, all these initiatives were considered by the 
Law of Victims’ monitoring commission to assess the level of state compliance with the 
national program of individual and collective reparations. In this sense, they were considered 
compliant behaviours capable to discharge – together with other measures - the state’s 
obligation to provide comprehensive reparations to victims.
503
 From the observation of such a 
remedial system, ultimately, it can be argued that public policies of commemorations are 
therefore officially undertaken by Colombia as remedial modalities of satisfaction, in 
compliance with the obligation to reparations.
504
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3.1.2 Commemorations as guarantees of non-repetition 
Public commemorations are also strong educational instruments. Visiting 
commemorative spaces or attending commemorative ceremonies imply the emotional 
participation of visitors in the historical events represented in that specific context. This allows 
the public to grasp and develop a deeper understanding of the history which is told. As noted 
in an accurate piece about the preventative role of memorials, well-thought out 
commemorations help those who did not experience the abuses to ‘feel’ victims’ suffering and 
to become compassionate - in the etymological meaning of the term, i.e. com-pathos: sharing 
emotions - with those who went through it.
505
 Compassion is crucial for enabling 
understanding, and understanding, in turn, is a first step toward non-repetition. According to 
that study, “if the victims of human rights abuse can be seen both as human beings and as 
citizens unlawfully deprived of their rights by state violence, then a potential next generation 
of bystanders may develop a firm sense of social responsibility with regard to mass 
atrocity”.
506
 Hence, monuments and memorials representing past atrocities are mementa to 
future generations to not repeat the same wrongs. 
Furthermore, from a different perspective, the official nature of public 
commemorations represents a formal acknowledgment by the state of its accountability for 
past violations. Through public commemorations, governments declare to both their societies 
and the international community that they are undertaking internal measures to prevent the 
recurrence of those abuses. Beyond the purpose of providing redress to individual victims, 
commemorations have been also implemented by governments as to symbolize that they have 
embarked on a process for coming to terms with past violence. 
This preventative rationale indeed underlies a great number of public decisions about 
memorials. The Argentine experience offers excellent examples. Since the end of the nineties, 
the government has adopted a series of memory-related measures to publicly mark the 
distance from its authoritarian past. This is the case, for instance, in the requalification project 
transforming the former Escuela de Mecanica de la Armada (ESMA) into an “Espacio para la 
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Memoria y para la Promoción y Defensa de los Derechos Humanos”.
507
 ESMA had been a 
detention centre during the years of the so-called ‘Dirty War’, where Argentine Navy personel 
held in captivity, tortured, and eventually killed thousands of prisoners. The act that 
established this transformation turned ESMA into a space of commemoration and 
remembrance, with the aim – expressed in the text of the agreement - to allow for the re-
elaboration, investigation, and transmission of the history of violence to future generations.
508
 
The statements made by the President during the official inaugural ceremony of ESMA 
concisely explained the strong moral obligation to remember which underlay these legal 
measures, and highlighted the preventative rationale which justified them. On that occasion, 
the President first made a public apology for the atrocities committed by state agents during 
the military dictatorship. Then, he affirmed that Argentina is “obliged” to remember that dark 
page of its history as a collective exercise of memory, in order to prevent “oblivi[on from 
creating] a fertile ground for any future repetition”.
509
  
Further measures in the same direction were subsequently taken by the government. In 
2006, a resolution was adopted that changed the national cultural heritage policy with regard 
to sites of memory related to the period of dictatorship.
510
 The resolution accorded special 
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protection to every place that hosted clandestine detention centres during the dictatorship, 
declaring them “intangible”. In this way, these sites are protected from any destruction or 
modification.
511
 The rationale referred to in the preamble of the resolution for justifying this 
measure is multi-faceted, and includes the victims’ rights to justice, truth, and reparations, as 
well as the rule of law and good governance. The duty to commemorate, however, is framed in 
the text as part of the state responsibility to prevent repetition of future violations. Echoing 
President Kirchner’s formal apology, it states that:  
It is the responsibility of constitutional organs (…) as an exercise of collective 
memory, to teach future generations [about the irremediable consequences of 
the violence], in order to avoid that oblivion be ground for future repetition.
512
 
As it was for Colombia, all such commemorative measures were then provided as 
evidence of compliance with the state obligation to protect human rights by the government.
513
 
3.1.3 The syncretic nature of commemorations 
The previous overview has described examples of commemoration measures that have 
been implemented by governments in order to fulfil their obligation to provide reparations and 
guarantees of non-repetition. The remedial and preventative arguments have been indicated as 
alternative, underlying rationales to those measures. As emerged from the presentation of the 
practice, these rationales nonetheless often overlap in that the preventative and remedial 
functions frequently coincide and coexist in the same initiative. 
Twofold, for instance, is the rationale behind the initiative “Projecto Memorial”, 
realized by the Chilean Ministry of Internal Affairs within the framework of the Human Rights 
Program of the government.
514
 The project involves an array of memorials, meaningfully 
named Obras de Reparación Simbólica, designed to rehabilitate the historical memory of 
people. The initiative fits within a larger human rights agenda, inaugurated by President Lagos 
                                                                                                                                                         
ESMA agreement (supra, fn. 507): “It is the responsibility of constitutional organs (…) as an exercise of 
collective memory, to teach future generations [about the irremediable consequences of the violence], in order to 
avoid that oblivion be ground for future repetition.” (Preamble, Consideranda V – VI). 
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in 2003, and significantly called No hay mañana sin ayer.
515
 The whole program insists on the 
key role of memory as an instrument of reconciliation and renovation for the State. The 
Government designated a fund of 450 million pesos to reconstructing and protecting the 
historical memory.
516
 From 2002 until now, the program has supported the construction of 
thirty-eight commemorative artworks, in addition to the support provided for renovating and 
maintaining some of the existing ones. Each project included several commemorative 




According to the Interior Ministry, which is responsible for the implementation and 
supervision of the program, building crosses, plaques, and monuments as sites of memory, 
beyond providing a response to the need for memory of the whole population, contributes to 
complying with the state obligation of truth and reparations.
518
 Presenting the program, the 
government acknowledges the remedial nature of commemorations. “Historical memory was 
and is a relevant factor in the search for, and definition of forms of reparation, to provide 
victims of gross human rights violations and their families with some form of relief for their 
suffering.”
519
 The official website of the project presents these initiatives as an “essential part 
of the reparation process” for victims of gross human rights, in that they aim not only to 
remember the horrible crimes that were committed in the past, but also to restore the memory 
of each of the individual victims who suffered from those crimes. At the same time, the 
program highlights the preventative purpose of these initiatives. The pedagogical character of 
these measures, in fact, allows them to contribute to shaping a social conscience that may 
prevent the repetition of the same atrocities in the country.
520
 In this sense, the program is 
presented by the government both for the purpose of individual reparation and under the 
general human rights prevention argument. It is important to note, in conclusion, that the 
government indicated these measures during the supervision phase of compliance with the 
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truth and reconciliation commissions’ recommendations as evidence of compliance with the 
state obligations to repair and prevent. This ultimately suggests some degree of opinio juris 
underlying the adoption of such activities. 
3.1.4 Assessing state practice 
From the analysis of the practice in the region, it can be observed that there is a clear 
trend among states to read commemorative initiatives as an indispensable part of the 
reparatory policies. The practice has shown that these measures are underpinned by two 
different rationales: remedial and preventative. In the light of this first excursus into state 
practice, however, it seems that commemorations are not only important parts of post-violence 
state policies. Indeed, as has emerged from the interpretation of the legal and official 
documents and official statements analysed above, governments undertake these measures as 
if they owe their implementation to both victims, as a form of redress, and the society, as a 
means of protection and safeguard. Hence, commemorations are perceived as mandatory 
initiatives that governments implement to comply with the secondary obligations arising in the 
aftermath of mass human rights abuses, in both the compensatory and preventative 
dimensions.
521
 After looking at the implementation of the duty to commemorate in the practice 
of states in the Americas, I should now proceed with examining how the main judicial body in 
the region has dealt with these measures. 
3.2 The Duty to Commemorate in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights 
The jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has had a major part 
in fostering the emergence of a duty to commemorate in the legal framework of reparations. 
Since it was established, the Court has played a pivotal role in enhancing the regional system 
of human rights protection in the Americas.
522
 Beyond that region, the principles developed in 
its progressive case law moreover have come to influence both the jurisprudence of the other 
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main human rights monitoring bodies and the development of general standards at the 
international level.
523
 On the issue of reparations, the Court has progressively moved from 
applying the standards developed in the international law system of state responsibility to a 
more flexible approach. In line with the traditional system, the Court initially understood 
reparation mainly as a synonym of monetary compensation, aimed at redressing the individual 
harm.
524
 However, the compensatory model progressively revealed its limits, and the Court 
acknowledged the insufficiency of such a system to provide redress for the kind of violations 
that were brought to its jurisdiction.
525
 As a result, the Court therefore gradually broadened the 
content of the state obligation to provide reparations beyond compensation, and eventually 
embraced the reparative model set forth by the Basic Principles. In line with them, the Court 
today understands reparations to include the five components mentioned above: restitutio in 
integrum, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and preventive measures.
526
 
With regard to commemorations, in keeping with this expansive trend, the Court has 
included memory-related initiatives in its reparation judgments since the end of the nineties. 
The cases in which these measures were issued are cases of particular serious nature, either 
because of the rights infringed (right to life, right to personal integrity; personal freedom; right 
to family life), or because of the magnitude of the violations (often involving massacres or 
mass killings). The remedial orders related to the remembrance of the past issued by the Court 
were initially rather sporadic and limited in the behaviour they prescribed (namely, they 
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mainly required that buildings or sites were named after the victims). In the latest 
developments, their application has however progressively become more frequent, and their 
content has taken more sophisticated forms.
527
 As modalities of reparations, the Court has 
ordered states to erect memorials;
528
 install commemorative plaques;
529
 name institutes, 
schools, streets, and squares after victims;
530
 realize public ceremonies to honour victims’ 
memories; 
531
 and publish accounts of the violations in official gazettes or newspapers.
532
  
These measures all promote the construction and protection of a certain consciousness 
of the past. Beyond that, however, from a legal point of view, different rationales have been 
used by the Court to justify their inclusion in the reparative decisions, admittedly not always in 
a consistent way. A close reading of the Court’s case law suggests two patterns. Firstly, the 
Court generally distinguishes among these measures according to the beneficiaries they aim to 
redress. On the one hand, there are cases where memory related measures are directed at 
                                                 
527
 In Radilla Pacheco, for instance, accepting the initiative of the State, the Court ordered the 
publication of “a bibliographical sketch of the life of [the victim], accompanied either by the reproduction of 
official documents regarding this case (admissibility reports, orders, expert reports) or with oral testimonies on 
his trajectory [sic], gathered in situ, for which the State would hire an investigator.” Case of Radilla-Pacheco v. 
Mexico, para. 355. Similar measures were also ordered in other cases, such as in Myrna Mack Chang v. 
Guatemala, where the Court asked the State to publicly honour the memory of the police investigator who was 
killed while investigating the facts. Case of Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala, para. 278. 
528 Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala; Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala. Reparations 
and Costs. Judgment of November 19, 2004. Series C No. 116; Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname; 
Case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia; Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia. 
529 
Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. 
Judgment of July 1, 2006. Series C No. 148. 
530 
IACtHR, Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Reparations and 
Costs; Case of Trujillo-Oroza v. Bolivia. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 27, 2002. Series C No. 
92; Case of Servellón-García et al. v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 21, 
2006. Series C No. 152; Case of Molina-Theissen v. Guatemala. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 3, 
2004. Series C No. 108; Case of the “Juvenile Reeducation Institute” v. Paraguay. Preliminary Objections, 
Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 2, 2004. Series C No. 112; Case of Vargas-Areco v. 
Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 26, 2006. Series C No. 155. 
531
 Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. 
Judgment of May 26, 2010. Series C No. 213, paras. 223-224; Case of Chitay Nech v. Guatemala. Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 25 May 2010. Series C No. 212, para. 248; Kawas 
Fernández v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of April 3, 2009. Series C No. 196 para. 202; 
Case of Carpio-Nicolle et al. v. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 22, 2004. 
Series C No. 117, para. 136; Case of La Cantuta v. Peru, para. 23; Case of Escué-Zapata v. Colombia. Merits, 
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of. July 4, 2007. Series C No. 165, para. 177. 
532 Case of Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru; Case of La Rochela Massacre v. Colombia.; Case of 
the Massacres of El Mozote and neighboring locations v. El Salvador. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment 
of October 25, 2012. Series C No. 252, para. 365. 
178 
compensating a single individual; on the other hand, cases where commemorations are meant 
to provide redress for a whole community or group. Secondly, the memory-related measures 
decided by the Court differ from each other according to the category of reparation in which 
they are classified; that is, some of them are issued as instruments of satisfaction for victims, 
others as measures of prevention. 
These two different criteria of distinction – beneficiaries and remedial categories – 
intertwine, and seem to suggest a line of reasoning in the Court’s judgments. First of all, when 
memory-related initiatives are ordered as a means to provide satisfaction to the specific victim, 
the Court mostly relies on the right of the family or the next of kin to preserve their beloved’s 
memory, the legal justification of which is primarily linked to the right to know the truth.
533
 
Second, memory-related measures have also often been ordered with a preventive function, as 
instruments to prevent similar abuses from reoccurring in the future. When this happens, 
especially for violations involving entire communities or indigenous groups, memory-related 
initiatives aimed at perpetuating the remembrance of the horrific violations throughout time, 
are seen alongside – reparation to individuals – as instruments for conveying a lesson to future 
generations. As such, they become components of the state’s general obligation to protect 
human rights. 
These two different perspectives seem to imply the adoption of different forms of 
memorialization. In fact, when the case related to one victim or a limited number of victims, 
the Court has ordered ad hoc prescriptions aimed at restoring the victim’s memory as due 
satisfaction. For instance, in Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico, concerning the forced disappearance 
of a Mexican citizen at the hands of Mexican Army agents in 1974, and the subsequent lack of 
investigation by the judiciary, the Court ordered the state to perform a public act of 
acknowledgment, and to place a commemorative plaque with the victim’s name in the city 
where the crime had occurred. The Court stated that those measures were due “in satisfaction 
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of the memory of [the victim]” and “with the objective of preserving the memory of [the 
victim] within the community”. In addition, the Court ordered the publication of a 
bibliographical sketch of the life of the victim to honour his memory.
534
 
On the other hand, however, when a large number of people or a whole community 
was affected by the violence, the memory-related orders issued by the Court have consisted of 
broader memory-related projects, such as building monuments and creating sites of memory, 
often in addition to other preventive tools for non-repetition. These measures have frequently 
been ordered in cases involving massacres and violations of the rights of indigenous 
communities.
535
 The Plan de Sánchez Massacre case offers a good example. It relates to a 
massacre of more than 250 persons perpetrated by a unit of the Guatemalan army in the village 
of Plan de Sanchez on 18 July 1982. Most of the victims, who suffered atrocious abuses before 
being killed, were indigenous Maya-Achì people. In the decision on reparations, the Court, 
after requiring the state to “honour publicly the memory of those executed” during a public act 
of recognition, ordered Guatemala to fund maintenance and improvements to the chapel where 
the Maya community commemorate the victims of the Plan de Sánchez massacre. According 
to the Court, “this would help raise public awareness to avoid repetition of events (...) and 
keep alive the memory of those who died”.
536
 
The Court applied this reasoning again, when, in another case of forced disappearance 
– the Anzualdo Castro case –, it rejected Peru’s offer to comply with its duty to provide 
satisfaction to the victim by, inter alia, realizing the project of a “Museum of Memory”.
537
 
Whilst the Court had limited itself to issuing memory-related orders without further 
elaborating on their foundation in the previous cases, Anzualdo seems to offer some insight 
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into the Court’s reasoning. After affirming the importance of vindicating the name and dignity 
of the victim and his or her next-of-kin, the Court argued that the construction of a memorial 
museum could not constitute an “adequate individual measure of satisfaction”, however 
important this would be to restore and rehabilitate the “historical memory of the society”. 
Based on this consideration, both as a measure of individual satisfaction “in order to preserve 
the memory of [the victim] and as a guarantee of non-repetition”, in accordance with the 
claims of the victims’ representatives, the Court instead required the state to place a 
commemorative plaque with the name of the victim. 
Hence, also in the practice of the Court, the two functions of commemorations that 
emerged from the analysis of the state practice above – satisfaction and prevention –overlap. 
And indeed, the Court orders most of these measures to accomplish both.
538
 Commemorations 
thereby become means to address both the individual and collective claim for redress within 
the society. As a result, in the remedial framework drafted by the Court, the double function of 
the duty to commemorate eventually reflects and adapts to the dual nature of memory, in its 
collective and individual dimensions. 
4. Rethinking Commemorations through Reparations: Problematic Aspects. 
The practice of states and the IACtHR case law support the conceptualization of a duty 
to commemorate under the legal category of reparations, both in the individual and collective 
dimensions. Constructing the duty to commemorate as part of the obligation to provide 
reparations, however, has some relevant consequences. In fact, the application of the 
principles and standards of reparations to commemorations necessarily adds additional layers 
to the commemorative performance. Saying that a duty to commemorate stems from the 
victim’s right to reparation may lead to the conclusion that there exists a (secondary) ‘right to 
memory’ with regard to past events. Such a right, if interpreted in a narrow sense as an 
individual right, enforceable through internal and international remedial mechanisms, would 
seriously endanger the democratic elaboration of narratives on the past. For a commemorative 
work to be created for providing satisfaction to a specific victim – or group of victims –, it 
would have to represent and celebrate the individual - or group - narrative of the past events 
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which resulted from the victim’s – or group’s – memories of those events. Criteria of 
adequacy, effectiveness, and proportionality should apply to assess such measures. As a result, 
if commemoration is to be intended as a remedial measure of satisfaction for the specific 
victim(s), in line with Lenzerini’s criteria of adequacy suggested above, modalities and forms 
of the commemorative performance are to be negotiated and assessed by the beneficiaries 
whose harm is to be alleviated by that initiative. 
Yet, this victim-centred approach to memory-related measures as satisfaction measures 
may create memory-conflicts within the society, fuelling tensions between the individual and 
collective memories and between the goal of reparations and other transitional justice aims, 
such as reconciliation. The recognition of the right of the victim to have his or her own 
individual narrative publicly commemorated as a form of redress for his or her own suffering 
can clash with the broader community’s interest in overcoming social conflicts and tensions. 
Especially in cases involving civil wars, ethnic conflicts, or the abuse of minority groups, the 
direct victims are in general just one of the parties involved in the pattern of violence. 
Remedial judicial orders have a limited scope, as the effects they produce are generally legally 
binding only for the legal parties to the case. As a consequence, ad hoc forms of 
commemoration ordered by judicial decisions and directed to restore a single victim or a 
specific group can leave out a number of victims and create a ranking of legitimacy among 
victims’ narratives and memories. 
On the other hand, however, the construction of the duty to commemorate as 
corresponding to a collective-based right to reparation, may promote the crystallization of 
monolithic social narratives to the detriment of individual memories.
539
 The defininition of the 
specific purpose and the specific beneficiaries of commemorative acts is therefore essential to 
tailor context-sensitive remedial schemes as well as to assess the effective capability of 
commemorative measures to act as a form of satisfaction; simmetrically, such an evaluation is 
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also essential to prevent legal decisions from producing unwanted side-effects on the delicate 
work of making sense of, and recollecting past atrocities. 
Other problematic aspects arise when considering the possibility of memory-related 
orders to be issued as remedial measures by judicial bodies, including supranational 
institutions like the IACtHR. As the example below will show, the decisions of the Inter-
American Court may interfere with local memory dynamics, bestowing special judicial 
protection on certain memory practices. In fact, the Court’s decisions impose practices 
designed to remember on states – and on societies. Even more significantly, the Court goes as 
far as to require states not only to undertake measures to remember, but also to prescribe what 
and how to remember. To what extent is it desirable that such institutions mediate the process 
of elaboration and reconstruction of the past? What effects do the “judicial truths” established 
in the decisions on reparations issued by these bodies produce in the complex process of 
negotiation of collective memory within a society? What is the impact of these judgments on 
the interaction between the individual (recognition) and social (reconstruction) demands 
placed on memory as an instrument of reparation? While these normative and sociological 
questions fall outside the scope and means of this research, it is still compelling to raise them. 
In the following section, a case study of manipulation of memories through judicial remedial 
orders is discussed to provide an example of such shortcomings. 
4.1 The Case of the Penal Miguel Castro-Castro v. Peru 
In November 2006, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held Peru responsible 
for violent acts committed by its agents in May 1992 within the maximum security 
penitentiary Miguel Castro-Castro.
540
 The Castro-Castro case occurred against a background 
of violence and violations of human rights that had traumatised Peru for twenty years. During 
the internal conflict that paralysed the country between 1980 and 2000, about seventy 
thousand Peruvians were killed, and more were disappeared.
541
 The Peruvian Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission was established in 2001 by the new democratic government to 
shed light on the violations that were committed during the years of the conflict. After two 
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years of work and investigation, the Commission presented its Final Report, which was made 
public in 2003. Members of terrorist group Sendero Luminoso and agents of the state were 
held responsible for most of the violations.
542
 The Commission ascertained that 6,443 acts of 
torture and abuse had been perpetrated. 
Regarding the case, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission reported that about 175 
inmates of the Castro-Castro prison – mostly women – were severely abused, and about 42 
eventually killed in the course of the military operation “Operativo Mudanza 1” ordered by 
President Fujimori.
543
 Most of the victims were accused of, awaiting trial for, or convicted of 
terrorism or treason offences. They were considered linked to Sendero Luminoso.
544
 In the 
judgment, after ascertaining the facts of the case, the Court accepted the partial 
acknowledgment of international responsibility by Peru, and ordered the state to undertake 
both monetary and non-monetary reparation measures. Among the latter, it required that the 
state would carry out a public act of acknowledgment of responsibility for the violations, 
specified in the decision “as any [sic] apology to the victims and for the satisfaction of their 
next of kin”,
545
 and would commemorate all the victims of the case by inscribing their names 
on the memorial “El Ojo que Llora” (The Eye that Cries).
546  
While commemorative measures had been requested by both the Commission and the 
victims’ representative, their requests differed from what the Court eventually ordered. The 
victims’ representative requested the construction of a specific monument or the creation of a 
park where the victims’ next of kin could plant trees in memory of the deceased. The state 
opposed those requests, arguing that “a monument (called the Eye that Cries) [had] already 
been erected in a public place of the capital of the Republic in favour of all the victims of the 
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conflict, and that it [was] the subject of continuous memorial and commemoration acts.”
547
 
The Court therefore decided on a compromise, demanding the inscription of the victims’ 
names on the existing memorial. In doing so, however, the Court misread the history and 
meaning of the monument and underestimated the potential for its memory-order to evoke 
stronger tensions. 
El Ojo que Llora is a particularly meaningful monument for Peruvians. It was built in 
Lima in 2005, thanks to the initiative of Peruvian civil society groups, with the aim of paying 
tribute to, and preserving the memory of all victims, as well as to educate about recent 
Peruvian history. A trickle of water continuously runs from a large, granite boulder at the 
centre of the memorial, which is surrounded by a labyrinth of concentric circles made of 
thirty-two thousand little stones, on which the names of some of the victims are engraved. The 
memorial represents Pachamama, the Andean Mother Earth, who cries for her children.
548
 
The inscription of the names of the victims in the Castro-Castro case was potentially 
capable of conveying a strong symbolic message to Peruvian society, and offering public 
redress to the memory of the victims. Nevertheless, the political proximity of those individuals 
to terrorist groups and their potential involvement in the civil conflict put the Court’s decision 
in a different perspective, sparking violent reactions in the country. On the one hand, human 
rights activists and those who defended the ruling upheld the importance of condemning the 
acts of violence perpetrated by the Fujimori regime, regardless of the political past of the 
deceased. On the other hand, the majority of the population felt uneasy about the decision to 
conflate memorialisation of “innocent victims” of the conflict (that is, of those civilians whose 
names had been originally inscribed in the memorial) with commemoration of those who were 
victims according to the Court’s decision, yet perceived as “perpetrators” by the public.
549
 
Protests, sit-ins, heated public debates, and political declarations were carried out in the 
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 It is interesting to note, however, that the names of the victims had already been inscribed on the 
Memorial since the beginning. However, this fact had not been brought to public attention before the IACtHR’s 
Castro Castro judgment. 
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country against the Court’s decision.
550
 The very authority of the Court was questioned,
551
 
and, eventually, the monument was vandalised. 
These social and political tensions brought to light the reality that the Peruvian past has 
not yet been dealt with in society. The Court’s judgment brought to light persistent memory 
conflicts.
552
 In Ciurlizza’s words, the decision “pours salt in the open wound”. According to 
this author, the public opinion received the decision as a “revealed truth”, as an “axiom that 
nullifies any discussion”, an insult to the suffering of the society, and, paradoxically, a denial 
of social memory.
553
 In the attempt to address the dual reparatory functions of memory as 
satisfaction and prevention, the Court’s ruling clashed with the reconciliatory function of 
another memory that had been negotiated within the Peruvian social fabric, and was still 
struggling to be accepted and accommodated in that social fabric. As a result of this clash, the 
intrinsic link between memory and identity, which makes memory-related measures crucial for 
the process of social reconstruction in the aftermath of traumatic events, was broken because 
of the interference of an external actor. This legal construction of memory, decided from 
above, was viewed as an external imposition, and an outside element that could play no role in 
the social dynamics of making sense of past atrocities. From a symbol of unity and solidarity 
for all victims, El Ojo que Llora turned into a site of contestation and division.
554
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 The fascinating and complex nature of the memorial – and the history it tells – led many scholars, 
mostly from the memory studies field, to engage with its meaning. Especially since 2007, after it was subjected to 
acts of vandalism, the monument has been at the centre of the memory debates in Peru. Scholars have used the 
recent history of “The Eye that Cries” as a starting point to investigate and analyse the deeper roots and dynamics 
of the conflicting interpretations of the Peruvian past and memory polemic. E.g. Milton, C. E. “Defacing 
Memory: (Un)tying Peru’s Memory Knots.” Memory Studies 4, No.2 (2011): 190–205.; Drinot, “For Whom the 
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Concluding remarks 
International human rights law has seen recent advances in the legal regime for 
reparations in cases of grave abuses of human rights. In particular, traditional mechanisms of 
the reparation regime have been revised in the light of the specific features that characterize 
this kind of abuses. This has resulted in the elaboration of more complex and flexible 
reparation schemes by states and human rights bodies that better adapt to these situations. 
Against this background, this chapter has drawn attention to the emerging practice of 
incorporating a duty to commemorate int the state obligation to provide reparations to victims. 
To that effect, the chapter has reviewed the practice of states and judicial bodies on reparations 
for mass violations in light of the legal regime of reparations under international and human 
rights law. The geographic focus of the investigation was the Latin America region. Practical 
and ethical hurdles of implementing this practice have been pointed out. Based on the 
investigation of this practice, some concluding observations can be made. 
First, it can be said that national and international practice use commemorations as 
modalities of reparation for victims, implementing them both through their inclusion in 
integral reparative programs and as standalone elements of ad hoc actions of redress. Second, 
it seems that states adopt this kind of measures with a sense of legal obligation towards 
victims, as a form of satisfaction. The Inter-American Court, in particular, includes reparation 
orders related to the remembrance of the past under the category of satisfaction. Third, the 
practice shows that commemorations are also undertaken as guarantees of non-repetition for 
both the society and the international community. The coexistence of the satisfactory and 
preventive functions in memorialization initiatives ultimately makes them suitable to meet the 
complexity of the system of reparations for gross human rights violations. 
However, drawing commemoration measures as remedial tools under human rights 
law, implies that each measure should be displayed and evaluated through the criteria for 
assessing reparations. In particular, it means that, in order to be considered a form of adequate 
reparation, through which responsible states can discharge their obligation to repair according 
to both international and human rights laws, each commemorative performance should meet 
                                                                                                                                                         
Eye Cries: Memory, Monumentality, and the Ontologies of Violence in Peru”; Hite, “The Eye that Cries”: The 
Politics of Representing Victims in Contemporary Peru.”   
 
187 
both the objective and subjective criteria indicated above in the chapter.
555
 That is, every 
memorialization measure undertaken for the remedial purpose should be proportionate to the 
harm which it aims to redress and requires the approval of victims. The effectiveness of 
commemorations as instruments of reparation is ultimately subordinated to their capacity to 
listen, and tell the victims’ narratives with a high degree of public recognition, taking into 
account victims’ preferences and considering the social context in which they are to take 
place. Participation processes, consultations with victims, and criteria of proportionality are 
essential elements for reparation policies to be in line with international standards, and 
therewith, for wrongdoing governments to comply with their obligations under international 
law. 
At the same time, commemorations have a distinct collective and social dimension, 
which must also be taken into account. While the incorporation of memory-related initiatives 
into the framework of reparations may open the latter to their transformative potential, the 
failure of international bodies in taking into account the double dimension of a duty to 
commemorate as a remedial tool may eventually lead to unforeseen and undesired negative 
results within broader social memory processes. The Castro Castro case is a case in point. 
Although the Court attempted to strike a balance between the different requests of the parties, 
it failed to consider the broader social and collective dimension of the memory-related 
initiatives. It failed to pay careful attention to the complex nature of memory processes within 
a society in transition, and instead limited its considerations to an assessment of the impact of 
memory-related measures on the parties to the case. 
As the case suggests, the official sanction of “one memory”, of “one truth”, using the 
language of one particular set of victims, may have the undesirable result of exacerbating the 
tension between the victims’ demand for reparations and the need for social reconciliation. 
Moreover, imposing the commemoration of a “judicial truth” established by a supranational 
entity may alter the complex process of negotiation through which a conflict-riven society 
achieves a shared view of its common past. The duty to commemorate, as emerging practice, 
therefore calls for a careful evaluation of its implementation. 
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The Duty to Respect and Protect 
Introduction – Debating History 
History is a highly contested field of research. Different accounts of historical facts, 
different interpretations of events, and different narratives of the past coexist, clash, and 
compete against each. These history battles not only are rooted in academic and scientific 
ambitions, but also fought for political and social reasons. The way history is studied, 
analysed, and discussed in society, and taught in schools impacts on the way the past is 
perceived, understood, and represented. It eventually affects the way memories about 
traumatic events of the past take shape.
556
 History, as we have seen in the theoretical chapter 
of this thesis,
557
 is closely related to the construction of cultural identity. It is, therefore, an 
influential instrument of power. This is why governments, especially non-democratic ones, 
have always shown a special interest in history-management policies: “He who controls the 
past, controls the present”.
558
 Although it is a science – and because it is a science –, history is 
– and should be - subject to revisions, discussions, and reassessments over time. Following the 
Millian paradigm which says that to find the truth we should challenge the truths, accounts of 
the past should never been taken as axiomatic, unquestionable realities.
559
 The story of the 
Katyn massacre teaches us the fallibility of even long purported narratives. The official history 
of the 1940 mass murder of Polish prisoners of war detained in the special prisons of the 
Soviet NKVD (the soviet secret police that preceded the KGB) told the story of the Nazis’ 
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responsibility for those horrible facts. Only in 2010, after seventy years of lies, Russia 
admitted the responsibility of the Soviet leaders at that time.
560
 
In a different perspective, a true and open discussion on history is not only intrinsic to 
the nature of the historical research, but is also protected on the basis of liberal values. 
Inherent to every democratic system is that public discussion on matters of collective interest 
is encouraged and facilitated by instruments of democratic participation. Every position and 
idea, even the more radical ones, can be voiced and confronted within the appropriate social 
fora, so as to be accommodated within - and possibly tempered by - the democratic 
confrontation of opinions and ideas. Freedom of opinion and expression has been enshrined in 
the list of fundamental freedoms of human beings exactly to protect this fundamental principle 
of liberal democracies. 
On the other hand, however, such a fundamental liberty has to be balanced against 
other equally-important competing interests. On this basis, it has been argued that questioning 
and disputing the past should have limits. At the individual level, the denial of historical 
traumas constitutes an additional harm to the victims’ suffering. It deprives victims of due 
respect to their memories and reopens wounds. In this perspective, the right to honour and 
reputation may therefore provide a ground to limit – under certain conditions – the freedom to 
publicly circulate narratives about the past. At the collective level, malicious views that 
deliberately aim at distorting or misrepresenting historically ascertained events amounting to 
massive human rights violations jeopardize the pedagogical value of the historical debate, and 
constitute an “assault on truth and memory”.
561
 Cultural rights, in this sense, may offer similar 
grounds for restrictions. 
This chapter explores the role of international law in regulating the historical debate 
with regard to the discussion on historical events that amount to mass atrocities. It is argued 
that the current regime of international law, through human rights instruments and the practice 
of international judicial and quasi-judicial human rights institutions, guides states’ behaviours 
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with regard to the production, circulation, and discussion of historical interpretations of the 
past. While in principle it requires states to respect and preserve the free debate on history as a 
value, under certain conditions it poses some limits against the revision of historical facts 
which are deemed especially meaningful for the international community. It therefore protects 
specific historical accounts from the possibility of denying them. Because of its relevance in 
the memory-making processes, this is what I call the state duty to respect and protect. 
The chapter explores the legal foundations that underlie the double-sided duty to 
respect and protect history. The analysis revolves around two main questions. Firstly, can 
states impose restrictions on historical debate? And secondly, do states have an obligation to 
prohibit certain views about history? In order to address these two questions, after the analysis 
of the legal foundations of the duty under examination, the Chapter is divided in two main 
parts. The first one examines the rationale behind, the nature of, and the practice related to the 
duty to respect freedom in historical debate. The second part conceptualizes the duty to protect 
history from manipulations and distortions as the outer limit to freedom of historical debate. 
While the first part specifically delves into the reconstruction of freedom of expression as a 
guiding principle of the historical debate – therefore as the main legal foundation of the duty 
to respect -, the discussion about the role and regulation of negationisms, revisionisms, and 
denial of historical events which amount to gross violations of human rights forms the core of 
the second part of the chapter. The latter is addressed both from the perspective of the 
international legal regime and through a glance at the debate at the domestic level. Together 
with the state practice that offers an account of the debate at the national level, the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights provides the lion’s share of the materials, although the 
practice of the other main human rights bodies is also considered, when relevant. 
1. The Duty to Respect and Protect – Legal Foundations 
In theory, the double-sided duty to respect and protect can be conceptualized by the 
interpretation of various existing human rights norms in the fields of - inter alia - education, 
cultural and participatory rights, access to information, and the corresponding state duties. 
Since an extensive account of all of these normative links cannot be provided in these pages, 
however, this chapter will explore the topic mainly from the perspective of the most common 
ground which has been used in the practice of international bodies to frame the discussion 
about guarantees and limits of historical debate. Indeed, most of the practice, both at the 
192 
supranational and national level, has placed the question on how to debate history, and what 
the admissible constraints to the historical debate are, within the legal framework of freedom 
of expression. I will therefore address the subject in this chapter from this viewpoint. Yet, 
because of its relevance for this discussion, and as a means to open future research avenues in 
this study, I will first make a brief excursion into the field of cultural rights, from the 
viewpoint of the rights to education and culture, as additional possible grounds to link the 
regulation of historical debate to the international human rights framework, to be further 
explored in future studies. 
1.1 Right to Culture – Future avenues of research 
The strong connection between memory, history, and identity which was explored at 
the beginning of this study, 
562
 suggests that the protection of history may found a logical 
justification in the protection of cultural identity. The knowledge of the past is part of a 
people’s heritage, and shapes its identity.
563
 Francioni defines the concept of cultural heritage 
as 
the totality of cultural objects, traditions, knowledge and skills that a given 
nation or community has inherited by way of learning processes from previous 




People’s history certainly falls in this category. If cultural heritage, as Scovazzi 
suggests, “may contribute to the formation and preservation of cultural identity and (…) 
[foster] people’s sense of community”,
565
 the protection of history therefore becomes a means 
to ensure and protect the peoples’ right to cultural identity. Stemming from this argument, the 
legal regimes of cultural heritage protection, especially the intangible heritage regime, may 
offer a first frame of reference to explore state duties with regard to the regulation of history. 
Following the recent developments of this branch of law in respect of the history of 
serious, large-scale human rights violations, it can be argued that the legacy of past atrocity 
forms part not only of the cultural identity of the groups which personally lived through those 
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events, but also of the heritage of the whole international community that those events have a 
significant impact on shaping identity. It is undeniable that the history of the Holocaust has not 
only dramatically shaped the identity of the Jewish people, but today constitutes an important 
part of the history of the whole of humanity. Similarly, the histories of the Armenian 
massacre, the atrocities against aboriginal communities in Australia, as well as the ethnic wars 
in the Balkans and Rwanda, unquestionably place a heavy burden on the memory and identity 
of humankind. History, in this sense, is protected in the general interest of the whole human 




Yet, looking at history through the lens of the states’ obligations in the cultural rights 
field causes complex issues, especially regarding the respect and protection of diversity and 
minority rights. How to ensure that different interpretations of the past are similarly protected 
as part of peoples’ cultural identities, while at the same time ensuring that certain ascertained 
historical truths are protected against revisionisms, in the interest of humanity? Whilst the 
domain of cultural protection seems a fruitful framework to explore the interrelationship 
between history, memory, and related states’ obligations further, a more thorough and careful 
elaboration of this normative ground and its conundrum is required in the future. 
1.2 Right to Education – Future avenues of research 
The most powerful instrument in the hand of governments to transfer knowledge is 
education. Hence, the international legal framework which governs this domain necessarily 
provides normative grounds to define states’ obligations in the regulation of circulation of 
knowledge, including history. In shaping and deciding which narratives are to be included in 
education curricula, and taught in classrooms, governments may – and actually do – play a 
crucial role in the way generations perceive, represent, and discuss the past. In Japan, for 
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instance, the shameful history of the abuses committed by the Japanese military forces against 
the so-called “comfort women” during WWII was neglected in history textbooks adopted in 
public schools for half a century.
567
 This exclusion contributed to maintaining the veil of 
ignorance, silence, and impunity over this abhorrent history, and until now feeds heated 
debates in the public sphere about how history should be taught in schools.
568
 
 Education, ça va sans dire, is a highly political field, on which states are keen to keep, 
in principle, domain reservé. Nonetheless, with the progressive development of human rights 
norms and standards, governments are to confront the international legal framework when 
they are to decide content and means of domestic education policies. The right to education, in 
the narrow sense referring to formal teaching in schools and educational institutions, is firstly 
guaranteed in general terms by article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
which recognizes it as belonging to every individual. Its qualifying characteristics are then 
delineated by article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR);
569
 principle 7 of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child,
570
 and articles 28 and 
29 of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC);
571
 and, to some extent, 
article 18(4) ICCPR. At the regional level, the right to education is protected in all the three 
main regional systems of human rights protection.
572
 A considerable corpus of other 
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international documents restates the right to education in specific cases, and details its 
content.
573
 From these overarching norms, two main principles emerge. 1) Education shall be 
free, and respectful of the cultural identity of the individual and of its freedom; 2) education 
shall promote human rights values, tolerance, and respect for diversity. These two parameters 
set the framework for assessing educational programs in the light of human rights standards. 
Their application to the regulation of the historical debate will provide a snapshot, prima facie, 
of the impact that the international framework on the right to education may have on the 
states’ obligations with regard to history. 
Starting with the first principle, freedom in education, it has to be noted that the 
general provisions on the right to education must be read in the light of the other rights and 
freedoms enshrined in the main human rights instruments. In this sense, a logical complement 
to the right to education seems to be found in articles 18 and 19 ICCPR, which promote and 
ensure freedom of conscience, opinion, and expression.
574
 The combination of these 
provisions with the recognition of the right to education entails that, while the aims of 
education should be - among others - to teach respect for human rights, equality, and human 
dignity, school curricula and programs must also ensure and promote the free formation and 
circulation of ideas and opinions. Hence, plurality of teaching and education is to be granted 
as a positive obligation of states. From this perspective, states must guarantee freedom in 
education to both teachers and students.
575
 The academic freedom of teachers, although not 
explicitly codified in general human rights instruments within the scope of the right to 
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has been closely monitored by supervisory human rights bodies.
577
 They have 
called upon states to enable members of the academic community to transmit their knowledge 
and ideas free from interference.
578
 From this perspective, it could be argued that restrictions 
to theories and views than can be taught in class by professors would violate such a freedom. 
Within this discussion, from the students’ perspective, it would also be interesting to inquiry to 
what extent the right to education entails a right to a truthful and complete knowledge. This 
critical research question requires further, and more thorough investigation. A more detailed 
analysis should be thusly conducted on the practice of human rights monitoring bodies, better 
to interpret the impact of such limitations in the academic historical debate. 
Freedom in education is also ensured by the provisions that require states to respect 
parents’ liberty to educate their children in accordance with their personal principles and 
beliefs, as well as to allow the establishment of educational institutions other than those 
created by the public authorities.
579 
This is certainly a guarantee against state monopoly over 
and an assurance of plurality in education.
580
 In this sense, the ECtHR has considered that 
[t]he State, in fulfilling the functions assumed by it in regard to education and 
teaching, must take care that information or knowledge included in the 
curriculum is conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner. The State 
is forbidden to pursue an aim of indoctrination that might be considered as not 
respecting parents’ religious and philosophical convictions. That is the limit that 
must not be exceeded. 
One can wonder whether historical interpretation of past events that are meaningful for 
the life of a group can be included within the category of individual “convictions”. The Court 
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has suggested that the term ‘convictions’ “denotes views that attain a certain level of cogency, 
seriousness, cohesion and importance”.
581
 Whilst the interpretation of the past is certainly a 
serious, important, and cogent matter for the identity of individuals and groups, it is doubtful 
whether – and maybe even risky to think that - a certain interpretation of the past may seek 
protection under the banner of ‘philosophical convictions’. This would range the scientific 
research methods in interpreting the past as a matter of ‘beliefs’. Nonetheless, even if one 
agrees with this interpretation, the Court has been clear in stating that not all convictions are 
worthy of protection, but only those which are in line with the principles and values of a 
democratic society and human dignity.
582
 From this perspective, the qualification of historical 
denial as a form of violence, as we will discuss later in this chapter, would eventually allow – 
and maybe even require – the state to exclude revisionist theories from education systems. 
This leads us to the second principle in the regulation of the right to education: respect for 
human rights values and cultural diversity. 
The provisions for education enshrined in the main human rights instruments, while 
generally silent on the content of the right to education (i.e. about the content of school 
curricula and education programmes),
583
 univocally coincide in requiring that education is in 
line with human rights values.
584
 This means that pseudo-educative programmes and teaching 
which are contrary to the respect for human dignity, multiculturalism, and diversity cannot be 
shielded by the protection of the right to freedom of education.
585
 The anti-discrimination 
doctrine, in this sense, seems to play a key role in assessing also education curricula. 
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Discriminatory, racist, or hate teaching runs counter to the guiding principles of the right to 
education, as framed in the international human rights system. And indeed, anti-discrimination 
laws also pay particular attention to education. State obligations in the field of education are in 
fact addressed in most of the international instruments which provide protection against 
discrimination.
586
 They mostly require governments to adopt measures to prevent and combat 
forms of discrimination when regulating education systems. Although these provisions have 
been mainly interpreted as referring to eliminating discrimination in access to, and enjoyment 




Bringing this discussion back to the main subject dealt with in this chapter – states’ 
duties in the regulation of the historical debate –, if one understands historical revisionisms as 
a form of racial discrimination or incitement to hate and violence, as will be discussed later in 
this chapter, the anti-discrimination and human rights-respect arguments may justify the 
recognition of a state obligation to preserve certain historical narratives from revisionist 
theories, especially in education contexts. This, as a result, would ultimately legitimate 
governments to restrict the circulation of negationist messages in teaching and textbooks. If 
the denial of historical injustices constitutes a form of hate speech, capable of inciting violence 
and hatred, its teaching in schools in effect would greatly jeopardize the goal of education as a 
tool for enhancing respect for human dignity.
588
 
While more aspects of this discussion deserve further investigation and elaboration, the 
interpretation of the two main principles that regulate the field of education under the 
international legal framework – i.e., on the one hand, freedom and plurality of education, and 
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on the other hand, respect of and protection for human values and diversity as the ultimate 
goal of education – seem to concur on the exclusion of teaching that purports discriminatory 
and violent messages from education. This exclusion may also target hatred narratives that are 
dressed up as historical theories. However, these restrictions seem to constitute only extrema 
ratio exceptions to the liberal principle of freedom in education, which is the basis of the 
international human rights system. All this considered, and in anticipation of further 
investigation, the right to education seems to offer prima facie clear legal grounds to shape 
state duties in regulating the historical debate. 
1.3 Freedom of expression 
As mentioned above, the main legal ground which has been used to set the discussion 
on the regulation of historical debate within the human rights discourse has been freedom of 
expression. Freedom of expression (FoE) is recognized and protected as a core value for the 
protection of civil, political, and cultural rights by the main international and regional human 
rights instruments. In Chapter III of this study, when we discussed this fundamental freedom 
from the specific angle of freedom of information, we had the chance to indicate its normative 
bases in the main human rights texts. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
firstly grants the right to freedom of opinion and expression to every individual. This twofold 
entitlement recognizes the freedom to hold opinions without interference, as well as the right 
to freely disseminate information and ideas – freedom of speech.
589
 It finds similar recognition 
in all the main human rights instruments: Article 19 of the ICCPR, Article 10 of the ECHR, 
Article 13 of the ACHR, and Article 9 of the ACHPR.
590
 Such a fundamental freedom protects 
what has been called the free market of ideas and opinions within a democratic society, which 
theory is best explained by Justice Holmes’ oft-cited quote: 
[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas —that the 
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their 
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One of the rationales behind its protection is certainly the safeguarding of public 
debate. It relies on the theories advanced by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty, according to 
which even the most widely recognized truths may – and perhaps should – be challenged in a 
democratic society, as the struggle for truth is best served by the continuous discussion of 
existing beliefs.
592
 As such, freedom of expression is a powerful instrument to prevent 
governments from imposing official truths, and allow individuals to question and dispute 
matters of public interest. This is clearly especially relevant for the discussion on history, 
particularly in contexts where authoritarian regimes manipulate historical findings to construct 
and impose official accounts of past gross human rights violations. 
Although a fundamental freedom crucial to democracy, freedom of expression is not an 
absolute right. Both the UDHR and the general human rights instruments admit restrictions to 
free speech in order to protect other competing rights and interests. Article 29 of the Universal 
Declaration provides that limitations to rights and freedoms recognized thereby shall be 
admissible insofar they are prescribed by law, and justified by the protection of other 
individuals’ rights and freedoms and the need to safeguard morality, public order, and general 
welfare in a democratic society.
593
 The main general human rights conventions provide similar 
conditions for legitimizing restrictions to free speech.
594
 In general, these limitations have to 
fulfil the conditions of legality (restrictions must be determined by law), legitimacy 
(restrictions can be imposed only to serve one of the legitimate interests indicated by the 
treaties: respect for other people rights and freedoms; public order and security; public health 
or morals), and necessity (restrictions must respond to a pressing social need of a democratic 
society).
595
 Restrictions, moreover, must be proportionate to the aim they pursue. 
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The provisions concerning freedom of expression have been used to regulate a set of 
different juridical situations and interests, both at the individual and at the collective level. 
With regard to historical debate, the legal discipline of freedom of expression influences the 
way states are expected to deal with the discussion on the past within society. While the 
extension of the scope of freedom of expression to the field of history firstly expects 
governments to respect and ensure the free and open discussion of issues of historical 
relevance, the construction of a legal regime of the historical debate on the basis of freedom of 
expression means that any constraint imposed on it has to meet the general requirements that 
apply to FoE’s restrictions. The specificity of this subject, however, requires some 
adjustments, and special attention is to be paid to the way the general rules on FoE are to be 
interpreted. It is therefore important to see how these principles actually have been interpreted 
and applied in the practice of supranational bodies in regulating the historical debate. 
2. The Duty to Respect - Ensuring Freedom in Historical Debate 
2.1 Rationale: the individual and collective dimension 
Freedom of researching and discussing historical facts – i.e. freedom of historical 
debate - is considered a value of democratic societies. Not only is ensuring freedom in 
historical debate a precondition for enhancing other protected values – public interest to know, 
right to access to information, right to an impartial education, academic and scientific freedom 
-, but it is also considered an end in itself. The rationales for protection are found at both the 
individual and collective level. On the one hand, at the individual level, the free discussion of 
history receives protection under FoE provisions as “every form of idea and opinion capable 
of transmission to others”;
596
 historians, as every individual, are free to shape, develop, and 
express their own opinions without interference from authorities and without discrimination. 
Stepping to a higher level, historians are further entitled to academic freedom in their research, 
which includes the freedom to conduct studies and investigations, to access historical records 
and archives, to develop theories, and disseminate results. Of course, these individual rights to 
freely investigate and discuss the past are not limited to historians, since they belong to every 
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individual. Yet, as we will see in the implementation of this duty in practice, the professional 
background of the right-holders leads to a higher level of protection.
597
 
On the other hand, however, freedom of historical debate is crucial for the 
development of democratic society, especially in context of transitions. It has been widely 
argued that, in order to overcome past traumas, societies should face their history.
598
 As a 
consequence, an open and honest discussion about the past is an essential element of the 
broader process of transitional justice. Even in democratic societies, however, the free 
discussion about the past is a guarantee for democratic values. From this viewpoint, freedom 
of historical debate is not just the expression of an individual right, but it serves the paramount 
interest in the search for historical truth of the whole society. As I have already discussed at 
the outset of this work, this touches on the core of collective identity.
599
 This argument puts 
historical debate among the interests deserving special legal protection for the collective’s 
sake. 
2.2 The nature of historical debate 
The nature of the epistemological endeavour for historical truth necessarily influences 
the contours of its protection. Genuine historical research requires a continuous work of 
analysing, evaluating, discussing, and questioning evidences, and interpreting facts. A certain 
degree of uncertainty, and the constant development of knowledge, are therefore intrinsic to 
the work of historians in interpreting and making sense of the past. For that reason, they have 
received protection in courtrooms. The Spanish Tribunal Constitucional meaningfully 
describes historical research as “always, by definition, controversial and debatable, since it 
arises from statements and judgments, whose objective truth is impossible to claim with full 
certainty”.
600
 Not only this uncertainty is acknowledged as “consubstantial to the historical 
debate”, but it is also considered “the most valuable asset” of historical research, that is 
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worthy of respect and protection because of the essential role it plays in shaping a historical 
awareness in a free and democratic society.
601
  
This view has also been endorsed at the international level, and the dialogic nature of 
the historical debate in the search for historical truth has received legal recognition and 
protection in supra-national human rights bodies as well. The European Court of Human 
Rights, for instance, in the relevant cases, has confirmed the inconclusive character of the 
search for historical truth. In line with the Spanish approach, it has consistently understood 
historical research as “a sphere in which it is unlikely that any certainty exists”,
602
 and has 
therefore considered the “continuing debate between historians that shapes opinion as to the 
events which took place and their interpretation” connatural to the struggle for truth, and – as 
such – worthy of protection.
603
 The question is therefore whether – and to what extent – states 
may impose legitimate restrictions on this continuous work of revision and discussion. 
2.3 Regulating the historical debate  
2.3.1 The international legal framework 
Human rights bodies have been suspicious of similar restrictions. In various fora, they 
have expressed concerns about restrictive measures aimed at limiting the discussion of history. 
In this sense, the FoE UN Special Rapporteur, Frank La Rue, has made clear that:  
With regard to discussion of history, the Special Rapporteur is of the view that 
historical events should be open to discussion (…). By demanding that writers, 
journalists and citizens give only a version of events that is approved by the 




In the Report, La Rue refers to General Comment No. 34, in which the Human Rights 
Committee in fact judged the laws that criminalize the expression of opinions about historical 




 ECtHR, Monnat v.Switzerland, App. No. 73604/01. Judgment of 21 September 2006, para. 63. In 
Perinçek v. Switzerland, the Court restated this position: «En tout état de cause, il est même douteux qu’il puisse 
y avoir un « consensus général », en particulier scientifique, sur des événements tels que ceux qui sont en cause 
ici, étant donné que la recherche historique est par définition controversée et discutable et ne se prête guère à des 
conclusions définitives ou à des vérités objectives et absolues» (para 117); see also para. 101. 
603
 ECtHR, Chauvy And Others v. France, App. No. 64915/01, Judgment of 29 June 2004, para. 69. 
604
 UN GA, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression, 7 September 2012, UN Doc. A/67/357, para. 55. 
204 
facts incompatible with the obligations concerning freedom of opinion and expression posed 
on states by the Covenant. In that Comment, by analysing the limits to freedom of expression 
enshrined in paragraph 3 of Article 19 ICCPR, the Committee put forth a narrow interpretation 
of the scope of permissible restrictions to freedom of expression in certain specific areas. With 
regard to historical research and discussion, it remarked that the Covenant protects every 
opinion on, or interpretation of past events and their expressions, even when these expressions 
are erroneous and incorrect.
605
 While general prohibitions of historical views are inadmissible, 
limitations to these views are to be assessed on a case by case basis through the lens of the 
criteria spelled out in Articles 19(3) and 20. With the outer limit of hate or racist speech – that 
I will discuss later in the chapter –, the presumption of protection for freedom of opinion and 
expression about historical facts therefore should be considered the guiding principle for the 
regulation of the historical debate under international human rights law. 
At the regional level, in the framework of the human rights discourse, the ECtHR has 
developed the richest case law on this matter. From its case law, it is possible to derive 
guiding principles and criteria that inform the regulation of the historical debate. Thus, the 
analysis of its jurisprudence in more detail is worth devoting a few paragraphs to. 
2.3.2 - The European Court of Human Rights’ case law 
The Court firmly considers historical debate as an integral part of freedom of 
expression, and, as such, it protects it against illegitimate interferences and manipulations.
606
 
The starting point for this protection is, of course, Article 10.
607
 This provision recognizes 
freedom of expression and stipulates the conditions for permissible restrictions as follows: 
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in 
the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
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information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary. 
608
 
The Court has interpreted and applied these criteria for scrutinizing restrictive 
measures imposed by states to utterances that purported historical interpretations of past 
events. This case law provides the backdrop for singling out the scope and limits of the 
protection of freedom of historical debate. 
2.3.2.1 The principle: Freedom of historical debate 
When reviewing the case law, it should become clear that the European Court of 
Human Rights highly values freedom of history and protects it. The historical debate is 
protected and regulated as an integral part of freedom of expression. As such, in line with the 
Court’s jurisprudence on FoE, the protection also extends to historical interpretations and 
views that can offend, shock, or disturb.
609
 While constantly refusing the role to adjudicate on 
matters of historical nature, the Court rejects the idea that the historical debate – being open 
and dialogic by nature – be crystallized in “vérités objectives et absolutes”.
610
 As a 
consequence, to preserve the plurality of the discussion, it protects minority views, which 
animate the debate on historical events that are still under discussion, from illegitimate 
interferences of the states.
611
 
The Court protects freedom of historical debate under both the individual and 
collective rationales mentioned above. It not only shelters alternative historical accounts under 
the guarantee of Article 10 as a form of protection of the individual freedom of expression, but 
it also highlights the social value of having a plurality of voices and narratives discussing the 
past. It therefore protects an open debate on history as both a legitimate interest and a duty of 
every democratic society.
612
 On various occasions, the Court recalled “the efforts that every 
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country must make to debate its own history openly and dispassionately”,
613
 especially (but 
not exclusively) in contexts of countries engaged in democratic transition. In 2001, in a case 
against Slovakia, the Court upheld the view that the way the history of a nation – especially 
with regard to periods of authoritarianism and violation of democratic values - is discussed in 
the public sphere may affect the democratic development of that country in the future. In this 
sense, historical debate is seen as a form of political discussion, in which freedom of 
expression has the highest importance in strengthening and safeguarding a democratic 
society.
614
 The Court has also applied this democratic argument when dealing with the 
sensitive debate about the Armenian genocide in Turkey. In that context, freedom of historical 
debate has provided a basis for striking down restrictive measures imposed by the Turkish 
government on journalists and researchers which had disputed the official narrative of the 
Armenian massacre in 1915.
615
 
On the basis of this democratic argument, the Court has stressed the importance of 
affording that debate a high level of protection. In cases concerning debates on matters 
particularly relevant for the history of a country, the Court has strengthened the guarantees 
provided by Article 10, tipping the balance between competing rights and interests toward 
freedom of historical debate. In Karsai v. Hungary, for instance, as we have seen when 
discussing the right to access public information,
616
 the Court extended the special protection 
granted to the press in view of its function of “social watchdog” to a historian who had 
published an article in which he criticized some of the national press, naming some names, for 
making anti-Semitic statements. The article was situated in the context of a high-spirited 
debate in the country about the Hungarian role in the Holocaust, but it was impugned and 
sanctioned for violating the right to reputation of one of the persons criticized. In the 
background of the case, there was the heated discussion about “the intentions of a country, 
with episodes of totalitarianism in its history, to come to terms with its past”.
617
 The Court 
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valued such a debate as one “of the utmost public interest”, and, on these grounds, protected 
the freedom of expression of the historian to the detriment of the right to honour and 
reputation of the politician who was named in the article.
618
 Besides confirming the inclusion 
of historical debate in the category of matters of public interest, this decision also points out 




Similarly, in Orban et al. v. France, the Court considered that the protection of public 
order and prevention of crimes did not adequately justify the conviction by the French 
authorities of the author and the editor of a book - Services Spéciaux Algérie 1955-1957 – in 
which the former General Aussaresses described the torture and summary executions 
committed by the French army during the Algerian conflict as a legitimate means of war.
620
 
The domestic courts had convicted the applicants for defence of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. Conversely, the Court considered that the book, although certainly controversial, 
enriched the historical debate on a very sensitive and contested part of the French past. It 
affirmed that the interest of the public in debating its history was worthy of the greatest 
protection, and that the restriction imposed by the domestic authorities did not rest on any 
“pressing social need”; and, on the contrary, may have hindered the public discussion, 
depriving the society of receiving relevant information on such a significant part of its own 
history.
621 
Accordingly, it found a violation of Article 10. 
The utmost importance recognized to the interest of a democratic society in discussing 
its history by the Court has therefore outweighed competing interests of different natures. In 
Monnat v. Switzerland, for instance, the Court deemed that the interest of the public in 
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receiving information about the participation of Switzerland in WWII atrocities through a TV 
programme justified the infringement of the competing right of the audience to receive 
objective and impartial information.
622
 The right to honour and reputation of the others was 
subordinated to freedom of historical debate also in Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan (concerning the 
1992 massacre of Azerbaijani civilians by Armenian forces in Khojaly);
623
 Ungváry And 
Irodalom Kft. v. Hungary (concerning the debate on the historical responsibility for the 
Communist regime); and Giniewski v. France (concerning the responsibility of the Christian 
community in the Jewish genocide during WWII).
624
 
Hence, the Court considers it crucial that historical debate on particularly serious 
events can freely take place in the public sphere. As a consequence, it has outlawed state-
imposed restrictions to the public discussion about dark periods of a country’s history, since it 
found that – as we will discuss in detail in the relative section - mere content-based limitations 
to the historical discussion fail to meet the necessity test of Article 10.
625
 Read in conjunction 
with the continuous call for an open and dispassionate discussion of history, this strengthens 
the protection of freedom in the historical debate by the rationale of protecting democratic 
values, good governance, and rule of law. It therefore provides a justification for such a 
reinforced safeguard offered by the Court. 
2.3.2.2 Exceptions: Restrictions to historical debate 
As we have seen when reviewing the legal framework, freedom of expression admits 
restrictions. When pursuing legitimate aims, states may therefore limit free speech. The Court 
grants a certain room for manoeuvring to states in determining the possibility of restrictions.
626
 
Nonetheless, in the context of historical debate, the Court has adopted a rather restrictive 
approach when scrutinizing restrictions imposed to the circulation of alternative historical 
narratives in the public debate, including controversial ones, by governments. The way the 
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Court has interpreted and applied restrictions to freedom of speech in this context suggests the 
favor of the Court for protecting freedom of historical discussion. It is interesting to dwell for 
a moment on the reasoning that the Court supplies to support this argument. 
In general, as previously shown in this thesis, the Court has argued that, when ideas 
and opinions contribute to debates on matters of public interest, there is little space for 
restrictions.
627
 Among the three conditions for restrictions – legality, legitimacy, and necessity 
–, the latter is the key argument when assessing cases involving matters of public concern. The 
Court has interpreted it as requiring the existence of a “pressing social need” to justify the 
imposed limitation. This interpretation leaves states with a rather wide margin of appreciation 
in assessing the existence of such a need. Yet, in cases involving issues of public interest, for 
which a balance had to be struck between competing relevant rights or related interests and the 
societal interest in discussing matters of public relevance – both hampered by the protection of 
Article 10 –, the Court has applied the necessity test with a restrictive approach. In these cases, 
as we have seen with regard to the public access to information,
628
 the Court actually has 
reckoned that the society has a general interest in receiving all the information and opinions – 
even if fallacious – with regard to those issues, and the societal interest of discussing questions 
of general importance for the community in fact generally outweighs other individual rights.
629
 
When the issue at stake is a matter of public interest, hence, the necessity test for assessing 
state-imposed restrictions to the individual freedom of expression is applied stricter. 
Because of the inclusion of the historical discussion in the category of issues of public 
interest, this approach also applies to restrictions to the historical debate. In cases involving 
the discussion on a country’s past, hence, the significant margin of appreciation that states 
have in interpreting and fulfilling their obligations under the ECHR is reduced, and leaves 
them little room to manoeuvre in imposing limitations to that discussion. Perinçek v. 
Switzerland is a good example of the Court’s most recent approach in assessing the necessity 
requirement in cases of restrictions to the historical debate. In that case, the Court held the 
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state responsible for the violation of Article 10 of the Convention for convicting an individual 
who had questioned the legal qualification of the Armenian genocide. The Court found that 
the restriction did not respond to a pressing social need of a democratic society.
630
  
Perinçek, a Turkish doctor in law, politician and historian, had on various occasions 
publicly declared that the genocide of the Armenian people committed by the Ottoman Empire 
was an “international lie”. In the light of his declarations, the Swiss courts found him 
responsible for racial discrimination, on the legal basis of a domestic provision that 
criminalizes genocide denial.
631
 After restating the principles governing the historical debate 
that were examined in the previous paragraph, the Court classified Perinçek’s utterances as a 
type of historical, juridical, and political speech. On this basis, it considered that the 




The Court then proceeded by applying the ordinary test of Article 10(2) to scrutinize 
the government’s interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression. Following its 
previous jurisprudence, the Court restated that, since freedom of historical debate is the rule, 
every restriction to it has to meet the requirements of legality, legitimacy, and necessity. In 
this case, while recognizing that the restriction imposed by the domestic courts legitimately 
aimed at protecting victims’ honour and reputation, it rejected the existence of a “pressing 
social need” that justified the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression. 
The reasoning of the Court to support its stance relied on two main arguments. Firstly, 
the Court referred to the recent developments in domestic practice on the issue of historical 
denial, and contrasted this case with its jurisprudence on the Holocaust cases.
633
 It considered 
that, while cases of Holocaust denial are still perceived as an alarming phenomenon in Europe, 
which should be controlled and fought by governments as a form of intrinsic anti-Semitism 
and racism, the denial of the legal qualification of the Armenian genocide did not raise the 
same level of social alarm. To corroborate its claim, the Court indicated recent decisions of 
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national and international bodies which have outlawed criminal legislation punishing historical 
denial tout court.
634
 While this approach may sounds dangerously close to promoting double 
standards for judging Holocaust denial cases versus other cases of genocide denial - as I will 
further discuss in the section on negationism -, the impact of this reasoning is substantially 
circumscribed by the crucial fact that the Court is called to decide on the denial of the legal 
qualification of genocide (i.e., a legal dispute over the legal label to be applied to those 
atrocities, and not over the factual truth about the existence of those events). As such, hence, it 
can be still wondered what the decision would have been, had the case concerned the denial of 
the existence of the atrocities against Armenian. 
 Secondly, the Court found that the applicant’s statements did not constitute incitement 
to hatred and violence. Perinçek’s utterances, in fact, did neither aim at denying the 
occurrence of the Armenian massacre nor expressed contempt toward the victims, but they 
rather focused on the legal qualification of those events, on which there is no general 
consensus. Consequently, according to the Court, the nature of these statements was not such 
as to advocate hate against Armenian people.
635
 This latter criterion indicates the limits of 
tolerance that a democratic government should have in the historical debate with regard to 
speech capable of “offend[ing], shock[ing] and disturb[ing]”.
636
 The threshold for restriction 
to the historical debate therefore seems to lie in the potential harmful nature of the speech, 
which grounds the existence of a pressing social need.
637
 As a result, in Perinçek, the Court 
eventually concluded that the public interference imposed by the domestic courts on the 
applicant’s freedom was not necessary in a democratic society. On the contrary, since this kind 
of restrictions could even end up jeopardizing the discussion of such an important issue in the 
public sphere, they are, in principle, to be rejected. This decision therefore seems to 
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corroborate the principle of freedom of historical debate and the restrictive approach to 
limitation imposed to that discussion. 
Overall, as an intermediate conclusion on the Court’s case law on historical debate, it 
can be said that the Court suggests a general presumption of freedom in the historical debate. 
The interpretative tools the Court uses to foster this protection are: i.) the restrictive approach 
to the admissible limits to Article 10, favouring the public discussion on history over 
individual personality rights and other interests; and ii.) the restriction of the states’ margin of 
appreciation in assessing the existence of justifications for applying restrictions to historical 
debate. From this perspective, the Court case law is in line with the restrictive approach 
expressed by the HRC and UN bodies that we discussed above.
638
 As I will discuss in the next 
section, however, such a generous approach to the historical debate takes a step back when the 
events disputed relate to the Holocaust. 
3. The Duty to Protect – Defending History from Falsifications and 
Manipulations 
In the previous examination, we have seen how international bodies have interpreted 
human rights norms related to the protection of freedom of expression as an essential effort 
that every democratic society should make and applied it in order to protect and promote the 
free and open discussion over the past. However, while the plurality of voices in debating the 
past has been explicitly considered a value in itself and protected by the firm shield of freedom 
of expression, the question has been raised as to how states should deal with those voices that 
purport interpretations of past events that tend to deny, minimize, or justify historical facts that 
amount to international crimes. By manipulating and distorting reasoning and methods of 
history and historiography, these voices promote narratives of past atrocities that tend to 
question historical findings widely verified by authoritative scholarship and commonly 
accepted as established.
639
 Negationism(s) can take different forms and show different degrees 
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 Negationist theories can target historical facts or their interpretation; they can 
ontologically contest the occurrence of a crime (e.g., no ‘final solution’ was planned and 
perpetrated against Jewish people in WWII), or limit themselves to question data or historical 
records related to that crime (e.g., the number of Jews murdered in WWII is way below the 
million); they can target a specific ethnic group, and be accompanied by moral judgment 
which aims at justifying, approving, relativizing, or trivializing the crimes in question (e.g., 
Jews invented the Holocaust myth to exploit Germany financially).
641
  
The question is, once more, whether the law should play a role in outlawing these 
kinds of (pseudo-)historical opinions, and to prevent their authors from disseminating them. At 
the domestic level, many states have adopted legislative acts to prohibit and repress denials of, 
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and misgivings about the actual facts of the major atrocities perpetrated in history.
642
 
Sidestepping the normative assessment and the capacity of these measures,
643
 one may 
question the compatibility of these legislative acts with principles and standards of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. In particular, from the legal point of view, the question can 
be framed as whether the prohibition of negationims can be conceived as a legitimate 
restriction to freedom of expression, in accordance with the principles of human rights law 
outlined in the first part of this Chapter. Before analysing the human rights legal frameworks 
and practice, the next section presents an account of the debate with regard to the so-called 
memory laws at the national level. This overview will provide evidence of the domestic 
practice on the regulation of the historical debate, in the light of which the solutions put forth 
in the international legal framework can be assessed. The kaleidoscopic picture that will 
emerge from this review, while suggesting the complexity of providing standards and 
principles to regulate this issue univocally, offers a viewpoint better to understand the 
uncertain regulation at the international level. 
3.1 The debate at the domestic level  
Memory laws are statutes that promote specific historical accounts of past events 
and/or prohibit the denial of, or the dispute on these narratives through the threat of civil or 
criminal sanction.
644
 They have been defined as those laws that, in spite of the different 
content, 
semblent procéder d’une même volonté: «dire» l’histoire, voire la qualifier, en 
recourant à des concepts juridiques contemporains comme le génocide ou le 
crime contre l’humanité, pour, d’une manière ou d’une autre, faire œuvre de 
justice au travers de la reconnaissance de souffrances passées.
645
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They can be given shape either in official, declarative acknowledgments of historical 
facts, such as the 2001 French Law recognizing the Armenian Massacre as genocide,
646
 or in 
civil or criminal acts or norms that aim at banning certain views regarding historical events as 
incompatible with the fundamental values of democratic states. While the first type raises 
concerns on the capabilities of the law to sanction historical truths,
647
 the latter is more 
problematic from the legal point of view, since it encroaches upon individual liberties, raising 
doubts about the legitimacy of these restrictions. The following analysis therefore focuses on 
this latter form. 
The review of the main legal systems with regard to the regulation of negationism 
reveals a kaleidoscopic landscape. The most liberal approach to this phenomenon comes from 
the United States.
648
 In that legal system, the principle of freedom of speech, as interpreted by 
the U.S. Supreme Court, while admitting legitimate legal grounds for restrictions,
649
 submits 
content-based restrictions to the most rigorous scrutiny under the solid protection of the First 
Amendment.
650
 In the European context, states have adopted different approaches to the 
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question of how to deal with historical negationisms. On the one side, there are states that 
specifically target revisionist ideologies through administrative or criminal provisions (the so-
called militant democracies).
651
 On the other side, some states have chosen not to introduce 
specific provisions prescribing the punishment of revisionist or negationist views in their legal 
systems.
652
 Even in this latter group, however, utterances that aim at maliciously denying, 
trivializing, or justifying historical events amounting to serious crimes have been frequently 
repressed under hate speech laws, or on the basis of general domestic provisions punishing 
conduct that constitutes defamation, breaches of the public order and security, or that encroach 
upon other individuals’ rights. 
The rationales behind the choice of whether to proscribe denialisms or not are various, 
ranging from historical to political and legal arguments. From the latter viewpoint, a number 
of rationales have been used to justify restrictions to negationist expressions. These grounds 
provide legal arguments to outweigh the repression of denial against freedom of expression in 
the balancing endeavour between different rights and interests. It is useful, also in the light of 
the forthcoming analysis of the case law of international bodies, to spell out the main ones. 
First of all, the ‘public order rationale’ has been used by domestic courts to legitimize 
restrictions. Accordingly, revisionist utterances should be banned since they may constitute a 
threat to the public order and security.
653
 From this perspective, negationism is assimilated to 
racist speech. It is grounded on the presumption that every form of negationism is driven by 
racially-motivated or discriminatory intent, and aims at provoking hatred and violence. As we 
will see in more detail in the next paragraphs, this is in fact the most common underlying 
argument against Holocaust denial, which has provided courts with grounds for admitting 
restrictions to these utterances even in the absence of explicit denial laws. A second argument 
grounds the condemnation of revisionist theories of historical crimes on the protection of the 
rights of the others. In this sense, the denial, justification, or minimization of past atrocities 
violates the right to honour and reputation of the victims and their heirs. By denying their 
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suffering, deniers indirectly (and sometimes even directly) accuse victims of falsity, and insult 
their memory. Moreover, similar expressions affect not only the individual victims, but the 
whole group that has been targeted by the violence. The Federal Court of Australia, in a case 
of Holocaust denial, ruled that  
negationist speech challenges and denigrates a central aspect of the shared 
perception of Australian Jewry of its own modern history and the circumstances 
in which many of its members came to make their lives in Australia rather than 
in Europe. To the extent that the material conveys these imputations it is, in my 
view, more probable than not that it would engender feelings of hurt and pain in 
the living by reason of its challenge to deep seated belief as to the circumstances 
surrounding the deaths, or the displacement, of their parents or grandparents. 
For the same reason, I am satisfied that it is more probable than not that the 
material would engender in Jewish Australians a sense of being treated 
contemptuously, disrespectfully and offensively.
654
 
The Court treats denial as a calumnious speech, capable of offending, insulting, 
hurting, and wounding members of Australian Jewry, and engenders in them a sense of being 
treated contemptuously, disrespectfully, and offensively.
655
 On the basis of these arguments, 
restrictions to negationist utterances are thus permissible – and even necessary - as a legitimate 
limitation to FoE. Thirdly, a more radical argument can be put forth to remove denialist 
ideologies from the protection of fundamental rights, namely that negationisms pose a threat to 
the constitutional order, since they aim at rehabilitating or justifying the legal orders that 
allowed those crimes to happen. These views are therefore considered to run counter to the 




With regard to the concrete regulation of historical denial, provisions prohibiting and 
punishing negationisms take different shapes. These differences may concern various aspects 
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 First, they may regard the object of the law, i.e., the historical event whose 
narrative is to be protected by the specific provision. Traditionally, repression of negationist 
speech has been linked to Holocaust denial. The historical heritage of each state mainly 
explains the differences in the choice of the event(s) whose denial is to be punished.
658
 Not 
surprisingly, countries such as Germany, Austria, and Belgium have decided to adopt ad hoc 
statutes that prohibit conduct that disputes the atrocities committed against Jewish people in 
WWII. Eastern European Countries, instead, have been keen to prohibit the malicious inquiry 
of the crimes committed by the Communist Party.
659
 Rwanda’s legislation condemns the 
denial of the 1994 genocide.
660
 Countries that bear a lighter historical burden, conversely, have 
often introduced more general provisions, prohibiting the denial of the most serious crimes 
without making distinctions among the historical events in which they occurred.
661
  
Second, anti-denial provisions may vary in their scope. They can be as broad as to 
target the denial of any mass human rights violation whose narrative is protected, regardless of 
its legal qualification, or can limit the proscription of the denial of specific international 
crimes, most often genocide.
662
 In this regard, these provisions sometimes specifically require 
that the historical event whose denial is proscribed be defined as an international crime by an 
                                                 
657
 For a comparative review of the legislation of European states, see Closa, Study on how the memory 
of crimes committed by totalitarian regimes in Europe is dealt with in the Member States, table 3.3 . 
658
 Interestingly, both the European Commission and Court of Human Rights have admitted that the 
historical legacy of a state may legitimately justify, in principle, political decisions that prima facie appear to be 
contrary to the principles of the Convention. See, e.g., ECommHR, B.H.; M.W.; H.P.; G.K. v. Austria, App. No. 
12774/87, Decision of 12 October 1989, para. 2; ECtHR, [GC] The Welfare Party and others v. Turkey, App. No. 
41340/98, Judgment of 13 February 2003, para. 124. 
659
 The Czeck Republic, Hungary, and Poland, for instance, punish the denial of both Communist and 
Nazi crimes. 
660
 Law N. 18/2008 adopted on 23 July 2008. The Law is very broad, and condemns a variety of 
behaviours related to genocide ideology. For this reason, the law has been heavily criticized, and its legitimacy 
has been questioned by human rights bodies. See Sullo, P. “Lois Mémorielles in Post-Genocide Societies: The 
Rwandan Law on Genocide Ideology under International Human Rights Law Scrutiny”, Leiden Journal of 
International Law 27, No. 2 (2014): 419-445. 
661
 This is the case, for instance, Switzerland; Luxemburg; Cyprus and Spain (this latter, however, as a 
consequence of the Constitutional Court’ Judgment 235/2007, prohibits only the justification of genocide, but not 
its mere denial). 
662
 E.g. Romania, Slovenia; Poland; Portugal; Cyprus prescribe the prohibition of denial of various 
serious crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity; crimes against peace; war crimes or other crimes committed 
by the Nazi or Communist parties. On the contrary, Germany; Belgium; Luxemburg formally condemns only 
genocide denial. See Closa, Study on how the memory of crimes committed by totalitarian regimes in Europe is 
dealt with in the Member States, 50 - ff. 
 
219 
internal, or – more often – an international court.
663
 This latter requirement may raise 
questions with regard to the boundaries between law and history, judge and historian, judicial 
and historical truths. By remitting to the judge the responsibility to define a fact as an 
“established historical fact”, the contestation of which is prohibited, these provisions 
eventually dress judicial decisions as historical truths. While this is a complex argument that 
cannot be addressed in depth in this chapter, its relevance for the present discussion cannot be 
downplayed, and opens the door for future discussion. 
Third, differences among types of anti-denial provisions lie in the actus reus of the 
offence. From this perspective, anti-denial provisions can target either the ‘mere denial’ of a 
certain historical event amounting to mass human rights violations (content-based 
restriction),
664
 or condemn only value judgments that aim to justify, glorify, or support that 
event. While the punishment of the latter type of offence can be justified by the hate speech 
rationales - as proscription of utterances which incite to violence and hatred -, or on the basis 
of the right to honour and reputation – as the justification or glorification of those atrocities 
which inflict new humiliation and suffering on victims and their heirs, the former one poses 
some complications, since content-based proscription of mere denial may be considered a 
form of repression of mere opinions, and therefore particularly heinous in democratic 
societies. The radical difference between these two approaches is well expressed in the heated 
debated revolving around this point at the level of national constitutional courts, the two 
opposing positions being represented by the Tribunal Constitucional of Spain and the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht. Whilst the former struck down the part of the domestic genocide 
denial provision that criminalized mere denial,
665
 since it found it incompatible with the 
constitutionally protected right of freedom of expression, the latter resolutely rejected the 
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possibility of shielding negationist speech under FoE protection. The argument used by the 
two courts is the same, but its application led to opposite results.
666
 The legal ground used by 
both courts was rooted in the distinction between facts and opinions. On the one hand, the 
Tribunal Constitucional considers the mere dissemination of ideas or theories that deny 
existence of historical facts classified as genocide “mere transmission of opinions”.
667
 The 
Court found that this kind of utterances do not automatically involve incitement to hatred and 
violence, or praise of the commission of crimes. As such, their general repression would cause 
to impose punishment about ideas as such. It consequently found that the criminalization of 
mere denial runs counter to democratic values. On the other hand, the German Constitutional 
Court refused to conceive Holocaust denial as the expression of an opinion, but it rather 
considered it an assertion of fact. On these basis, it argued that, whilst full protection should 
be accorded to opinions, statements of facts are protected to the extent to which they 
contribute to the formation of public opinion. The Court judges that utterances that aim at 
denying the existence of the Jewish persecution are patently untrue statements of facts, and 
considered them of no interest to society. As such, holocaust denial being an obviously false 
statement of historical facts, its expression falls outside the protection of the constitutional 
right to freedom of expression.
668
 
Finally, with regard to the elements of the offence, in order to avoid unconstitutionality 
claims for punishing mere opinions, some national parliaments have further enriched their 
provisions by requiring an additional element for the prosecution of historical denial. For this 
kind of expressions to be punishable, some provisions require that they intend to cause, and/or 
are capable of causing harm to other protected values. This requisite is introduced either in the 
form of a psychological element - mens rea – which requires that the agent acts with the intent 
to incite hatred, violence, and discrimination,
669
 or as a material element, requiring that the 
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conduct constitutes a form of hate speech, discrimination, or threat to public order or the rights 
of other individuals in fact.
670
 The presence of these requirements, in particular in the form of 
the objective element of the harm, even if narrowing down the application of anti-denial 
provisions, offers more solid reasons to argue in favour of their legitimacy. By requiring that 
negationist views may be punished only if they pose a threat to or harm other interests and 
rights, norms thusly constructed indicate to the judge the balancing exercise that has to be 
carried out in concreto to assess the necessity for restricting the individual freedom of 
expression. According to this approach, hence, it eventually rests upon the judge to assess 




In this overview of the state practice on negationisms, we have observed the variety of 
approaches and legal avenues which are, in principle, available to domestic institutions to 
regulate this phenomenon. It is now time to look at whether – and how - the international legal 
framework poses constraints or suggests guidelines and standards to delimit the scope of 
capabilities of states when dealing with the denial of the history of past atrocities. 
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3.2 International Legal Framework 
The memory of the Holocaust and Colonialisms played a significant role in shaping the 
human rights discourse in the post-war era.
672
 Those narratives have had a powerful influence 
on the cultural heritage of the international community, giving present generations the moral 
burden to protect them so that they may stand as a warning for future generations against the 
repetition of similar atrocities. On these ground, in spite of the pivotal role that the human 
rights system assigns to freedom of expression in the protection of human rights and 
democracy, the international community has felt at odds with according protection to forms of 
expressions that amounted to denial or mystification of its historical heritage. These 
expressions have been equated to behaviour aimed at inspiring, stimulating, or encouraging 
the acts of racist and xenophobic groups, insulting the memory of victims, and threatening the 
dignity of the whole community
.673
 As such, international bodies have been keen to express 
their reproach for these expressions, and to encourage states to clearly distance themselves 
from them. Nevertheless, no explicit prohibition of historical negationism is included in the 
general human rights instruments. In the absence of specific provisions, the rejection of 
revisionist theses, while remaining mostly in the domestic sphere of state sovereignty, has first 
sought an alternative legal stance in the fundamental rights framework via legal interpretation 
of positive law. 
The discriminatory nature of similar forms of speech – either explicitly or implicitly – 
suggests equality as the first legal ground to combat revisionisms. The anti-discrimination 
discourse provides, I dare to say, the outer limit to freedom of expression. The regulation of 
hate speech therefore offers a reference frame to condemn negationist theories as unlawful 
forms of expressions under international law.
674
 The recognition of the legitimacy of 
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On the basis of the anti-discrimination doctrine, international law expressly condemns 
hate speech as utterances that promote, instigate, or manifest racially motivated opinions and 
expressions, and encourages states to ban these forms of expressions through legal and 
political measures.
676
 The state obligation to outlaw hatred manifestations can be inferred from 
the texts of the main human rights instruments.
677
 The ICCPR and the ACHR explicitly 
require states to prohibit any promotion or praise of “national, racial or religious hatred that 
constitutes an incentive to discrimination, hostility or violence”.
678
 Other instruments, such as 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, go as 
far as requiring the criminalization of hate speech in domestic law systems.
679
 In this 
conceptualization, history is protected from malicious manipulations and falsity on the basis of 
the argument that historical denial of past crimes associates with discriminatory and racist 
behaviours. As such, negationisms are expunged from the legal protection of FoE on the basis 
of anti-discrimination laws. As we will see later in this section, this is the main argument that 
has been used by international human rights bodies to deal with the issue of revisionism,
680
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and this is also, as a matter of fact, how western legal doctrine has first approached this issue 
from the legal point of view. 
Beyond the indirect proscription of negationisms via the anti-discrimination discourse, 
more recently, the denial of historical crimes has been progressively analysed as an 
autonomous subject. The XXIth century has sadly witnessed the proliferation of forms of 
negationisms and reproachable public mystifications of historical atrocities.
681
 Whereas at the 
domestic level – as we have seen above -, this has stimulated governments to enact memory 
laws to preserve ‘historical truths’ in the attempt to put an end to the painful insult to the 
memories of a traumatic past, at the international level the resurgence of negationisms has 
urged international bodies to adopt declarations that explicitly condemn the denial of serious 
crimes in history. 
Despite all this, it is hard to argue for the existence of a legal obligation to repress 
negationisms as such under international law. Yet, the body of international instruments 
specifically targeting such a reproachable practice is growing, especially in the European 
scenario. The UN General Assembly has promoted this trend by consistently reaffirming the 
importance of protecting the memory of past atrocity, and to combat historical revisionisms.
682
 
In 2007, the General Assembly eventually adopted resolution 61/255, which expressly 
condemns “without any reservation any denial of the Holocaust”, and explicitly urges states to 
reject unreservedly any form of historical denial of the Holocaust and any activities to that 
end.
683
 Judge Cançado Trindade highlighted the relevance of this resolution for the protection 
of the duty of remembrance, and the fight against historical revisionism. 
The 28th special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations was 
effectively garnished with significance and symbolism, at a time when direct 
witnesses (the survivors) of these atrocities are growing old and will not be 
around much longer. Hence the justified importance ascribed to the cultivation 
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of memory in the face of the threat posed by historical revisionism, in complete 
disregard of the immeasurable human suffering of those victimized [sic].
684
 
The Council of Europe, moreover, has been at the forefront in guiding national policies 
on this very sensitive matter. Under its auspices, within the framework of the fight against 
racism and xenophobia, the only general international instrument that provides for a state 
obligation to punish forms of denials of international crimes was adopted: the Additional 
Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime concerning the criminalization of acts of a racist 
and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems.
685
 By this treaty, states commit 
themselves to undertake measures to punish as criminal offences the act of  
distributing or otherwise making available, through a computer system to the 
public, material which denies, grossly minimises, approves or justifies acts 
constituting genocide or crimes against humanity, as defined by international 
law and recognised as such by final and binding decisions of the International 
Military Tribunal, established by the London Agreement of 8 August 1945, or 
of any other international court established by relevant international instruments 
and whose jurisdiction is recognised by that Party.
686
 
Although Article 6 prescribes a mere content-based restriction to denialist views, the 
Protocol allows states to introduce an additional requirement for the punishment of the 
revisionist conduct. They may prescribe that the denial is punished only when the author acts 
with dolus specialis, i.e. with “the intent to incite hatred, discrimination or violence against 
any individual or group of individuals, based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic 
origin, as well as religion if used as a pretext for any of these factors, or otherwise”. 
Alternatively, governments may make reservations to the whole or parts of this provision. Not 
surprisingly, many countries – including the U.S. and a number of EU Member States – have 
refused to sign the Additional Protocol, or make use of the reservation clause to Article 6 by 
invoking the protection of FoE.
687
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Moreover, at the EU level, several political documents were adopted to condemn 
revisionist theories of genocides and other international crimes in the framework of the fight 
against racisms and discrimination. Indeed, the Holocaust narrative has provided the basis for 
the construction of a shared European memory as a stepping stone in the process of integration 
toward a common European identity. The Stockholm Programme, which set the European 
agenda of priorities and objectives for the period 2010-2014, made the repudiation of 
genocides, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed by totalitarian regimes the 
common ground of the European identity. While paying due respect to the sovereignty of each 
Member States in approaching their own history, the Programme urges that “the memory of 
those crimes (…) be a collective memory, shared and promoted, where possible,” by all the 
European Members.
688
 Hence, also within this context, the anti-discrimination discourse has 
provided the conceptual background for developing the EU hate speech policy, on the basis of 
which the condemnation of negationisms has been mainly justified. 
Within this framework, the European institutions have developed a clear policy that 
pushes for the prohibition of historical negationisms, and that will most likely influence the 
memory policies of Member States.
689
 In 2001, the Commission initiated the proposal for 
reviewing the common policy on the fight against racisms and xenophobia,
690
 which 
eventually culminated, seven years later, in the adoption of the Council Framework Decision 
2008/913/JHA (hereinafter FD 2008/913/JHA or just FD).
691
 The Decision expressly requires 
Member States to enact criminal legislation to punish the defence, revisionism, and denial of 
the core international crimes. Although it originally aimed at harmonizing the legislation of 
Member States with the treatment of Holocaust denial, as a result of the political pressures 
from Eastern European Countries, the scope of the Decision was eventually extended to 
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include forms of revisionisms that also target other serious human rights violations, the 
criminalization of which is therefore required in an obligation for Member States. 
Article 1 of the FD obliges member states to undertake measures to punish the 
following intentional conducts: 
(c) publicly condoning, denying or grossly trivialising crimes of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes as defined in Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, directed against a group of persons 
or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, 
descent or national or ethnic origin when the conduct is carried out in a manner 
likely to incite to violence or hatred against such a group or a member of such a 
group; 
(d) publicly condoning, denying or grossly trivialising the crimes defined in 
Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal appended to the 
London Agreement of 8 August 1945, directed against a group of persons or a 
member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent 
or national or ethnic origin when the conduct is carried out in a manner likely to 
incite to violence or hatred against such a group or a member of such a group.
692
 
The anti-discrimination rationale clearly underpins this provision. Similar to the CoE 
Additional Protocol, the broad scope of the FD is mitigated by the significant margin of 
appreciation that the Decision grants to Member States. Firstly, by failing to provide a specific 
definition of the elements of the proscribed conducts, the Decision de facto leaves the task of 
concretely determining the contours of the utterances to be criminalized up to domestic 
authorities. Secondly, by requiring that the discriminatory conduct is potentially able to create 
harm (“carried out in a manner likely to incite to violence or hatred”), member states can 
decide to repress only that behaviour that constitutes a threat to public order or to the honour 
and reputation of other individuals’ rights.
693
 Lastly, the FD offers member states the option to 
subordinate the concrete punishment of a certain conduct to the previous qualification of those 
events as an international crime by a final decision of a national or international court.
694
 This 
option in fact offers states the possibility to establish political ranking of legitimacy among 
historical narratives of mass crimes – hierarchies of truths –
695
, subordinating the protection to 
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courts’ decisions. As a result of the wide margin of appreciation left to Member States in 
limiting the scope of the provision, the broad obligation to criminalize negationisms tout 
court, as originally framed in Article 1 of the Decision, is certainly mitigated. It is however 
certain – and of the outmost relevance - that EU Member States have today a treaty obligation 
to punish historical denial.
696
  
3.3 Case Law on Negationisms 
3.3.1 Human Rights Committee 
International legal documents are mostly silent on how states should treat negationist 
theories. With the exception of the two documents mentioned in the previous paragraph – the 
CoE Additional Protocol to the Cybercrime Convention and Council Framework Decision 
2008/913/JHA -, the supra-governmental instruments that tackle this issue are mainly political 
documents lacking binding force. Nevertheless, in specific cases of historical revisionisms, 
human rights bodies have been called to the challenging task of striking a fair balance between 
ensuring fundamental freedoms and rights on the one side, and protecting the memory of 
events related to past atrocities from oblivion and falsification, on the other. 
In section I of this Chapter I have already discussed the reluctance of the Human 
Rights Committee to legitimize the crystallization of state-imposed interpretations of past 
events through legislative measures that aim at restricting historical debate.
697
 However, in the 
only case in which the Committee was called to adjudicate on a case of Holocaust denial, it 
ruled in favour of the protection of the narrative about the extermination of Jews during WWII 
against malicious fabrications in private speech.
698
 
The decision is well-known. In Faurisson, the Committee was called to adjudicate on 
the conviction of a French citizen by national courts on the legal basis of the first, and most 
famous of the French memory laws, the Gayssot Act.
699
 Section 24bis of the Law prescribes: 
Seront punis des peines prévues par le sixième alinéa de l'article 24 ceux qui 
auront contesté, par un des moyens énoncés à l'article 23, l'existence d'un ou 
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plusieurs crimes contre l'humanité tels qu'ils sont définis par l'article 6 du statut 
du tribunal militaire international annexé à l'accord de Londres du 8 août 1945 
et qui ont été commis soit par les membres d'une organisation déclarée 
criminelle en application de l'article 9 dudit statut, soit par une personne 




Monsieur Faurisson, the applicant, was an academic who had publicly questioned the 
reality and modalities of the Jews extermination. The Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris 
found that his statements violated the prohibition of Holocaust denial established by the 
Gayssot Act, and therefore convicted the applicant for "contestation de crimes contre 
l'humanité". Monsieur Faurisson lodged a complaint at the Human Rights Committee, in 
which he contested the Gayssot Act, arguing that it constituted “unacceptable censorship, 
obstructing and penalizing [of] historical research”, and claimed that the conviction violated 
his right to freedom of expression, ex Article 19 of the Covenant. 
The Committee, whilst expressing reservations about the legitimacy of the content-
based restrictions imposed by the Gayssot Act in abstracto, in concreto ruled against the 
applicant, finding that the conviction was legitimate in view of the three-tier test imposed by 
Article 19(3). The Committee constructed its decision on the basis of the anti-discrimination 
doctrine. The argument was driven by the consideration that Holocaust denial is a vehicle for 
anti-Semitism which states must oppose through the adoption of appropriate measures. Since 
this kind of speech – such as the applicant’ statements –, can encourage or foster anti-Semitic 
feelings, its restriction is both legitimate – in that it preserves the Jews’ right “to live free from 
fear of an atmosphere of anti-Semitism” -, and necessary in a democratic society – in that it 
aids in the struggle against racism and discrimination. To admit restrictions to expressions that 
deny the Holocaust, the Committee therefore requires that the utterance is potentially capable 
of strengthening racist inclinations and discrimination.
701
 
Indeed, at a broader level, the case offered the Committee the opportunity to express – 
de jure condito - an assessment of the compatibility of memory laws in general with the 
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principles and rights of the Covenant. However, the Committee did not fully exploit this 
opportunity, and limited itself to warning that 
[t]he application of the terms of the Gayssot Act, which, in their effect, make it 
a criminal offence to challenge the conclusions and the verdict of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, may lead, under different 
conditions than the facts of the instant case, to decisions or measures 
incompatible with the Covenant. 
By means of this statement, the Committee implicitly suggests that the criminalization 
of expressions that challenge historical facts, even when ascertained as judicial truths by 
international courts, are hardly reconcilable with the principles of the Covenant. It further 
restates that every restriction, including those imposed on negationist speech, should meet the 
conditions set out in Article 19, paragraph 3. However, when it comes to concretely 
scrutinizing those restrictions, the way the Committee applies the Article 19(3) test to the 
Gayssot Act seems to imply that Holocaust denial automatically justifies the necessity of a 
restriction. Indeed, the Committee fails to examine in detail the connection between 
negationism and anti-Semitism or incitement to hatred, as well as the necessity of banning 
negationist theories to fight against racism and anti-Semitism, thereby implicitly espousing the 
argument that – at least with regard to the Holocaust - every form of negationism is hate 
speech. 
The separate opinions to that decision challenged the state’s freedom to impose general 
restrictions to the historical debate more, and reinforced the position that memory laws are 
generally incompatible with the FoE regime expressed by Article 19. Four members of the 
Committee, in particular, stressed the duty of states to protect “bona fide historical research 
against restriction, even when it challenges accepted historical truths”, and incidentally 
suggested that legislative measures that try “to turn historical truths and experiences into 
legislative dogma that may not be challenged” would hardly meet the validity test to allow 
restriction to freedom of expression.
702
 Whilst the subsequent developments in the HRC 
practice that we discussed above have favoured a restrictive approach to memory laws,
703
 this 
decision in a way confirms the tendency that we have already found at the national level to 
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consider Holocaust denial cases as cases of hate speech tout court, in which revisionist 
theories cannot seek protection under FoE provisions. 
3.3.2 European Court of Human Rights’ case law 
Besides the indications provided by the HRC in Faurisson, the European Court and 
Commission’s case law enriches the jurisprudence on negationism. As we have seen in the 
previous section, the Court has been keen to protect freedom as the guiding principle of 
historical research and historical debate.
704
 The Court has constantly restated that it is not its 
role to adjudicate on historical debates, and has consistently valued the open discussion on the 
past as an essential condition of democracy, especially for those countries riven by a ‘dark 
past’. Nevertheless, the especially heavy heritage of the Holocaust that weighs on the 
shoulders of European countries has caused the Court – and before it the Commission – to face 
the idea that certain historical narratives need to be protected against falsifications and 
manipulations. Since the beginning, therefore, the European human rights bodies have been 
concerned with condemning negationist theories, in particular with regard to those related to 
Holocaust denial. In fact, the European Commission of Human Rights already condemned 
revisionist or negationist theories of the Holocaust as contrary to the fundamental principles 
and values of the European Convention, and warned against the negationists’ attempts to 
shield their hatred views with the protection of freedom of expression. 
However, the legal reasoning used by the European adjudicatory bodies has not always 
been coherent, and two different legal avenues can be identified in the jurisprudence of the 
Council of Europe’s bodies in regulating issues of historical negationisms.
705
 On the one hand, 
using a ‘softer’ approach, restrictions to expressions that aimed at denying or manipulating 
historical facts are scrutinized under Article 10 of the Convention. On the other hand, showing 
a more radical stance, these expressions are removed tout court from the protection of Article 
10 under certain conditions, through the application of Article 17. 
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The former approach was first adopted and followed by the Commission, which 
between 1982 and 1996 decided a number of cases concerning Holocaust denial.
706
 Applying 
Article 10 to decide these cases, the Commission, consistently considered restrictions imposed 
by national authorities to expressions aimed at denying or questioning the existence or the 
circumstances of the Holocaust interferences with the individuals’ freedom of expression. 
However, applying the three-tier test, it constantly judged these interferences lawful, as 
responding to some legitimate social interests, which proved “necessary in a democratic 
society”.
707
 In these cases, Article 17 was used by the Commission as an interpretative 
instrument to the limits to FoE.
708
 
The latter avenue was developed more recently by the Court, as a result of the 
increasing number of Holocaust denial cases that it was called to adjudicate. In this radical 
jurisprudential turn,
709
 the Court suggests that Holocaust denial, running counter to the 
fundamental values of the Convention, constitutes an abuse of rights, and as such it cannot 
rely on any protection within the European system of human rights protection. Therefore, it 
applies Article 17 to dismiss as manifestly ill-founded all claims against restrictions imposed 
to these expressions by national authorities. 
Article 17 introduces an inner safeguard into the Convention by prohibiting the abuse 
of rights. 
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group 
or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their 
limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention. 
Oetheimer explains Article 17 by saying that it aims at “withdrawing from those who 
wish to use the Convention’s guarantees the benefit of those rights because their aim is to 
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challenge the values that the Convention is protecting”.
710
 Notably, the travaux préparatoires 
reveal that the main motivation behind this provision was the objective to prevent 
totalitarianisms from using the Convention to shield their actions.
711
 Introducing this provision 
to an audience of judicial trainers of human rights in Strasbourg, Françoise Tulkens, former 
judge and vice-president of the ECtHR, recalls Saint-Just words, “No freedom for the enemies 
of freedom”, and quotes J. Rawls in that “justice does not require that men must stand idly by 
while others destroy the basis of their existence”.
712
 Article 17 is therefore the ultimate 
safeguard for the values protected by the European Convention of Human Rights. 
The two approaches to the phenomenon of negationism are dramatically different. 
Indeed, the application of Article 10 obliges the judge to make an evaluation of content, 
context, and aims of the restricted expressions in order to assess the legitimacy of the 
interference. In this way, negationist theories are assessed on the basis of the effective harm 
they may cause to public order and individuals’ rights, also in consideration of the means 
through which they are uttered and disseminated, and of their impact on the society. This 
approach therefore imposes a case by case method, which requires a careful evaluation of, and 
a balancing exercise between, the different interests at stake in the specific situation. 
Conversely, when Article 17 is directly applied in relation to Article 10, it categorically 
excludes the possibility of accommodating certain expressions under the protective scope of 
freedom of expression (guillotine effect).
713
 As a consequence, neither evaluation of the 
context nor balancing of values is to be carried by the judge, thusly, restrictions to these 
expressions are always admissible. 
                                                 
710
 Oetheimer, M., “La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme face au discours de haine”, quoted in 
Tulkens, F., “When to say is to do. Freedom of expression and hate speech in the case-law of the European Court 
of Human Rights”. Expert Seminar on Human Rights for European Judicial Trainers. 3 September 2013, 3. 
711
 Travaux préparatoires on art 17 ECHR (DH (57)4) (1949, 18t session, pp. 1235, 1237, and 1239): 
”I1s 'agit d'empecher que les courants totalitaires puissent exploiter en leur faveur les principes posés par la 
Convention, c'est-á-dire invoquer les droits de liberté pour supprimer les Droits de l'Homme.” In Yearbook of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, European Commission of Human Rights, Documents and Decisions 
(1955-1956-1957), (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: 1959), at 224. On the origin and rationale of the abuse clause, 
see Cannie, H. and Voorhoof, D. “The Abuse Clause and Freedom of Expression in the European Human Rights 
Convention”. 
712
 Tulkens, “When to say is to do”, 3. 
713
 See Cannie,. and Voorhoof, “The Abuse Clause and Freedom of Expression in the European Human 
Rights Convention”, 58. 
234 
In the context of Holocaust denial, the Court first developed this latter approach in 
Lehideux and Isorni v. France.
714
 The case concerned the conviction of two French citizens 
who had placed an advertisement in the newspaper Le Monde, in which they presented 
Philippe Pétain (Chief of State of Vichy between 1940 and 1944, who had been sentenced to 
death and convicted “for collusion with Germany with a view to furthering the designs of the 
enemy”) as a positive public figure in French history, seeking to rehabilitate his image. The 
applicants were convicted by the Paris Court of Appeal for “public defence of war crimes or 
the crimes of collaboration”. Before the Court, the Government justified the conviction 
arguing that the publication did not contribute to a public debate of a historical nature, and 
contesting the lack of objectivity and seriousness of the historical research reported in the 
script. The Court did not respond to the issue about the quality and the requirements of the 
authentic historical research, but it introduced the category of “clearly established historical 
facts – such as the Holocaust” in the reasoning, maintaining that every denial or revision 
thereof is removed from the protection of Article 10 by Article 17.
715
 Through this obiter 
dictum, the Court audaciously refuses Holocaust deniers the employment of the protection of 
freedom of expression in order to shield their theories. However, in Lehideux, the Court 
excluded the facts of the case from that category, since it found that the applicants’ publication 
had not attempted to deny or revise Nazi crimes. Consequently, it assessed the imposed 
sanctions through the ordinary test of legitimacy, lawfulness and necessity prescribed by 
Article 10(2). 
It was in Garaudy that the Court first applied the Article 17 guillotine to declare 
inadmissible the complaint lodged by a French citizen, who, by virtue of the above mentioned 
Gayssot Act,
716
 had been convicted of denying crimes against humanity in his book, The 
Founding Myths of Israeli Politics. In the book, the author challenged a number of historical 
findings related to WWII, in particular questioning the occurrence, extent, and gravity of the 
persecution of Jews, and the “final solution” carried out by the Nazi regime, on different 
points. Quite drastically, the Court refused to qualify the applicant’s work as ‘historical 
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research’, and found that he could not invoke the protection of Article 10 to deny the reality of 
clearly established historical facts, such as the Holocaust.
717
 Such a denial, in view of the 
Court, is evidently not motivated by a genuine quest for truth. On account of its real purpose 
being “to rehabilitate the National-Socialist regime and, as a consequence, accuse the victims 
themselves of falsifying history”, it falls outside the scope of historical research - which is 
instead protected by freedom of expression. On these grounds, the Court observes that such a 
form of denial is a type – one of the most alarming ones – of racism and racial defamation. As 
such, this kind of utterance is incompatible with the Convention’s core values and principles. 
[I]l ne fait aucun doute que contester la réalité de faits historiques clairement 
établis, tels que l'Holocauste, comme le fait le requérant dans son ouvrage, ne 
relève en aucune manière d'un travail de recherche historique s'apparentant à 
une quête de la vérité. L'objectif et l'aboutissement d'une telle démarche sont 
totalement différents, car il s'agit en fait de réhabiliter le régime national-
socialiste, et, par voie de conséquence, d'accuser de falsification de l'histoire les 
victimes elles-mêmes. Ainsi, la contestation de crimes contre l'humanité 
apparaît comme l'une des formes les plus aiguës de diffamation raciale envers 
les Juifs et d'incitation à la haine à leur égard. La négation ou la révision de faits 
historiques de ce type remettent en cause les valeurs qui fondent la lutte contre 
le racisme et l'antisémitisme et sont de nature à troubler gravement l'ordre 
public. Portant atteinte aux droits d'autrui, de tels actes sont incompatibles avec 
la démocratie et les droits de l'homme et leurs auteurs visent incontestablement 
des objectifs du type de ceux prohibés par l'article 17 de la Convention. 
This is to say, in other words, that freedom of expression does not cover the freedom to 
express revisionist theories that question or misrepresent historical events which are generally 
regarded as clearly established by the international academic community.
718
 The anti-
discrimination doctrine and the victims’ right to honour and reputation provide the grounds for 
this exclusion. 
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This radical approach to revisionist speech can be criticized on a number of points.
719
 
First of all, it is questionable whether it is in line with the general approach of the Court which 
tends to interpret the scope of rights and freedom broadly, usually encouraging a case by case 
balancing exercise between competing rights. As has been noted, the exclusion of certain 
narratives from the freedom of speech protection allows governments a lot of room to 
manoeuvre in imposing content-based restrictions to forms of expressions,
720
 thereby fuelling 
the fear of legitimizing censorship. Secondly, and touching more on the core of the regulation 
of the historical debate, it is hard to reconcile this approach with the principles of freedom in 
the historical research that we discussed in the first part of this Chapter, and which the Court 
has consistently confirmed in parallel to the ‘clearly-established-facts-doctrine’ in cases other 
than Holocaust denial.
721
 Finally, the category of the so-called ‘clearly established historical 
facts’ proves problematic in that it does not offer any criteria to distinguish among different 
historical debates. It does not clarify which narratives can be considered uncontrovertibly 
established in history and should be protected against denial and revisionisms ipso jure 
(through the application of the abuse clause), and which ones are instead still subject to the 
ongoing debate typical of historical research that is protected from illegitimate interferences 
by Article 10. What are, in other words, the criteria to consider an historical event “clearly 
established”? Who is to establish when an historical debate has led to the establishment of an 
historical truth? The Court’s case law provides little clarification. It limits itself to reiterating 
that the Holocaust is an example of clearly established historical facts, the denial of which 
would justify the application of Article 17.
722
 While, on the one hand, this allows one to argue 
that there are other historical facts that can be included within this category, on the other hand, 
the Court failed to mention any.
723
 The ultimate result of this approach is that the Court 
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applies the ‘guillotine clause’ only to Holocaust deniers, thereby de facto creating double 
standards for different categories of historical injustices. 
Indeed, in cases related to denials of historical events other than the Holocaust, the 
Court refused to apply Article 17, and instead scrutinized the restrictions imposed to the 
negationist expressions through the lens of Article 10. This was the case in Perinçek v. 
Switzerland, which I discussed above as a point in case for freedom of historical research.
724
 
As the reader will remember, that was a case involving a conviction for denial of the 
Armenian genocide (rectius: denial of the legal qualification of the Armenian massacre as 
genocide), in which the Court found a violation of the applicant’s freedom of expression on 
the basis of Article 10. The Court neatly distanced this case from the previous decisions on 
Holocaust denial, and carried out a concrete evaluation of the kind of utterance under scrutiny, 
and its potential harmful nature. The Court stressed the following differences with Holocaust 
denial cases in particular. Firstly, the facts of this case were not in respect of the denial of 
historical events, but rather the denial of their legal qualification; secondly, Nazi crimes had 
been judged on a specific legal basis, i.e. Article 6 of the Nuremberg Tribunal Statute (unlike, 
implicitly, the crimes committed against Armenian people); finally, Nazi crimes had been 
clearly established by an international court.
725
 In addition, as mentioned above, the Court 
found that Holocaust denial cases further diverged from expressions that deny the qualification 
of the Armenian massacre as genocide in their aim, since the former intrinsically convey and 
promote anti-Semitic messages, which can be regarded as a form of incitement to hatred and 
violence, whilst the latter do not.
726 
 
With this reasoning, the Court does two things. On the one hand, it seems to refer to 
legal instruments (either legal texts, such as the Nuremberg Tribunal Statute, or judicial 
organs, such as an international court) to establish when a historical debate can be considered 
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closed, and, therefore, when a historical facts can be considered ‘clearly established’. On the 
other hand, from hate speech law, it borrows the teleological purpose of incitement to hatred 
and violence and the intrinsic potentiality of the conduct to cause harm to restrict the 
application of Article 17 in cases of denial of serious crimes, other than the Holocaust. Whilst 
the first argument seems worrisome, especially in the light of the protection of the 
independence of historians and historical research,
727
 and the boundaries between historical 
and judicial truths, the second argument, as noted above, seems to narrow down the cases in 
which historical debate – even in the case of negationist theories - can be restricted.
728
 It seems 
to say, in other words, that the ultimate rationale to allow states to restrict historical debate is 
the repression of hate speech. 
While the jurisprudential approach in Perinçek seems to be welcomed for its casuistic 
approach when assessing restrictions to the free discussion of history, it has still to be verified 
whether this latest development in the Court’s case law on negationism will also apply to 
Holocaust denial cases, or whether the Court will decide to keep the exceptional approach it 
has adopted so far for those cases. 
3.3.2.1 Overcoming double-standards. Different interpretative avenues? 
It has been suggested that a different perspective may be taken to reconcile the double-
standard approach used by the Court in adjudicating cases of negationsisms. The victims’ right 
to honour and reputation, in this sense, has been indicated as a possible interpretative avenue 
to justify restrictions to denial speech in cases of gross human rights violations.
729
 The 
reasoning would entail, as mentioned above, that negationisms constitute an offence to 
victims’ memory, and cause additional suffering to their honour. This argument is certainly an 
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interesting lens through which the issue of historical denial can be approached. Besides its 
substantial value in the recognition of victims’ rights, this argument would also have the 
advantage of avoiding resorting to the non-discrimination doctrine to justify restrictions. 
Thereby, it would bridge the gap in the Court’s reasoning between denials intrinsically 
enshrining racist manifestations (i.e. Holocaust denial, excluded from the protection of Article 
10 by Article 17) and those whose racist or discriminatory nature has to be ascertained and 
assessed in concreto through the lens of Article 10. This would allow it to use the same line of 
reasoning with regard to the denial of every case of serious and severe human rights abuses 
that happened in the past. Furthermore, this would put the protection of human dignity at the 
centre of the evaluation process for defining the outer limits of individual freedoms. 
Indeed, the protection of the victims’ right to honour and reputation, which constitutes 
a legitimate justification for restricting freedom of expression in the main human rights 
instruments,
730
 has been taken into account both at the national and supranational level. 
Besides the practice at the domestic level, the right to honour has been also used as a limiting 
ground to freedom in the historical debate by the Strasburg Court in a number of decisions.
731
 
Nonetheless, in spite of the advantages to this argument, some doubts may be cast on the 
capability and feasibility of it overcoming the ambiguity as to the different approaches used to 
outlaw negationisms in the Court’s jurisprudence. 
First of all, from a theoretical point of view, it does not seem that this approach will 
bring any reconciliation between – or clarification of – the category of the “well established 
historical facts” and that of matters on which “historical debate is still going on”, which 
constitute a major area on which the Court maintains a wide margin of discretion. Second, 
from a positivist viewpoint, it does not appear that the Court is willing to use this ground as 
the guiding principle of the balancing exercise it has to apply in cases of discussions of public 
interest, such as historical debates. While it has always expressed the greatest respect for the 
victims’ right to honour and reputation, in practice, the Court has struck the balance between 
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the latter and freedom of expression in alternating ways. In cases involving debates on 
historical events amounting to serious human rights violations (other than the Holocaust), the 
balance was mostly tipped in favour of the interest of society in discussing its own history,
732
 
also in consideration of the effects of the passage of the time,
733
 whereas in Holocaust denial 
cases, the balance was reversed.
734
 Admittedly, on more than an occasion, the Court has 
suggested that the denial or trivialization of serious human rights violations would constitute 
an inadmissible offence to victims’ dignity.
735
 Yet, in none of the cases - other than the 
Holocaust denial ones -, the Court has upheld a restriction to historical debate on this ground. 
The equality argument, for all that it would need to be refined by the Court, therefore seems 
the preferred avenue of interpretation so far.
736
 Nonetheless, future developments in the 
Court’s jurisprudence may position victims’ suffering better as a threshold for assessing 
historical debate. 
Concluding remarks  
This Chapter has discussed the legal framework that international law provides for the 
discussion on history, mainly on the legal basis of freedom of expression. In particular, the 
Chapter has raised the questions of whether – and to what extent -, according to the existing 
zhuman rights framework, states may impose restrictions to the historical debate, and whether, 
under certain circumstances, they have an obligation to do so. The results of this analysis 
provide additional elements for sketching the contours of the state duty of memory in that they 
point out the impact of human rights law, through freedom of expression provisions and their 
practical implementation, on the public discussion of the past. 
From the previous analysis, it can be derived that the fundamental principle governing 
the historical debate is freedom. Public discussion on past events that constitute the historical 
heritage of a society is protected both at the individual level – as a form of expression of 
individual freedom – and at the collective one – as a form of protection of the public interest in 
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debating matters that are relevant for the democratic life of a society. Moreover, such a 
discussion is promoted and favoured as a means to foster the democratic transition of countries 
emerging from authoritarian regimes or systematic violence, and strengthen the values of 
pluralism, tolerance, and respect in established democracies. Plurality of researches, studies, 
and theories in investigating the past is considered a contribution to the struggle for historical 
truth, and is thus protected and promoted. This principle seems further supported by the other 
legal grounds in the field of cultural rights, which have been suggested in order for future 
research to delineate the state duties with regard to the historical discussion. 
In this sense, it can be affirmed that states do have a duty to respect the free and open 
discussion on historical matters, especially when such a debate involves the discussion of 
historical events that are particularly meaningful for the society, such as mass state-sponsored 
crimes committed in the past. International bodies have rejected the legitimacy of general 
restrictions – such as the so-called lois memorielles - imposed on historical debates by states. 
Even erroneous or incorrect opinions that participate in that debate, as well as shocking or 
disturbing ones, should be protected by freedom of expression. Although restrictions to the 
application of the general principles of freedom of expressions are admissible, their legitimacy 
has to be strictly scrutinized. In the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, 
historical debate is included among matters of public relevance, in which the margin of 
appreciation left to states is small. Through the restrictive interpretation of the criteria of 
legality, legitimacy, and – in particular – necessity, the Court has thus ultimately strengthened 
the protection of freedom of historical debate to the detriment of other competing values. 
In apparent contrast to these principles, the Chapter has also analysed the phenomenon 
of the prohibition of ‘negationisims’, i.e. the practice of banning expressions that aim at 
denying or questioning the history of international crimes committed in the past. This 
phenomenon has provided the grounds to examine and assess the second question, namely the 
existence of a state duty to punish historical denialisms – the duty to protect history. The 
question is particularly thorny, and involves not only legal issues, but also, and especially, 
moral and political considerations. Although acknowledging the moral and political hurdles 
intrinsic to this discussion, the chapter has mainly focused on its legal assessment. 
The rationales underlying the prohibition of negationisms are various and diverse, but 
they mainly revolve around two main arguments: the victims’ right to honour and reputation, 
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and the anti-discrimination rationale. Negationist speech, in fact, has been deemed an insult to 
the victims’ dignity and honour, and an insult to their memory. At the same time, however, the 
fight against racism and discrimination has provided the main justification for imposing 
restrictions on revisionist speech. The underpinning argument to this latter rationale is that 
these utterances pose a threat to public order and security, since they intrinsically embody 
some forms of incitement to racially motivated hatred and violence. As such, they must be 
repressed. 
The need to protect these values, also in the light of the historical experiences of each 
country, has made some states and international bodies adopt instruments for restricting forms 
of negationisms. The analysis of the state practice has revealed a kaleidoscopic landscape. 
While not all the states have decided to criminalize historical denial, most of them have either 
introduced specific norms to outlaw the dissemination of negationist views in the society, or 
have used hate speech law arguments to restrict their utterance in courts. The European 
scenario has proven particularly fruitful for analysing the subject. The delicate balancing 
exercise in assessing historical denials has fuelled a heated debate among national 
constitutional courts about the admissibility of anti-denial laws. At the supranational level, 
while the ECtHR has never explicitly taken a position on the legitimacy of memory laws in 
general, it has taken a radical approach when assessing cases related to Holocaust denial, 
excluding this kind of expressions from the protection of Article 10 tout court. Furthermore, 
the recent EU FD has significantly imposed on EU Member States the legal obligation to 
introduce into their national legal systems the criminal repression of historical denial of all 
international crimes, although allowing for some limitations to the scope of this obligation. 
How can these trends be reconciled with the principle of freedom in historical debate 
and with the state duty to respect it? It seems that the non-discrimination doctrine can assist in 
this sense. By justifying only the repression of those expressions that concretely constitute an 
incitement to hatred and violence, which pose a real threat to public order or cause damage to 
other people’s rights, the application of the hate speech regime to the discussion on history 
entails that mere content-based restrictions to the historical debate should be considered 
unacceptable and freedom is preserved as the rule governing that debate. In this interpretation, 
the state duty to protect history against manipulations and falsifications exists only with regard 
to views that purport malicious intents, or which constitute a form of advocacy for hate and 
violence. These views, it can be argued, cannot be even considered scientific opinions. Those 
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who maliciously fabricate historical narratives with racist and hatred intent cannot be admitted 
within the circle of bona fide historians. This view is in line with the approach adopted by both 
the ECtHR
737
 and the HRC
738
 which accords protection only to bona fide historical research, 
depriving malicious revisions of the history of mass atrocity of the banner of history. Although 
this approach admittedly causes the rise of the problem of identifying what the criteria of the 
historical research are, and, in particular, the question of whether courts are the appropriate 
fora to discuss them, it seems to reconcile the two trends at the international level. On the one 
hand, it forces national parliaments to refrain from adopting broad and generalized restrictions 
to the historical debate, and requires courts to apply an accurate case by case balancing 
exercise to assess the concrete threat and harm caused by the negationist statements. On the 
other hand, it expulses racist and discriminatory argumentations from the realm of historical 
debate, therefore allowing for their repression by states. 
While this reconstruction seems consistent with the general trends at the international 
level, the special regime to which Holocaust denial cases have been submitted should be 
noted,. On the grounds that Holocaust denial intrinsically entails an anti-Semitism ideology, 
the concrete assessment of a real harm or threat that the utterance may cause is hardly required 
for admitting restrictions in these cases. Opinions about the legitimacy of this separate regime 
diverge. Professor Pech argues that the justification for the different treatment reserved for the 
memory of the atrocities suffered by Jewish people in WWII is to be found more in moral and 
historical grounds that in legal arguments. While this explanation is certainly 
understandable,
739
 it is doubtful whether human rights systems should still pay this 
exceptionalism tribute to the legacy of the past. The application of the same criteria of 
evaluation, while not diminishing the importance and respect which we all are to pay to the 
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memory of that past, seems more in line with the principles of equality and non-
discrimination. Indeed, the casuistic approach required by the balancing exercise enshrined in 
the FoE provisions seems to allow enough flexibility, but more equality, to deal with these 






1. Overview of this Research 
This study has examined the role of international law in shaping the memory of past 
atrocities. It queried whether and to what extent a duty of memory, defined as the set of states’ 
behaviours that are compelled by international norms and that influence the dynamics of 
memory-making processes, is emerging in the current regime of international law. The 
investigation has focused on the interactions between international law and practice and 
memory processes in the aftermath of gross human rights violations. The hypothesis of the 
research was that international law imposes certain duties and obligations on states that – 
directly or indirectly - influence the ways that narratives of mass crimes are told and 
represented within the affected societies, and ultimately transmitted to future generations. 
The aim of the study was to identify the states’ behaviours which result from 
international obligations that impact on the construction and circulation of memories in order 
to recognize their legal foundations and to outline their scope through the interpretation of 
international legal instruments and the practice of national and international judicial and quasi-
judicial bodies. While holding to a positivist analysis of the existing legal regime of 
international norms and the observation of the practice, this research has adopted a critical 
approach to the subject by pointing out the shortcomings of the ways these duties have been 
framed in the law and interpreted in the practice. 
The analysis ultimately led to the creation of a map – a puzzle – of the duty of memory 
in which the compelled states’ behaviours are the constitutive pieces. This study identified five 
main duties which states bear in the aftermath of mass atrocities that are relevant for the 
creation and representation of images of past traumas. The duty to ascertain facts that 
amounted to gross violations of human rights through official investigations; the duty to make 
the resulting narratives and all the other relevant information publicly available, and to allow 
them to circulate within the society; the duty to collect historical records of the abuses, and 
create human rights archives to preserve those documents from the passage of time; the duty 
to commemorate the occurred violations; and, finally, the duty to respect and promote the 
plurality of voices in the public debate about the history of those events, while protecting the 
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memory of ascertained narratives against malicious revisionisms and negationisms. While not 
being definitive, as more duties can certainly be found and encompassed in the puzzle to 
enrich it, the duty-to-memory-puzzle presented in this thesis – in fieri as a ‘Lego’, which 
offers the possibility of inserting new building blocks to expand the construction – suggests a 
framework to construct a legal theory – I dare to venture – of a broader obligation to memory. 
Before drawing general conclusions about the nature and relevance of this duty, it is 
useful to recall the main findings about each of the different components. I will present them 
along a timeline of memory. 
2. The Duty of Memory as a Pendulum: Back and Forth throughout Past, 
Present, and Future – The Components of the duty of memory 
Borrowing Booth’s metaphor, the duty of memory, in the five components analysed in 
this thesis, works like a pendulum,
740
 which moves back and forth throughout the categories of 
time: past, present, and future. It can be seen as an organizing category of distinct legal norms 
that, throughout the temporal dimensions, influence how history is interpreted and the past is 
represented, and therefore impacts on the ways individual and collective memories are shaped. 
It is a lens through which we can observe the development of memories of past atrocities 
within the legal framework. In so doing, the duty of memory takes shape in the form of 
different legal items, moving from the field of primary rights to secondary norms of 
responsibility. The five components analysed in this study can be therefore organized 
according to the temporal phases of memory-construction they touch upon. 
2.1 The Past – The Duty to Ascertain the Truth 
First of all, the duty of memory digs into the past, influencing the phase of recollection: 
the creation of narratives. It requires states to delve into the history of the abuses, and to 
construct a narrative about them. It does so on the legal basis of the obligation to investigate 
under human rights law, which informs the scope and modalities of this first component. In 
this first conceptualization, the duty of memory firstly imposes an obligation on states to face 
their past tout court. The clarification of the historical facts amounting to serious crimes is an 
obligation under human rights law, and excludes the choice for states to turn the page of past 
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violence, imposing silence and oblivion. This clearly entails a first major constraint on the way 
states may decide to deal with the trauma of past violence. 
International and regional judicial and quasi-judicial bodies have developed criteria to 
comply with this obligation in practice. Practice suggests that states must carry out 
comprehensive and thorough investigations in order to discharge their obligation to 
investigate. Moreover, in cases of the most serious human rights violations, criminal 
proceedings are indicated as the primary means to ascertain facts and responsibilities, although 
alternative mechanisms of truth seeking may be added. 
The combination of these two criteria, together with the element of publicity which is 
required for investigation to be adequate, leave an important imprint on the resulting narrative 
that recounts the violations. This narrative will be filtered through the lens of criminal law – 
through its rules of procedure and mechanisms –, told by a criminal court, and officially 
sanctioned as ‘truth’ – although a judicial one. The judicial records produced by the criminal 
trial concurrently create historical records that will form the basis for the construction of the 
collective memory within the society. Although admittedly this judicially constructed 
narrative may be only one of the different voices that concur in representing images of the past 
within the society, especially in transitional justice contexts, the seal of law endows it with 
special authority, which may impair the interplay between narratives in the process of 
memories-negotiation. 
It is true that human rights bodies have welcomed the adoption of alternative truth 
seeking mechanisms, besides the criminal avenue. These mechanisms – the most common 
being truth and reconciliation commissions - undoubtedly greatly contribute to expanding the 
scope of investigation to the broader historical context in which the violations took place, 
overcoming the limits of criminal proceedings. Nevertheless, the analysis has shown that, 
whilst with regard to the latter a proper legal obligation is generally established, at least for the 
most serious crimes, the creation of non-judicial mechanisms is left to the political decision of 
governments. From this, it can be concluded that the current regime of human rights law, 
considered from the legal ground of the obligation to investigate, expects states to review and 
interpret the past through the lens of judicial proceedings, but not necessary through other - 
perhaps more appropriate - means of historical research. The risk is to designate courts as the 
main party responsible for writing the history of violence and disseminating its accounts. This, 
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in turn, may diminish the role of other agents – such as professional historians – in the 
endeavour of truth seeking. 
2.2 The Present – The Duty to Disclose 
If the duty of memory first asks states to look back at their past, in order to clarify 
historical facts that amount to gross human rights violations, and eventually to create a 
narrative about them through the lens of judicial mechanisms of accountability, it 
subsequently acts in the present by regulating the circulation of knowledge about the past 
within the society. The management of information related to widespread patterns of state-
sponsored violence is crucial for the social processes of reading and interpreting the past. By 
regulating which information should be made public, and who is entitled to access it, 
international law influences the representation of narratives about the past and their flow 
within the society. In this sense, the specific standards and principles developed by 
international bodies through the interpretation of the provisions regulating the right to access 
to information in cases of serious human rights violations provide a legal framework for the 
production and distribution of narratives. 
Although not yet clearly established as a binding obligation under general international 
law, the state duty to disclose information and documents of public interest is progressively 
emerging in the regional human rights systems, at different levels. The principles of maximum 
disclosure and public interest override, which inform the legal regime of public information in 
cases of serious human rights abuses, restrict the state’s control over the interpretations and 
representations of the past, and, in principle, discourage state policies directed at keeping 
secret information about patterns of state-sponsored violence. 
This process of ‘democratization of truth seeking’,
741
 which allows individuals to 
access information of public relevance, extends its effects to the processes of memory-making. 
In exactly the same way in which monopolies distorts the market, classification policies on 
materials related to periods of systematic and serious human rights violations distort the social 
processes of memory-elaboration and production. The progressive affirmation of a duty to 
disclose increasingly pushes states to adopt policies that create open access to historical 
documents for the public. In the conceptualization of the right to access to information, the 
duty of memory thusly facilitates and protects the creation of a pluralistic network of 
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individual and collective narratives that emerge and circulate in the society. If citizens have 
the right to access information about periods of systematic and serious human rights 
violations, they can feed memories with original sources and contribute to enriching the social 
dialogue among narratives. In this sense, the duty of memory – stemming from a primary right 
– deprives states of the monopoly over historical records, and restitutes the ownership over the 
interpretation of the past and negotiations of narratives to the society by democratizing access 
to documentary sources. 
2.3 The Future – The Duty to Preserve 
Construction of, and access to knowledge about the past are the first two steps in which 
international and human rights law provisions interfere with the memory-making processes, in 
the two conceptualizations of the state obligation to investigate and the public right to access 
information. These two underpinnings respectively regulate the production and circulation of 
information about past human rights abuses, and they consequently ultimately impact on the 
interpretation and recollection of that history. While the first and second components look at 
the past and work in the present, respectively, requiring states to carry out an in-depth 
assessment of the facts and regulating the legal regime of circulation of information that 
documents serious violations of human rights within the society, the third component 
examined in the present study turns to the future by requiring states to preserve that 
information from the passage of time. This was defined as the state duty to collect and 
preserve documents and records related to past violations. In the revised UN Set of Principles 
for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity, this 
duty was significantly referred to as “the duty to preserve memory”.
742
 
Admittedly, in this third conceptualization, the duty of memory is more a set of guiding 
principles and good practice on record management than a binding norm. Nonetheless, the 
research has shown how these principles and guidelines are progressively entering into human 
rights documents and conceived as instruments of human rights protection. In the aftermath of 
mass violence, under the conceptualization of the right to know – in both its individual and 
collective dimension –, they guide states in collecting and maintaining documentary sources 
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that enable individuals and society to read the past and they eventually allow the transmission 
of this knowledge to future generations. In practice, this has finally resulted in regulating the 
creation and management of human rights archives that document the periods of violence. 
If archives are sacred spaces of memory – as this study has argued -, their regulation 
affects the protection of memory and its transmission throughout time. By indicating criteria to 
collect and preserve records about human rights abuses, these principles potentially restrict the 
margin of discretion of states in managing the knowledge about the past once more. If this 
emerging trend reached the status of binding norm, governments could no longer decide to 
order the destruction of historical records of past abuses, as their retention would be a duty 
toward the victims and the society. Moreover, the preservation of sources that document 
patterns of mass and systematic human rights abuses further serves the interest of the whole 
international community by preventing the repetition of those events. In this sense, the duty to 
preserve crosses the borders of secondary obligations, and works as a mementum to future 
generations. 
So far, the duty to preserve only goes as far as to require states to implement 
appropriate legal and administrative frameworks to support the creation and functioning of 
human rights archives, and to allocate adequate resources to enable them to work effectively. 
The concrete criteria to select and manage documents are therefore ultimately left up to the 
discretion of professional categories of archivists. This is certainly a welcome approach. 
Indeed, the overregulation of archives’s management through legal provisions at the 
international level may deprive the society of the ownership over the local processes of 
interpreting and negotiating the past, of which archives are an essential component. 
Nonetheless, the indication of minimum standards which states are to comply with in the 
management of documents seems an important safeguard for the free debate on history. 
2.4 Bridging Past, Present, and Future – The Duty to Commemorate 
Along the line between present and future, the duty of memory further takes the shape 
of the state duty to commemorate, i.e. to undertake and implement forms of commemoration 
related to periods of state violence. In this thesis, the duty to commemorate has been 
constructed within the realm of secondary obligations of state responsibility, as part of the 
obligation to provide reparations for violations of human rights norms. In this 
conceptualization, the duty of memory is at the same time a backward-looking measure, in that 
it aims at providing symbolic redress to victims’ suffering, and a forward-looking instrument, 
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in that it provides assurances of non-repetition to both the society and the international 
community. In this way, it creates a bridge between past traumas and future memories. 
This thesis has pointed out the emerging trend of including commemorative measures 
in the remedial schemes that states are required to adopt in the aftermath of gross human rights 
violations. This trend was widely supported by the practice of human rights bodies 
investigated by the study, in particular by the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court and 
Commission of Human Rights. It finds further support at the international level in the Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the victims’ right to reparation, which explicitly include 
memorialization as a form of satisfaction. 
It was argued in this thesis that the inclusion of memory-related measures in the 
general framework of reparations for massive and systematic patterns of human rights 
violations contributes to an in-depth reconsideration of the role of reparations in these 
situations. Commemorative measures, which embody the presence of the past in the present, 
detach the meaning of reparations from closure with the past – in the classical international 
law approach of wiping out all the consequence of the violence –, and suggest a healing 
dialogue to overcome the trauma between past, present, and future instead. In so doing, 
memory departs from the individual dimension of satisfaction and becomes a vehicle for 
promoting a collective awareness of the past, claiming that only the public recognition of the 
past and the preservation of its remembrance may allow for the non-repetition of the same 
atrocities: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it”.
743
 The 
individual dimension of commemoration as a means for healing therefore embeds the 
collective dimension of the state obligation to provide guarantees of non-repetition in the duty 
to commemorate as well. 
Yet, the construction of memory-related measures as the object of the state obligation 
to provide for reparations is problematic, both in its individual and collective dimension. 
Depicting commemoration measures as individual instruments of satisfaction for victims 
submits them to the criteria of adequacy and proportionality that human rights law expects 
states to meet when implementing reparations. This means that, for commemorations to be 
                                                 
743
 Santayana, G., “Reason in Common Sense”, in The birth of reason & other essays, ed Cory, D. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1995). 
252 
considered adequate form of reparations, they have to acknowledge and tell victims’ narrative, 
sanctioning their memories through the official recognition of the state. If this entails a 
welcoming involvement of victims in the processes of defining and drawing reparations, at the 
same time, these measures may exacerbate battles of memories by impairing the complex 
dialogue among the different narratives that compete in the public fora. Indeed, just like in the 
case of judicially-constructed accounts of the past, commemorative remedial orders may 
create different degrees of legitimacy among narratives by granting individual memories the 
sanction of law. 
Through the observation of the legal practice, this research has further pointed toward 
another shortcoming of enacting commemoration in the form of remedial orders. Indeed, 
doubts arise as to whether courts should be the competent fora in which to negotiate 
memories, and whether judicial decisions should be the appropriate vehicles for conveying 
individual memories (or groups’ memories) into the broader collective narrative. This is 
especially problematic in cases in which the remedial orders to commemorate come from 
supranational organs – as in the case of the IACtHR -, and when adjudicatory bodies are called 
to assess the adequacy of these measures. The Peruvian case analysed in the relevant section 
provided an example of these hurdles, and eventually suggested a careful evaluation of the 
possibility of holding, and modalities of implementing, a duty to commemorate. 
2.5 Discussing the Past in the Present - The Duty to Respect and Protect  
Memory and history strongly intertwine, and restrictions imposed on the latter 
necessarily reflect in the first. On this basis, the thesis has explored the role of human rights 
law and practice in regulating the discussion about the past. This analysis showed that states 
firstly bear the responsibility to ensure and protect the free and open discussion about 
historical matters of public relevance, such as the discussion about historical periods which 
were marked by patterns of systematic human rights violations. Freedom was recognized as 
the guiding principle which should inform historical debate, both as the expression of the 
individual scientific and academic freedom of historians and as a form of protection for the 
collective interest in participating to, and being informed about matters of public relevance, 
which constitutes a central component of the democratic life of a society. In this way, the duty 
to respect freedom in historical debate was constructed as a safeguard for ensuring plurality of 
voices in the public discussion of the past. 
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By expecting states to ensure and protect the circulation of different narratives and 
interpretations of historical events that are particularly meaningful for the identity of a society, 
the international legal system of human rights protection rejects the imposition of official 
historical narratives and the crystallization of only one truth on the interpretation of the past. 
Through the analysis of the practice, the thesis has shown that international bodies deny 
legitimacy to general restrictions imposed by states on historical debates – as in the case of the 
so-called lois memorielles. They protect even erroneous, incorrect, radical, or disturbing 
interpretations that belong to that debate under the freedom of expression. In so doing, human 
rights bodies tend to promote the social process of memories-negotiation, ensuring the same 
degree of autonomy and freedom to speak in the public sphere to every memories-carrier. This 
duty was mainly widely supported by the European Court of Human Rights’ case law, and was 
further confirmed by soft law instruments and practice at the international level. 
But words matter. They may work as weapons against individual and collective rights 
and values, and cause great offence and suffering to victims’ dignity and honour. Hence, the 
imperative of freedom in discussing the past is to be reconciled with the same urgency to 
eradicate infamous distortions of the history of mass crimes from the public debate. This is an 
increasingly pressing need of modern societies, especially in the Internet era. Whilst in the 
past negationist messages were confined to restricted fora of discussion, and their utterance 
was easily attributable to a relatively limited number of easily-recognizable individuals who 
could access a wide range of media or publication systems, the development of the Internet 
has somehow ‘democratized’ negationism. The global network of information and social 
media today offers every individual the opportunity to masquerade as a professional historian, 
and spread whatever distorted interpretation of history worldwide. Everyone can become an 
unknown – and therefore hardly punishable – negationist. 
The thesis has tried to understand how these two opposite interests, the preservation of 
freedom in historical debate and the fight against distortion and manipulation of history, have 
been accommodated in the international practice. Through the analysis of the legal instruments 
that have been adopted at the international and national level, and the interpretation of the 
relevant human rights decisions adopted by supranational human rights bodies, this study has 
eventually indicated the anti-discrimination doctrine and equality as the grounds to delineate 
the outer limits of the historical debate. In this sense, the state duty to protect the history of 
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mass crimes against denial and mystifications is aimed at opposing the misuse of history in 
order to pursue discriminatory and racist acts. In this interpretation, revisions of history are 
allowed insofar as the arguments used to that purpose do not hide an incitement to hatred and 
violence, and do not constitute a real threat to public order or other people’s rights. A case by 
case evaluation of the circumstances is always required, and, consequently, mere content-
based restrictions to historical discussion are not admissible. This thesis, however, has 
addressed and critically discussed the ‘selective’ approach used by adjudicatory bodies - the 
ECtHR in particular - in Holocaust denial cases, which significantly diverges from the 
interpretation described so far.
744
 While this different approach is easily explicable from a 
historical perspective, its coherence with anti-discrimination arguments raises important 
concerns. Nevertheless, besides this exception, the discussion of the past in the present, within 
the outer limit of discrimination and racism, is generally preserved against illegitimate 
interference of governments. 
3. Nature and Content of the Duty of Memory 
There is no explicit recognition of a state obligation to memory in the texts of general 
human rights treaties. This thesis has inferred the scope and content of what has been called a 
‘duty of memory’ from the analysis of other existing obligations on states which arise from 
specific human rights norms. From this analysis, it can be inferred that there is not a state duty 
of memory under international law in the sense of a general duty to remember the past, tout 
court. Nonetheless, this study has demonstrated that, in the aftermath of mass crimes, several 
human rights provisions determine legal constraints on the way states decide to deal with their 
past, and eventually represent and remember it. This thesis, thus, has presented the duty-to-
memory-puzzle as the result of the interplay among the above-mentioned duties that influence 
the relation between a state and its history. This duty rests on different legal bases: the general 
state obligation to ensure and protect human rights, substantive human rights provisions, and 
the secondary obligations to provide reparations and guarantees of non-repetition. Overall, this 
interaction results in a duty for states to undertake positive and negative actions to allow and 
ensure that events of the past that constitute gross violations of human rights be recognized 
and remembered. Cumulatively, because of the way these underlying norms have been 
enshrined in international instruments, interpreted in more or less binding oversight bodies’ 
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decisions, and implemented in the state practice, a duty of memory – in the way that it was 
described in this thesis – seems to be emerging in the international law framework. 
The duty of memory, however, as presented in this study, is certainly not directly 
enforceable. As such, it does not give rise to individual or collective rights. It does not 
empower individuals to bring claims before human rights organs, and its breach, as such, 
cannot be invoked as a foundation for state responsibility either. It is instead a legal 
consequence of the implementation of existing rights and duties in the field of human rights 
law, the breach of which can ground state responsibility and legitimate claims from 
individuals. As an organizing category of distinct legal situations, its capacity to bind states 
therefore rests upon the degree of recognition and the binding force of the underlying legal 
rules. Hence, the legally binding nature of the state obligations to clarify and disclose 
information on gross human rights violations and to ensure freedom in historical debate can be 
affirmed, albeit with the caveat provided in the respective sections, whereas the state duties to 
commemorate as a form of reparation to victims and to create human rights archives cannot be 
considered international obligations yet. Nonetheless, they are both pointing to the 
establishment of good practice and standards in their respective fields. The first one 
furthermore can be considered an indication of consolidated regional state practice in the 
Inter-American context, which is further supported by the broad and consistent case law of the 
Inter-American institutions. 
Since it does not give rise to specific rights, the duty of memory does not directly 
create right-holders. Nonetheless, since the underpinning foundations have both an individual 
and a collective component, this double dimension is also reflected in the different duties 
which compose it. As was pointed out in the respective sections of this study, the duty to 
ascertain the facts expresses the individual dimension in the victims’ rights to know the truth 
and have access to an effective remedy, whereas the general obligation to ensure and protect 
human rights underlies the collective one. Similarly, the duty to disclose and the duty to 
collect and preserve information base their individual and collective component respectively 
on the individual right to access personal information and the general right of the public to 
have access to information of public relevance. The duty to commemorate is individual in the 
conceptualization of the victims’ right to obtain satisfaction and collective in its preventative 
construction. Finally, the duty to respect and protect projects the individual component in the 
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protection of individuals’ freedom of expression, and the collective one in the public right to 
discuss matter of general interest. This double dimension in turn is mirrored in the overall 
content of the duty of memory. There is, hence, both an individual and a societal component to 
the duty of memory. 
Finally, as regards the content, the way the duty of memory has been constructed and 
interpreted in practice seems to presuppose a clear equation between truth and memory. The 
memory of past atrocities, at least the one channelled through public institutions, has to be 
built upon the factual clarification of the abuses. The duty of memory requires states to allow 
societies to construct images of the past on the basis of full and truthful knowledge of the facts 
(production and disclosure of knowledge about the past). Subsequently, that full and truthful 
knowledge is to be preserved from the natural passage of time (through the construction and 
management of archives), from fading memories (through memorializations and 
commemorations), and from malicious mystifications (through the fight against negationisms). 
Yet, in line with the Millian understanding of thruth, the coexistence of, and dialogue among 
multiple interpretations of the past are protected from illegitimate interference (through the 
protection of freedom of historical debate). Whilst the content of the duty of memory 
admittedly to some extent overlaps with the content of the right to truth, it goes beyond that. 
Indeed, it requires not only that states investigate and disclose facts, make them public and 
circulate them in the public domain, but it also requires that the narrative of that past is 
discussed, remembered, and transmitted. 
4. Rationales 
The different conceptualizations which underpin the duty of memory that were 
examined in this thesis shed light on the underlying rationales of this duty. The taxonomy of 
these main underpinnings forms the conceptual basis. From the analysis of the different 
elements that constitute the duty of memory, it has emerged that, while distinct and 
autonomous, these rationales may – and actually do - play and interact to justify interferences 
of supranational decisions in the relation between a state and its history. Indeed, while in the 
course of this thesis, each component was consistently defined on both its legal foundation and 
content, it is argued that the different foundations of the duty of memory strictly bind, and 
strongly entwine with, each other and their contours often blur and overlap. 
The first rationale is the functional argument. It would appear to lie mainly in the right 
to information – or right to know –, in both its individual and collective dimension. It firstly 
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justifies the state duties to clarify, collect, preserve, and make accessible information about 
past human rights violations as enabling instruments to allow individuals to exercise civil and 
political rights and freedoms, and the society to pursue legitimate interests. The rights to 
education and culture, which were only mentioned as avenues for future research in this thesis, 
can also be encompassed in this rationale. For instance, without a state duty to preserve and 
disclose historical records of the periods of violence, individuals would struggle to obtain 
information about past violations to vindicate their rights. This has been widely demonstrated 
by the examples discussed in this work of countries which adopted classification regimes to 
silence narratives of their ‘dark past’, and to block their circulation in the public sphere. In 
those situations, even many years after the end of the violations, a pattern of impunity was 
generally maintained, also due to the lack of information publicly available for lodging 
complaints before the appropriate body. The functional argument further explains the 
relationship between the duty of memory and freedom of opinion and expression. On matters 
of general interest – as patterns of state-sponsored violence committed in the past certainly are 
–, to deny the state obligation to inquiry into historical injustices, disseminate the findings, and 
allow plurality of voices to discuss them would deprive individuals of their right to form an 
opinion free from prejudice and bias about those events, and the public to exercise democratic 
control over the government’s politics of the past. Finally, the duty of memory is functional to 
identity.In Memory and Identity, Pope John Paul II claims that, through memory, human 
beings model their sense of identity, both at the collective and the personal level.
745
 In the first 
part of this thesis, the link between memory and identity was discussed. It was noted that the 
processes of working through the past and the attribution of symbolic meanings to past 
traumas are essential steps in the construction of collective identities. Moreover, at the 
individual level, knowledge of one’s own history is crucial in the construction of the 
individual self. Massive human rights violations are founding moments of this process of 
identity building, both at the collective and at the individual level. Indeed, narratives about 
those constitutive moments ultimately define the identity of a people and its members. Access 
to the past – in the sense of access to information about those founding moments – is therefore 
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a precondition for the enjoyment of a number of personal rights related to identity. From this 
perspective, the duty of memory acts at the level of primary rights. 
The second conceptual underpinning of the duty of memory is the remedial rationale. It 
firstly rests upon the healing nature of memory. Public forms of commemorations are seen as 
instruments to publicly restore victims’ dignity and to allow victims’ mourning. As such, they 
can play a therapeutic role in the individual process of coming to terms with past traumas. 
This was the main argument used by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to justify the 
commemorative remedial orders issued in its extensive case law; this argument, admittedly, 
may be disputed in consideration of the equally important role of forgetting in the healing 
process of victims’ rehabilitation, which should also be carefully considered from a 
psychological point of view. Yet, the healing function of memory works mainly lies in the 
public recognition they provide. Official acknowledgment of the victims’ narratives of trauma 
is in fact the core of the remedial character underlying the duty of memory. Yet, not only 
commemorations strictu sensu, as were examined in the corresponding section of this work, 
but also the official clarification, public disclosure, and acknowledgement of the historical 
truth about the abuses are powerful instruments of individual redress. As was discussed in the 
appropriate section, this was one of the rationales put forth by human rights bodies when 
requiring states to carry out investigations and disclose information, especially in cases of 
enforced disappearance. The remedial rationale therefore moves the duty of memory to the 
level of secondary norms. 
The third rationale supporting the duty of memory is the preventative argument. It 
closely relates to the pedagogical dimension of memory. From this perspective, it is posited 
that the work of reading, interpreting, discussing, and remembering the history of mass abuses 
would constitute a guarantee against their repetition in the future: Never Again! The 
corresponding state duties that the duty-to-memory-puzzle entails are useful to transpose that 
aspirational guarantee into public actions. This argument is controversial, since it can be 
disputed that a society that remembers the wrongs committed in the past will not repeat them. 
Yet, it is a commonly shared view that the knowledge of past atrocities and the suffering they 
caused would have a deterrent effect on its repetition. In this rationale, the role of education is 
crucial. On this basis – and correctly in my view -, the preventative rationale was used by 
international bodies as a powerful argument to push states to clarify historical injustices and to 
transmit the lesson learnt as a warning to future generations. Many soft law instruments and 
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court decisions discussed in this study indeed resorted to this rationale to substantiate 
interferences with the states’ discretion in managing information about serious human rights 
violations. Within the realm of secondary obligations, the duty of memory fits squarely within 
the category of guarantees of non-repetition. 
Grasping the conceptual justifications that underpin the duty of memory is important 
not only for providing a theoretical foundation, but also to define the scope and content of the 
specific behaviours that states are required to adopt in compliance with their international 
commitments concretely. The concrete content and shapes of the memories that will circulate 
in the society, in fact will be the result of the manner in which those behaviours will be 
performed in order to meet the specific goals for which they were prescribed. 
5. International Law as a Vector of Memory 
This long journey concludes with a twofold answer to the question driving this 
investigation. While there is not an obligation of memory as such, the preservation of the 
memory of massive human rights violations is seen as of paramount interest to the 
international community which is protected through international norms and by the 
supervision of international bodies. Accordingly, states have obligations in respect of the 
interpretation and representation of the past. 
This thesis has put forth the argument that international law is a vector of memory. In 
particular, borrowing the ‘presentist approach theory’ from the field of sociology and applying 
it to the international law discourse, it was posited that international law, by influencing the 
way states affected by patterns of serious human rights violations relate to their past, conveys 
human rights values and principles into the local and global memory-making processes. This 
study has presented some of the ways in which international law steps into the processes of 
production and circulation of knowledge about the past, regulating means which traditionally 
have been used by governments to select their own collective memories. Through these legal 
institutions, international law – as an interest-bearer of the human rights discourse – not only 
influences the process of reconstruction of identity for societies emerging from deep 
institutional and social crisis, but also contributes to the creation of a global memory, in which 
mass atrocities are portrayed as symbolic markers for the construction of a human rights-
respectful global conscience. 
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The impact of international law on the memory of mass crimes is twofold.
746 
On the 
one hand, through international courts and adjudicatory bodies which issue judicial accounts 
of the abuses, international law produces narratives and endows them with the authoritative 
seal of the law. Likewise, by encouraging or even mandating states to undertake official 
commemorations of specific traumas, it tells memory directly and carves it into the global 
conscience. In these cases, international law itself becomes a memory-maker. On the other 
hand, by regulating the production and circulation of information about the past, it indirectly 
impacts on the construction and transmission of memories at the social level. Considered from 
this perspective, international law acts as a facilitator of memories. This double interplay 
between international law and memory impacts on the production of memories both at the 
official level – the way national institutions publicly tell and commemorate the nation’s past -, 
and at the social one – in that it introduces and provides instruments for moulding narratives to 
be circulated and discussed within public fora. While in the first case it institutionalizes 
certain memories, in the second case it provides frameworks through which the past should be 
filtered and represented. In both cases, however, it defends the memory of the most heinous 
assaults to human rights against oblivion, as a moral imperative of the international 
community. 
Notably, by providing rules and standards for the production and circulation of 
knowledge about past atrocities, international law acts as a guarantor protecting against the 
political manipulation of the past and the imposition of official memories by governments. 
Yet, as this study has shown, placing the role of vector of memory on international law may 
eventually lead to worrisome shortcomings. Rather than acting as a safeguard for the 
democratic processes of working through the past and negotiating memories, it may end up 
crystallizing some narratives, masqueraded in the clothes of historical truths, through the 
language of the law. If international actors want to resort to international law to venture into 
the intricate and sensitive processes of making sense of past atrocities, and to perpetuate their 
remembrance in the striving for Nunca Mas!, they should refrain from the temptation of using 
the law as a weapon to write history and impose memories. When stepping into the relation 
between a violence-torn society and its past, international organs should be aware – and 
respectful - of the internal struggles for identity and reconstruction which their decisions will 
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impact upon. They should listen to the existing social narratives and understand their inter-
relations. In doing so, as interpreters and bearers of human rights values, international human 
rights bodies can refrain from playing the role of memory-makers, which impose specific 
interpretations of the past with a top-down approach, and rather embrace the role of memory-
facilitators, promoting and protecting the interplay of different voices involved in the process 
of rethinking the past. 
Let me conclude in the same way that this journey started. 
The passing of time imposes (...) the duty of remembrance and emphasizes the 
need for it. Each person has a “spiritual patrimony” to preserve, hence the need 
to cultivate memory to preserve identity, both at personal and collective levels. 
Oblivion enhances the vulnerability of the human condition, and cannot be 
imposed (not even by “legal” contrivances, such as amnesty or the statute of 
limitations): there is an ethical obligation of remembrance. 
747
 
This ethical duty progressively seems to emerge as a legal duty for states. This thesis 
has indicated some of the routes through which this process is taking place in the international 
legal discourse. Yet, more pieces could be identified to complete the puzzle, and ethical 
considerations about the possibility of framing a duty of memory in legal terms should be 
addressed in other milieux. The end of this journey, hence, opens up new directions for the 
next expedition. 
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